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ABSTRACT The thesis is a systematic study comparing the ordinary human soul 
to the human soul of Jesus Christ as the model. Since the time of the pre-Chalcedon 
controversies, the tension arising from the relation of the human being of Jesus with 
the divine Being of the Son of God is the subject of intense debates. One aspect of the 
debate questions the relation of the human soul of the historic Jesus with his pre-
resurrected human flesh and his resurrected body. In answer to this tension, the 
thesis claims that the divine Christ and his human soul enact an essential unity with 
the ordinary human soul. The thesis develops a Thomistic definition of the human soul 
and argues that Jesus’ human soul is the causal exemplar of the ordinary human soul.  
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To assist the reader I have copiously employed footnotes to explain the technical 
arguments of the thesis. For the person unaccustomed to the works of Thomas Aquinas 
(1225 – 1274) the sections on The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis and the 
Summa theologiae, Chapter 2, may be of assistance.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
I propose that the introduction of the paired FOX P2 gene into chromosome 7 of 
the human DNA double-helix molecule approximately 200,000 years ago was a miraculous 
event.1 The paired FOX P2 gene is fundamental to the emergence of the rational animal 
named homo sapiens sapiens that in an evolutionary heartbeat would express itself as 
planet Earth’s dominant species. Human inquisitors have always posed the question: 
“What takes place after the breath of one’s life ceases to function?” The responses to this 
question, and a multitude of other similarly framed queries, have laid the foundation of 
how we understand and form relationships between the human rational soul, the physical 
human body, and, a divine Creator. Instead of directly responding to this ancient question 
in my thesis, I regard its mirror image – what takes place well before the breath of one’s 
life begins to function? The answer to the latter question lays the foundational direction 
of my thesis. Very succinctly my question is: What role does the human soul of Jesus 
Christ play in the creation of the human soul? In this work I follow the theological and 
                                                     
1
 I prefer the punctuated theory of evolution rather than the gradual theory as the punctuation events 
frequently are caused by environmental incidences that mark critical changes in the evolutionary directions 
of species. I claim that a miraculous event occurred for the insertion of the FOX P2 gene into chromosome 7 
for several reasons. The first regards the unlikely probability that such an event could occur through natural 
selection without some external input. The chromosome 7 molecule is very stable and not prone to 
mutation of the order of inserting a new gene. In order to be successful the expression of the gene must be 
found in the copulating male and female of the human species in order for it to be functional. As well, the 
FOX P2 gene is responsible for cognition and language skills hitherto unknown on planet Earth. 
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metaphysical discipline inherent in the methodology of the Scholastic theologian Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274). 
The notion of a rational soul finds its source in the reasoned thought of the ancient 
Hellenist/Greek philosophers. The Greeks employed the term psyche/psuche which was 
later translated by Latin scholars as anima to describe what we call today the soul. In 
some measure there is little distinction between the Scholastic soul and the modern 
conception of the human mind. The diversity of the ancient understanding of the human 
soul and its relationships are with us today.  
Modern philosophers, scientists and theologians, understand the existence and 
structure of the human soul not much differently than did the ancient pagan philosophers 
and early Christian thinkers.  Modern theological thought still contains the dualistic 
concepts that God transcends the world as Creator to a created reality, and, that a 
distinction and separation between the body and soul exists whereby the body is seen as 
a corpse being dragged around by the soul.2 On the other hand are those who follow the 
philosophy posed by the ancient monists who are loosely divided into two camps, idealist 
monism, and, materialist monism. Idealist monism resembles neo-Platonism and the 
hylemorphism of Aristotelian philosophies, whereas materialist monism denies a 
distinction between body and soul.3 The dualist philosophy of Plato dominated Christian 
dogma until Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) not only resurrected the philosophical teaching 
of Aristotle, but transformed it into a foundation of a Christian understanding of the 
                                                     
2
 Tad Brennan, “Stoic Souls in Stoic Corpses,” in Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Dorothea Frede 
and Burkhard Reis, 390. (New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2009). I will refer to the human soul in 
the neuter gender since the human soul as a principle of being is asexual.  
 
3
 Catholic Encyclopedia, Monism http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10483a.htm (accessed 12 May 2011). 
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Triune God. I intend in my thesis to employ the Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphic 
philosophy to construct my interpretation of relation between the ordinary human soul 
and the human soul of Jesus Christ.   
I have formulated three hypotheses that assist me to determine the scope of what 
I consider is a fresh approach to apprehending the relation between the human soul and 
Jesus Christ’s human soul. The proofs relating to my arguments are elaborated in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Briefly, the two core hypotheses for Chapter 2 are: That the ordinary or 
fallen human soul suffers an additional potency due to its separation from God which is 
analogically recorded in Genesis 3:21 as the garments of the skin of the animal.4 I propose 
that the pre-lapsarian human matter-soul relations are different than the fallen human 
matter-soul relations. The differences are one of degrees of potency as a consequence of 
original sin. An immediate question is therefore: Should the human matter that the 
human soul informs be seen as potency or an added substance that entangles actuality 
with potency? Thomas Aquinas, and, in a brief but critical illumination, Duns Scotus, 
(c.1265-1308) provide some relief to this dilemma.5  Aquinas understands the relation of 
                                                     
4
 Michael. D Coogan, ed., The New Oxford Annotated Bible 3
rd
 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 16. Please note that all biblical references are from this edition. 
 
5
 R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students (Westminster, Maryland: The 
Newman Press. 1959), vol. 1. 154. Dunns Scotus was keenly interested in the notion of individuation as a 
perfecting principle and developed a comprehensive philosophy based on the ancient notion of ‘haecceitas’ 
or thisness. Although the thesis does not completely agree with Scotus’ interpretation of the haecceitic 
principle as the “source of individuation is … by a formal distinction… the ultima realitas entis [the final form 
of being].” The source of individuation in Scotus’ world is the consequence of original sin and that my 
conception of over-burden of the flesh of the animal viz. Genesis 3:21 necessitates animal matter 
(perception through the senses) for individuation which is contrary to Aquinas as found in Summa 
theologiae Ia Q. 84. A7. Additionally the three Persons of the Holy Trinity Who are differentiated through 
their Personhood and not through their substance and as such are a community of self-communicating 
Persons. I argue that humanity, created in the imago Dei, is also meant to be a community of persons with a 
necessary self-communicating principle which is negated due to the individuating thisness of fallen human 
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the human soul to the human body as “the substantial form of a physically organized 
body”6 which describes the present human condition accurately. However, I diverge in one 
critical aspect of Thomas’s metaphysical construction of the human person as a 
hylemorphic composite of body and soul. I hypothesize that my understanding of the 
Aristotelian composition of the person differs from Aquinas’ interpretation of the relation 
between the matter (potency) of the body and the actualizing principle of the body, the 
human soul. My sense is that Thomas understands the human soul as an entity that is 
substandard due to original sin. Instead, I take the position that it is the human soul’s 
relation with its body, a body now burdened with an added potency that now hides the 
soul from its own gaze. In other words this added potency degrades the human soul’s 
ability to properly correspond with, and, be fully aware of the natural order and God. My 
notion seems to be in contradiction to Scripture as God queries how the Adamic couple 
knew they were naked. My counterpoint here is that the added potency of animality, the 
garments of skin of animals, hides or has extinguished the luminosity of the properly 
actualized pre-lapsarian body. The hypo-added potency I ascribe to the matter of the body 
renders the common human soul to the corporeal realm more so than the pre-lapsarian 
couple and the earthly Jesus who enjoy a fullness of reality.7 In my scheme the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                                                 
flesh. I also argue that a community of persons is a necessary condition of the original human soul and of 
the Christ human soul. I develop this hypothesis further in Chapter 2 and complete it in Chapter 3. 
 
6
 Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Translated as On the Uniqueness of Intellect 
Against Averroists by www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8246/, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeUnitateIntellectus.htm (accessed 04 April 2011). 
 
7
 I do not contend that the human soul is devoid of the ability to be aware, however, two issues are of 
concern. The first is that, as Thomas Aquinas and others teach, closeness to God requires an exemplar moral 
behaviour. The second is that mystics exist. Saints such as Brother St. Andre of Montreal seem to function 
with an awareness of the presence of God, or the nature of a poor soul’s illness that requires healing, not 
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soul’s abilities are extrinsically and apparently diminished, thus reducing its power to 
obtain knowledge either of the world or of spiritual beings. Thomas states that “In the 
present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible (sic) body, it is impossible … to 
understand anything actually except by turning to the phantasms.”8 I hypothesise that the 
necessity of turning to the phantasms is a consequence of the added potency to the 
human matter and therefore the proper or original human cogitative process is not 
through the phantasms. Finally, the Schoolmen proposed that the distinction of identity is 
through the haecceitic principle which I suggest is a consequence attributed to the 
ordinary human soul separated from God. Instead I propose that the fallen human signet-
matter is dependent on the haecceitic nature of the clothes of the skin of the animal, a 
divinely imposed privation, and not a principle. Therefore such privation is not proper to 
the human soul.  
The third hypothesis is presented and argued in Chapter 3 and is the most difficult 
to address. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that “two beings fully in act cannot 
form an essential unity” I hope to demonstrate that in the specific realm of the human 
soul such a unity is possible, even a necessary component of a proper teleological being. If 
I interpret Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on this subject correctly, then by necessity the 
human soul of Jesus Christ, fully in act, forms an essential unity with the divine nature of 
the Second Person of the Trinity and with his human body. Therefore, I claim that the 
Mystical Body of Christ is not an aggregate of human rational souls as citizens of a country 
                                                                                                                                                                 
unlike Jesus’ healing of the leper, or the cripple – the healing of the body being a signification of the healing 
of the soul. It seems our power to be aware is severely curtailed however. Note that potency is the 
‘negative’ of actuality and therefore to add to potency is to make it less, therefore the prefix ‘hypo-‘. 
 
8
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q. 84. A7, respondeo.  
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known through the natural order, but are formed as an essential unity known through the 
intentional order of existence. Although the essential unity of the two beings proposal is 
an overall aim of the thesis, many minute steps are to be taken, each with its own 
gratifying nourishment for the human intellect. The demonstration of, or, at a minimum 
providing new insights for the above three hypotheses, is what I term the illumination of 
the ordinary human soul by the human soul of Jesus Christ. The success of the thesis 
therefore depends on effectively arguing for these hypotheses.   
As seen from the above the subject matter of the thesis is decidedly conceptual 
and therefore cannot be written in a linear or chronological fashion; nor is it concise.  
The Purpose and the Problem 
The purpose of the thesis is to present a metaphysical and ontological speculation 
of the ordinary human rational soul9 illuminated by the human soul of Jesus Christ. 
Thomas Aquinas asserts that “an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in 
acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of 
living things.”10 
The ultimate ability to know the universality of being11 for the human soul is to be 
aware of separated and simple substances. The Thomistic notion that a human soul, 
                                                     
9
 The term, ‘rational soul’ is the Scholastic term employed to generally depict the human mind. The term 
‘ordinary’ refers to the fallen human soul/person of Genesis 3:23 which is the human being’s present state. 
 
10
 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima, trans. Foster, Kenelm O.P. and Humphries, 
Sylvester O.P. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), html edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P. 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeAnima.htm#11 (accessed 02 February 2011). 
 
11
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q.13. A11, repondeo. Aquinas clearly lays the foundation for how 
we should consider the universality of being. In God, who is pure universality the notion of form is 
incoherent since God is” being itself.” Aquinas agrees that there are degrees of universality and that “our 
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separated from the unity of its body, is not fully human is fundamental to Aquinas’ 
Aristotelian philosophy, otherwise it would be Platonism. Intertwined with such thinking 
is the age-old Scholastic question of how to reconcile truth, unity and being. Placing the 
Scholastic reconciliation issue within the subject of the thesis, the object of the thesis is to 
demonstrate how the individual human composite may be reconciled with the belief of 
the unity of the Body of Christ.12 The object of the thesis takes place in the crafting of a 
metaphysical understanding of Christ’s human soul’s role in the creation of the human 
soul. Aquinas points to me the correct general direction. 
“On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same 
disposition of things in being and in truth.” Summa theologiae Ia Q. 16 A3 sed 
contra. 
 
However, Scripture tells us that Jesus is the “the Way, the Truth and the Life…” (John 
4:16) Is Jesus speaking symbolically, or does a substantial reality associated with Jesus’ 
viaticum exist?13 Thomas responds to the sed contra:  
“As good has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. 
Now everything, in as far as it has being, is to that extent knowable. Therefore it is 
said in the book on the Soul that "the soul is in some manner all things," through 
the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is 
the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds 
relation to the intellect.14 
                                                                                                                                                                 
intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life.” Therefore the human soul is created with 
attributes that provide for such knowledge.  
 
12
 Many will view that the Body of Christ is an aggregate of human souls/persons which is a universal such as 
the term ‘humanity’ that is in essence an aggregate of individuals. Such a notion is based on the Nominalist 
philosophy. The thesis takes the Realist stance in that there is a real unicity amongst the members with 
Christ. John 17: 22-23.  
 
13
 The literal translation of viaticum is ‘food or provisions for a journey’.  
 
14




By concluding that true adds relation to the intellect Thomas is also stating that 
the intellect is endowed with an intentional attribute or power. However, 
Thomas cautions us:  
“But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are many absolutely, and 
one in a particular respect, while with others it is the reverse. Now one is 
predicated as the same way as being. And substance is being absolutely, while 
accident or being of reason is a being only in certain respect. And so those things 
that are one in substance are one absolutely, though many in a certain respect. 
And so those things that are one in substance are one absolutely, though many in 
a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral 
or essential parts, is one absolutely, because the whole is being and substance 
absolutely, and the parts are beings and substances in the whole. But those things 
which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct 
absolutely, and one in a certain respect. Thus many [humans] are one people, and 
many stones are one heap, which is unity of composition or order. In like manner 
also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many absolutely, and 
one in a certain respect, since to be one in genus or species is to be one according 
to the consideration of the reason.”15 
In the above passage Thomas asserts that a tripartite mode of expressing the 
convertibility of being exists.16 The first mode refers to being (ens) absolutely, in other 
words, being that is substantial in its own right, such as a dog or cat. For now I exclude 
human beings because of the arguments I am developing regarding the human soul. 
Animals, for example, have a unity of being (singular, individual). It is not possible with 
present scientific knowledge and instruments to force two substantial beings together 
arriving at one composite.17 The second mode concerns unity per accidens. Particular dogs 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia-IIae Q. 17. A4, sed contra. 
 
16 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Of Being and Unity, (De Ente et Uno) trans. Victor Michael Hamm (edition 
by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), http://www.esotericarchives.com/pico/beinguni.htm (accessed 20 June 2011). 
Pico provides an informative and comprehensive treatment, including the historicity, of the notion of the 
convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’; ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ as viewed from the 15
th
 century perspective 
looking back to Thomas Aquinas’ work.    
 
17
 The thesis recognizes that it is possible to bombard certain elements with neutrons, for example, and 
create new elements which may be considered as O
18
 which is O
16 
and two neutrons that may be considered 
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and particular cats may enjoy accidental unity if they have the same colour of fur.  
Accidents such as colour enjoy intra-species, intra-genera etc., unity since the accident is a 
being that is contingent on the substantial being (entia) but unified with all similar 
congruent accidents. However, the canine and feline species are essentially distinct. 
 Therefore, a problem the thesis faces is that one could reason that the divine 
species and the human species are so distinct that they are unable to form an essential 
unity which is contrary to the Chalcedon formula in the case of the divine and human 
natures of Jesus Christ.  
 The final mode concerns a unity of essentia (nature) which is understood as a 
unity of logic or reasoning.18 We can abstract the animal-ity from the nature of the cat 
and dog, just as we can abstract the triangular-ity of isosceles and equilateral triangles. 
Under this mode of reasoning, Aquinas would deny that there is a real unity, a unity of the 
first degree between the Christ-soul and the human soul since it violates his notion of the 
integrity of the composite being; such a unity would make all who enjoy such a union 
identical to the being (ens) of Christ. In other words, according to Aquinas’ thinking, all 
Christians are unified and convertible to the being (ens) of the Body of Christ, just as all 
human beings are members of the homo sapiens sapiens species, or as citizens of a 
country, which is a nominalist view of reality.  
 Thomas’ thought presents a tension with my scheme as it may not be possible to 
demonstrate unity-of-being of individual human beings as the Body of Christ without 
                                                                                                                                                                 
as two beings fully in act that form an essential unity. However, the creation of a new animal fully cat and 
fully dog is not possible.  
 
18
 The thesis employs the term ‘final teaching’ broadly since within the mentioned quotation there are 
certainly more than three lessons from Aquinas.  
10 
 
elevating such human members to be Gods (sic).  Thomas would state that human beings 
as the Body of Christ constitute an accident-to-substance relation with Christ’s soul just as 
the colour of fur of a dog constitutes the same relation. The illumination of the ordinary 
human soul by the human soul of Jesus Christ, the thesis’ raison d’être, will be achieved if 
I can demonstrate that there is a true unity between the human soul and the human soul 
of Jesus Christ.  
Two centuries after Thomas Aquinas’ untimely death, the question of unity was 
still being debated. The Italian Dominican philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 
(1463 – 1494) replied to Angelo Poliziano (1454 – 1494) regarding a conversation the 
latter had with the Florentine Lorenzo de' Medici (1449 – 1492). The treatise, Of Being 
and Unity, most eloquently sets the structure of the problem I am addressing. 
“And if our unity is purchased by the enslavement of a reason submitted to the 
rule of the law of the members, that will be a false unity, since thus we shall not 
be true. For we are called and appear to be men, that is, animate beings living by 
reason; and yet we will be brutes, having for law only sensual appetite. We will be 
performing a juggling trick to those who see us, and among whom we live. The 
image will not conform to its exemplar. For we are made in the likeness of God, 
and God is spirit (John 4:24) but we are not yet spirits, to use St. Paul's words, 
(1 Corinthians 2: 14; 15:46) but animals. If, on the contrary, by grace of truth, we 
do not fall beneath our model, we have only to move towards Him who is our 
model, through goodness, in order to be united with Him in the after-world.”19   
(emphasis added)  
 
Pico’s work previews my Christ-exemplar concept that is vivified in the upper chamber 
encounter between Thomas the Apostle and the Risen Christ. The coincidence of Thomas 
and Jesus supports my concept that the ordinary human soul may apprehend a separated 
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 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Of Being and Unity, (De Ente et Uno) trans. Victor Michael Hamm (Edition 
by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), Chapter X, (edition by Joseph H. Peterson 2001), 




substance while still in its present state, that is, the human soul is united to a corruptible 
body. In order to counter Aquinas’ thinking on this subject I propose the following 
scheme. 
 The pre-resurrected Jesus was aware of the intimacies of all ordinary human 
souls thus by-passing the garment of the flesh of their bodies. In the Thomas-Christ event 
Thomas reciprocated Jesus’ call by being aware of Christ’s dual, but unified natures. The 
exchange between Christ and Thomas demonstrates how truth knowledge may be 
acquired, unity formed with individuated substances, and, how separated beings may be 
aware of each other. Following once again Aquinas who commences his teaching on this 
subject with a quotation from Augustine of Hippo, “our mind acquires the knowledge of 
incorporeal things by itself” leans to the notion that the human mind, that is, the human 
rational soul, may acquire knowledge aphantasmically.20  
Methodology and Scope of Research  
The primary methodology of the thesis is grounded in the metaphysics and theology of 
Thomas Aquinas. The process required to unpack and develop the concepts presented 
within the thesis is complex. The pertinent concepts were extracted from the literature 
and in some instances re-employed in a speculative manner employing Thomas’ 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q. 89. A2, respondeo, The mind does have the power to acquire 
knowledge. However, without assistance it does not have the power to discern absolute nor in many 
instances perceptive truth, which was lost during original sin. The thesis employs the following definitions: 
Perceptive truth is truth acquired through the senses – the soul does not have the power to separate form 
from matter, that is, in regards to the human soul, it is not aware of separate substances; knowledge truth is 
therefore defined as knowledge of material substance but is incomplete or termed ‘general truth’; 




metaphysical methodology and teachings.21  The re-employed concepts are prepared 
using specific teachings from Thomas Aquinas, primarily from his Summa theologiae. 
Other concepts are interpreted by the author of the thesis with assistance through the 
secondary literature from other theologians and philosophers. Still other concepts are 
presented in a new, but perhaps, controversial light. Modern commentators frequently 
detract from the objective and subjective nature of Scholastic metaphysical inquiry. 
Rather than detracting from such inquiry, I consider Thomas’s Summa theologiae not only 
an invaluable source, but also a rigorous theological and metaphysical methodology. 
Thomas employs both “a priori and a posteriori [reasoning], and the latter both in the 
objective and the subjective sense.”22 I am of the opinion that the exegetical skill of 
Thomas Aquinas surpasses not only his contemporaries but many who follow as well, 
even to the present.  
Thomas clearly states his rationale and structure of the Summa theologiae in the 
initial prologue to the Prima Pars, the First Part, and in the prologue to question 2 of this 
same section, respectively.  
“The teacher of catholic truth [my emphasis] […] [and] the purpose of this book 
[is] to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion in a way that is suited 
to the instruction of beginners.”  
And, the prologue to question 2 states:  
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 I find the work of two Thomist philosophers, Lawrence Dewan O.P., and W. Norris Clarke S.J., particularly 
appealing and therefore I follow their philosophies. 
 
22





“in our endeavour to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God. (2) Of the 
rationale creature’s movement towards God (Part II). (3) Of Christ, Who as man, 
is our way to God (Part III).” 
 The scope of the thesis is considerably less adventurous than the above prologues 
entail. The Gospel of John 4:16 records that Jesus informs his disciples that he is “the 
Way, the Truth and the Life.” I will therefore concentrate on the metaphysical relation 
between ‘truth’ and ‘Truth’ whereby truth is that which human beings perceive through 
their sensory apparatus, and Truth, which is the Incarnated Word, is not necessarily 
perceived through the senses. The notion that Jesus, as Truth, cannot be perceived by the 
ordinary human soul requires a complex and elaborate analysis.  
Thomas Aquinas teaches that being, goodness and truth are convertible. That is, 
each may refer to the other and still maintain the same meaning and metaphysical intent.  
The object of the thesis is to more fully understand how, or if, ordinary human beings are 
sufficiently aware to know truth or a truth-value, between one relation and another given 
that humanity’s fallen condition prevents the human soul from being fully aware of God 
and each other. The dichotomy between the ordinary human soul’s sensory acquisition of 
knowledge and truth, and, the Christ-soul, that acquires knowledge and truth in an 
apperceptive mode, (c.f. n. 93) must be resolved if I am to succeed in demonstrating their 
proper relations.  
The second quotation above introduces the thesis’ second limiting factor; the 
thesis is Christological in its foundational belief. Through Thomas’ methodology I attempt 
to apprehend a new relation between the ordinary human soul and the human soul of 
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Jesus Christ with the Christ-soul as the instrumental causal exemplar to the ordinary 
human soul. 
The section titled The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis provides an 
overview of the thesis’s metaphysical foundation. However, many who read through my 
enterprise may consider that Thomas Aquinas23 is a theologian who strictly projects the 
dogma of the medieval Roman Church. As such, readers may also consider that my thesis 
is steeped in Roman Catholicism. Although elements of Catholicism are inherent in the 
thesis, my major arguments are based on a catholic theological nature and a medieval 
metaphysical foundation. Thomas starts the section Treatise on Man in the Summa 
theologiae with an introduction that brings to light his and my theological philosophy.  
“Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to 
treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance. We shall 
treat first of the nature of man, and secondly his origin.”24 
 
In the prologue to the third part, Treatise on the Incarnation Thomas states:  
“Because our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to save His people from their 
sins (Matt. 1, 21), as the angel announced, showed to us in His own Person the way 
of truth, whereby we may attain the bliss of eternal life by rising again …”25  
The metaphysical thought of Thomas provides a rich methodology and a fertile 
ground to secure an understanding of the relation between the soul of the ordinary 
human person and the Trinity through the human Christ. The philosophical thought of 
Thomas Aquinas also provides a solid foundation to build an apprehension of humanity’s 
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 An interesting point the author of the thesis found in Thomas’s references to Catholicism is that he 
frequently employed the term ‘catholic’, meaning universal.  
 
24
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q. 75. 
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relationships. Finally, Thomas Aquinas’ theology conforms to the dogma of the Chalcedon 
Definition which explains the unity of Person and duality of natures of Jesus Christ as 
follows:26 
“The person or hypostasis of Christ can be viewed in two ways. First as it is in 
itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. 
Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it pertains to subsist in 
a nature; and from this point of view the Person of Christ subsists in two 
natures. Hence, though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are 
different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, 
in so far as one being subsists in two.”27 
The thesis is divided into three chapters and is portrayed within the framework of 
a Christocentric theology. In Chapter 1 I elaborate on the thesis statement and introduce 
the metaphysic background. In Chapter 2 I describe the metaphysical construction of the 
ordinary human soul as portrayed by Thomas Aquinas. In order to limit the scope of the 
thesis, I present only two metaphysical criteria which form the core of my arguments. The 
core attributes revolve around the mode in which the human soul acts as the forming 
principle of the human composite. I examine Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of how the 
human soul individuates itself, and, once individuated, what is the mode of acquisition of 
knowledge (through sensory perception) from its environment. The second part of 
Chapter 2 is divided into four sections that present the thesis’ metaphysical view of:  
 The essence of the soul and its relation to its first act and to truth;  
 The Origin of the Rational Soul,  
 Original Sin, and,  
                                                     
26
 The Council of Chalcedon (451) answered the questions arising from the heresies of Arius, Nestorius, 
Apollinaris and the Eutychian controversy etc. The Council determined that the divine and human natures of 
Jesus Christ are united in a single person.  A critical claim of the Council is that the “each nature being 
preserved and being united in one Person and subsistence.” (emphasis added) It is also the thesis’ intent to 
adhere to the Chalcedonian teachings. 
http://www.earlychurchtexts.com/main/chalcedon/chalcedonian_definition.shtml (accessed 02 June 2011). 
 
27
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae IIIa Q. 2. A 4, respondeo. 
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 The Metaphysical Consequences of Original Sin.   
 
The third hypothesis is presented and argued in Chapter 3 and is the most difficult 
to address. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that “two beings fully in act cannot 
form an essential unity” is a necessary consequence for human beings as proper 
teleological creations of God. If I interpret Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on this subject 
correctly, then by necessity the human soul of Jesus Christ, fully in act, is in an essential 
unity with the divine nature of the Second Person of the Trinity in the person of the Son of 
God. I prepared a vast literature base which immediately follows, in order to ensure a 
complete view is attained. 
Literature Cited 
 The concepts, claims and conclusions made in the thesis are fresh, somewhat 
speculative and perhaps controversial to the point that few theologians have dealt the 
subject matter in the same manner as the thesis. However, many modern thinkers have 
re-visited the dogma and proclamations promulgated from the Council of Chalcedon (451) 
and the ramifications of the two natures of Christ. I have adapted many ideas extracted 
from the work of modern thinkers to fit into the arguments of my thesis.  
 Aaron Riches examines the difficulty of the Chalcedon Father’s to resolve the 
dyothelite wills of Jesus, while Richard Cross, Josuha Bohannon, and Ivor Davidson, look to 
the metaphysic of the Incarnation concerning the issues that faced the Chalcedon 
framers. The primary question the Council of Chalcedon faced concerns the definition of 
the Person of Jesus Christ to be fully Divine and fully man. The quandary facing the 
Council members, and most interested theologians and philosophers of yesterday and 
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today, concerns the mode by which an Infinite Being could be unified with a finite man 
without falling into all the vagarities (sic) such a union would entail. Instead, I compare 
like with like; I compare the perfect soul of Jesus with the perfectly created but fallen-
from-grace-soul of the ordinary human person. However, most thinkers study the 
Incarnated Jesus in isolation from the ordinary human soul. I propose to the reader that 
one may be able to apprehend much from understanding such a separation and the unity 
the human soul once enjoyed with the perfected human soul of the Christ.   
 I employ, throughout the thesis, the methodology and the principles that have 
been most carefully argued, articulated and presented with the utmost integrity by 
Thomas Aquinas. As such Aquinas provides a toolbox of finely honed instruments for 
manipulating the metaphysical construction materials to explain or even to contradict 
dogma. The works of W. Norris Clarke, Lawrence Dewan, Anthony Kenny, R. P Philips, 
Robert Pasnau, and John Wippel have provided invaluable insight into the mechanics and 
relevance of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysic in present day thought. Still, the interest in the 
subject material, steeped in Scholastic metaphysics, is not popular outside of Catholic 
circles and therefore there is little in the literature that specifically relates to the thesis’ 
direction. For example, few in the modern world believe primary matter exists. Primary 
matter that which is fully potential and is responsible for the underlying constancy of 
identity during change, is not only a difficult concept to conceive, but most artisans 
outside the realm of metaphysics doubt primary matter’s existence. Therefore as readers 
contemplate my speculative philosophical concepts, such as, the concept of memory, that 
is, memory of ‘what it is to be human’, which, according to Augustine and Thomas resides 
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in the suppositum of God, and, since I compare such memory to primary matter, the 
reader must overcome an incredibly difficult hurdle.28  
 My secondary support draws upon and develops the works of modern scholars 
such as Mortimer Adler for his ideas on intentionality, Boris Bobrinskoy who articulates 
the unique Pauline notion of morphê “though he *Christ+ was in the form (en morphê) of 
God”;29 Sheldon Cohen assists by explaining how sensible forms are received in the 
passive intellect; Gregory Doolan unpacks the notion of the Divine exemplar cause;30 
Jason Eberl discusses the notion of the nature of human beings in the hylemorphic sense 
as opposed to the dualist version; Orestes Gonzales teaches on the act of being (actus 
essendi) of the soul; Aloys Grillmeier provides historical background for the relevant parts 
of the thesis; John Haldane argues for the integrity of Thomas Aquinas’ works, and, sheds 
new light on Aquinas’ employment of the active intellect, and finally, William Walton 
provides insight as to the awareness of one’s own being (ens).  
 Although the works of many ancient and modern scholars are considered, the 
foundation of the thesis relies on the works of Thomas Aquinas, especially his Summa 
theologiae. Although rarely, I also draw upon such works as: De Anima, Summa Contre de 
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 There may be attributes that are common between primary matter and the memory of what it is to be 
human residing in the suppositum of God which could advance the cause of Thomism. An immediate point 
that comes to mind is that primary matter as pure potency and if we conceive of unactualized memory as 
pure potency of the human entity, how is this tension resolved since God is pure act? The miracle of the 
creation of the universe is that a Being, that is pure act, creates entities inherently in potency to their act of 
being. Furthermore, primary matter being a constancy in change one can argue that the memory of what it 
is to be human also provides such constancy.  
 
29
 Boris Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic 
Tradition, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel (Crestwood, New York, USA: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999), 122. 
 
30
 Gregory Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes. (Washington, DC: The Catholic 




Gentiles, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, Quaestiones disputatae, De Anima, De 
memoria et reminiscentia, Quaestiones disputatae veritate which are employed sparingly 
to provide me with  deeper insights.  
 I concentrate on two sections of the Summa theologiae. The first concerns 
Thomas’s Treatise on Man31 questions 75 to 89. The particular questions relative to the 
thesis are: Q. 75, Of Man, Who is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance; and 
First, What Pertains to the Essence of the Soul; Q. 76, Of the Union of Body and Soul; Q. 
77, Of the Things which Belong to Powers of the Soul in General; Q. 78, Of the Powers of 
the Soul in Particular; Q. 79, Of the Soul’s Intellective Powers; Q. 82, Of the Will; Q. 84, 
How the Soul While United to a Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It, and, Q. 87, 
How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and all within Itself . 
 I gain much  insight from Aquinas’ Treatise on the Incarnation, Summa theologiae 
IIa IIIae. The particular questions employed are: Q. 2, Of the Mode of Union of the Word 
Incarnate; Q. 3 Of the Mode of Union of the Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the 
Person Assuming, Q. 4 Of the Mode of Union On the Part of the Human Nature Assumed, 
Q. 5 Of the Manner of Union with Regards to the Parts of Human Nature, Q. 7 Of the 
Grace of Christ as an Individual Man, Q. 9 Of Christ’s Knowledge in General, Q. 10 Of the 
Beatific Knowledge of Christ’s Soul, Q. 11 Of the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused In the 
Soul of Christ, Q. 13 Of the Power of Christ’s Soul, Q. 15 Of the Defects of Soul Assumed By 
Christ, and Q. 17 Of What Pertains to Christ’s Unity from the Standpoint of Being. I only 
reference Thomas’ work in the Summa theologiae regarding the Incarnation and I have 
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 I recognize that it is preferable to employ the more inclusive term ‘human being’ however in order to 
accurately refer to Thomas Aquinas’ work’s his notations are transcribed as he wrote them. 
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not developed the full structure as produced in Chapter 2 on the human soul. My intent 
here is not to continue Thomas’ thinking. Instead I wish to develop my own philosophy 
based on the hypo-potency of the clothes of the skin of the animal worn by the ordinary 
human. I have considered employing Thomas’ Incarnation treatises but this would change 
the form of my thesis from an ontological speculation into a dialectical oeuvre.  
 The literature cited reflects Thomas’ impact on today’s world of theology and 
philosophy. I explain my background reasoning and interpretations in the footnotes. I 

















CHAPTER 1  PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY CONCERNING CHRIST'S HUMAN SOUL  
The purpose of this section is to introduce of three contextual aspects of the thesis 
as it relates to the ancient and Scholastic thinkers. As such it is written to provide the 
reader a basic historical framework of the thesis’ content intertwined with its metaphysics 
and a conceptualization of the metaphysical undertones.  
The first aspect regards the controversies regarding the unity of being of the Second 
Person of the Trinity during the Apostolic and Patristic periods. The second provides an 
introduction to the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. The third provides the reader with a 
sense of the metaphysical issues that were prevalent during the thirteenth century 
Scholastic era.  
The controversies regarding the unity of being of the Second Person of the Trinity 
commenced approximately 350 years after Plato introduced to the ancient world his 
creation philosophy and model of the human soul found in the Timaeus as developed in 
the philosophy of the Jewish theologian Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE – 40 CE), also 
known as Judaeus Philo. Philo generated pivotal Platonically oriented commentaries to 
the biblical narratives which then form the foundation for dualist-type Christian thinking 
concerning the human soul’s relation to its body.32  
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 David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1986), 3. I 
start with Philo for several reasons. The first is his proximity to Jesus’ earthly existence. The second is due to 
his influence on the early and later Christian thinkers. Philo introduced Platonic notions to Christian 
apologetics and exegesis. His writings on the Logos are attributed to have influenced the writing of the 
Gospel of John. Philo provides excellent exegesis regarding the Jewish term eucharistia, in other words ‘to 
give thanks’ as it relates to God and the cosmological aspect of creation, especially humanity.   Eucharistic 
Christology the unity between YAHWEH and humanity (David T. Runia, “Philo in Early Christian Literature: A 
Survey” in Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum as Novum Testamentum Section III, ed. Y. Aschkenasy et al. 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 78.). Thirdly, the dogma of Philo provides a foundation for future 




“This mind, divine and immortal, is an additional and differentiating part of the 
human soul which animates man just like the souls of animals which are devoid of 
mind. The notion of God’s existence is thus imprinted in our mind that needs only 
some illumination to have a direct vision of God (Abr. 79-80; Det. 86-87; LA 1.38).”
33
 
The events surrounding the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ turned the Philonic 
harmony of pagan metaphysical distinctions of Creation and the soul, by the Demiurge, 
with the Pentatauch into a new play that fundamentally changed the way Christian 
thinkers consider humanity’s relation to God.34  
Philo is attributed with providing the foundation for the Christian understanding of 
the doctrine of the Logos as it applies to Jesus Christ, the Incarnated Son of God.35 Philo’s 
fusion of Greek philosophy and Hebrew faith comprehends the Logos as distinct from 
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 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (updated April 21, 2005), s.v. “Philo of Alexandria” by Marion Hillary. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/ (accessed 11 July 2010). 
 
34
 Andreas Schule, “Transformed into the Image of Christ: Identity, Personality, and Resurrection,” in  
Resurrection, Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael 
Welker, 224. (Michigan: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002). The notion of resurrection is 
complex, and is frequently biased through the culture inherent in one’s personal faith. Within this chapter 
Andreas Schule presents a notion of Wolfgang Pannenberg’s that “the problem of identity as the crucial 
issue of a theological account of resurrection.” The gist of the essay is that the concept of pre-resurrection- 
identity is divided into two camps. The first regards memory of the deceased that lives on in the community 
only. The second notion regards one’s identity that is not only immortalized in the community but also is 
retained in a separated and immortal soul. The thesis employs the latter distinction. The thesis presents an 
argument (Chapter 2) that the memory of what it is to be human (a scaffold that structures human nature) 
is posited in an eternal suppositum and that the memory of personal identity gained through life’s 
experiences are supra-imposed on the human scaffold and are retained for eternity as noted in Summa 
theologiae Ia Q. 69. A8 “But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it 
resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.  
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what 
belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, 
as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, 
when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now 
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God.36 One may also surmise that the reading of Genesis 3:21 “And the Lord God made 
garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them” may be interpreted as a 
natural distinction between the human body and its soul that is not unique to Greek 
philosophy.37  
There are myriad philosophies that may be chosen to further one’s understanding 
of the human soul. The triptych of dualism, ideal monism and material monism is 
particularly relevant since the individual panels differ sufficiently to complicate our 
understanding of the manner in which the human soul of Christ moves towards the 
ordinary human soul. Philo’s illumination of the Pentatauch with Platonic philosophy 
initiated a dialogue that influenced the work of early Christian thinkers such as “Clement 
of Alexandria, Christian Apologists like Athenagoras, Theophilus, Justin Martyr, 
Tertullian38, and Origen.”39 Their dialogue centered on the two natures of Jesus Christ as 
God and man as one person.  
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 Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) trans. John 
Bowden (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 30. 
 
37
 The Platonic notion of the relation between the human body and soul is an extrinsic relation. The clothes 
of animal flesh for human beings is not the extrinsic distinction as considered by most, but is an added 
potency due to the separation of humanity from God. The separation necessitates a haecceitic individuation 
of the human composite which is absent in the human Christ. 
 
38
 Jonathan Barnes, “Anima Christiana,” in Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Dorothea Frede and 
Burkhard Reis, 448. (New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2009). Jonathan Barnes picks apart 
Tertullian’s work On the Soul, written circa 210-213 CE, due to Tertullian’s lack of academic rigor. However, 
Tertullian argued that the soul is corporeal in its substance, which, at least with respect to its corporeality, 
resembles the Stoic view (he was not shy to employ pagan philosophies when it suited his needs even 
though he may have twisted them to suit his purpose). Many modern day philosophers and scientists who 
expound an atheist understanding of human nature also hold this same Tertullian understanding of the 
corporeity of the soul. Barnes also remarks that Tertullian’s work “is typical of early Christian 
philosophizing.” The point I am making here is that such work, and similar discourses by others, introduced 
a complex dialogue that complicated early Christian comprehension of the relation and substance of the 




The five centuries after Christ’s resurrection are marked with varying 
understandings of the unity of the two Christ beings40 – the sarx, denoting the earthly 
Jesus, and the Logos, denoting the divine Word. The distinction initiated by Philo between 
the sarx and the Logos, although intended for another purpose, would divide the early 
church. Ignatius of Antioch (c. 50 – 98-117), an Apostolic Father, brings to light the tension 
regarding “the unity of the two kinds of beings in Christ, Logos and sarx.”41 Ignatius’ 
apologetics foresaw the heretical divisions about to occupy the early church. Attempts by 
the Fathers of the Church, such as Athanasius, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Cyril of Alexandria, 
Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo (to name a few) to understand 
the relations of the Triune God, the Logos, the Logos-sarx, and the sarx, the Christ flesh, 
launched, in opposition, manifold philosophies and theologies from thinkers such as 
Apollinaris, Arius, Eutyches, and Nestorius (again to name a few). The tensions between 
these camps regarding the unity and distinction of the natures/person(s) of Jesus Christ as 
man and God shaped the agendas of Councils, Episcopates and Roman Emperors including 
the Council of Chalcedon (451) whereby the person of Jesus Christ defined as fully human 
and fully divine was formulated.42 
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 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (updated April 21, 2005), s.v. “Philo of Alexandria” by Marion Hillary.  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/ (accessed 12 May 2011). 
 
40
 I am employing the term ‘two Christ beings’ in order to differentiate from the Chalcedon formula of two 
natures in on person. My intent is to show that metaphysically it is possible to demonstrate the union and 
intimate relation between the human Christ and the Word.  
 
41
 Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) trans. John 
Bowden (Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975), 87. 
 
42
 The Council of Chalcedon (451) controversies related to the manner in which the formalization of the 
distinction between the divine hypostasis and the human nature of the Second Person of the Trinity and the 
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Apollinaris, Arius and the authors of other heresies are placed to one side while I 
briefly touch upon the Nestorius heresy since it is more relevant to the arguments of the 
thesis and also to today’s hermeneutics.  I argue for a concept of the human body that if 
applied to Jesus could be confused with a Nestorian heresy. The relation between the 
present human body, conceived as the flesh of the animal (cf. Genesis 3:21), although 
claimed by Thomistic thinkers as Aristotelian in its unity to the soul, instead, could be 
construed in a dualist body-soul philosophical mode. Furthermore, many of today’s 
Protestant faith traditions deny the notion of Mary as Theotokos which then introduces a 
Nestorian separation in the Incarnated Son between his divine and human natures. 
Finally, Aquinas cautions his readers against the subtle traps of employing analogies that 
unwittingly introduce such heresy.43  
Returning to Philo, David T. Runia unfolds a critical aspect of Philo’s philosophy. 
According to Runia Philo pays considerable attention to “the relation between the 
structure of the cosmic soul and the nature of the heavenly movements.”44  Through 
Runia’s research we apprehend that “man’s reason is not so much a fragment of the 
cosmic soul, but rather, for those who follow Moses in their philosophizing, an imprint of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
person of Jesus Christ was argued.  Apollinaris argued for a soulless Christ while Nestorius argued for the 
lack of unity between Christ’s two natures and so on. 
 
43
 Nestorius is attributed with the notion that there is a separation between the two natures of Christ 
resulting in two persons which challenges the claims of the thesis. The key issues are that there are 
multiform avenues which unwittingly promote separation of natures. Aquinas for example brings forward 
the notion of the habitus or Christ assuming human nature as a garment and he shows that this concept is 
another form of the Nestorius heresy in Summa theologiae IIIa Q. 2. a6. 
 
44





the divine image, i.e. the Logos.”45 (emphasis added) Runia continues to analyze Philo’s 
commentary on the Timaeus and Plato’s understanding of the divine Logos as “the cosmic 
soul being ‘stretched’ by the demiurge so that it completely envelops the cosmos’s body 
and at the same time wholly permeates it.”46  Philo’s cosmic soul in this instance is 
uncharacteristically un-Platonic and, although a stretch arguably provides some ground 
for the thesis’s hypothesis that creatio ex nihilo and therefore the creation of the human 
soul is an intentional act,47 which as such is a creative act stretching forth divinized 
through the Creator and mediated for humanity through the soulful act of the Logos.48  
Jean LaPorte furthers our understanding of the very early church via his treatise on 
Philo’s understanding of Eucharistia and its relation to the Christian Eucharist.49 I mention 
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 Ibid., 204. Although Philo nor others suggest that it is only Christ who is the imago Dei, the human soul of 
Jesus is the exemplar image through which all of humankind are imaged in the likeness of the Triune God. 
The Christ-soul, as the exemplar, allows for a particularly intimate unity between his human and divine 
natures while at the same time provides a degree of distancing which prevents all of humanity from being 
divinely incarnated. These concepts are more fully developed further in the thesis. 
 
46
 Ibid., 204. 
 
47
 I believe that the creation of the universe and the human soul are one act of the Creator. Can we envisage 
a scenario whereby the universe is created through the Word, but also with the human optic kept in mind? 
That is, the created universe is made through the lens of humanity, the human soul in order for the universe 
to have the properties benevolent to human life? “Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of 
creation (for it knows how God creates), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode…” ST IIIa Q. 13. A2, 
adversus 3. In ST Ia Q. 29. A2, respondeo Aquinas teaches that “According to the Philosopher substance is 
spoken of in two ways. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing; in this sense substance is called… 
essence. In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of 
substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is 
called the suppositum.” However, my reading of creatio ex nihilo is that it demonstrates Aquinas, as I am, an 
essentialist in philosophy. I make my case as follows. The case of the word nihilo is the Latin ablative case. 
The rationale for employing the ablative case is to define a movement from a source.  
 
48
 The writing of Philo is the earliest reference to the Logos in Christological contexts that the author of the 








Philo’s work for two reasons; Philo provided the foundation for much of early Christian 
philosophy as founded on Jewish faith and Greek, primarily Platonic, philosophy, and, for 
articulating “the world’s vocation of praise and thanksgiving.”50 Later in the thesis I 
develop a critical metaphysical entity, the principle of reciprocation, that although is 
independent of Philo’s articulation nevertheless one can see through Philo’s work the 
germination of such notions. I develop the principle of reciprocation in Chapter 3 as the 
acknowledgement, by the Second Person of the Trinity to his Father as his only begotten 
Son. Accordingly, the world’s vocation of praise and thanksgiving is rooted in the Son’s act 
of reciprocation. 
The early Christian apologists grappled with their understanding of the human soul 
of Christ and its relation to the sarx, the flesh of his body.  The Patristic dialogues 
concerning the sarx-Christ-soul unity bring into sharp relief ideas that fractured the early 
Church with each faction vying to impregnate the dogma of the Church with its particular 
understanding of the nature and relationships of the historical Christ as the sarx-Logos, 
particularly the degree of unity. The interpretations of such relations dominate the 
discourses of the Apostolic and Patristic thinkers who produced a multitude of ideas 
concerning the relation and nature of the human soul of Christ to his divine nature. From 
the beginning of the Council of Ephesus (431) to the Council of Chalcedon (451), we see a 
shift in emphasis from that of understanding and defining the human and divine 
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expressions of Jesus, to “the manner of the union.”51  According to Aloys Grillmeier, Cyril 
of Alexandria promotes the unity of Christ while Nestorius the distinction, “without 
wishing to deny the unity.”52 The relation between the human body of Jesus and his soul 
is more intimately unified than that of the ordinary person which has implications 
regarding Jesus’ self-identity, the independence of his will and the unity it enjoys with the 
divine substance. The metaphysical methodology necessary to advance the logic of these 
relations was not available until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when the Arabian 
translations and commentary of Aristotle’s work were discovered by Scholastic 
theologians. I have decided to employ the same metaphysical methodology in my thesis in 
order to provide a fresh view on the important elements concerning the relation between 
the human soul of Christ, as a truth-event in the creation of the human soul, and, his 
soul’s relation to his divine nature.  
 A predominant theme of the neo-Platonist Christian theologians was to secure a 
unity between the Christ as man and the Divine Christ in order to set the Chalcedon 
formula.  The dualist philosophy would dominate Christian thinking until the arrival of the 
Scholastic theologians and philosophers such as Albert the Great, (c. 1193/1206 – 1280), 
Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, (c. 1265 – 1308) a Franciscan who leaned towards Plato in 
his philosophy, Henry of Ghent, (c. 1217 – 1293) Godfrey of Fontaines, (prior c. 1250 – c. 
1306 – 1309) and Averroists such as Boethius of Dacia, (flourished in the 13th century) and 
Siger of Brabant (c. 1240 – post c. 1280).  
                                                     
51
 Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) trans. John 






Thomas Aquinas reconciled Aristotle’s metaphysics with Christian faith and 
established a new means of analyzing and understanding Scripture through a 
metaphysical method that is grounded in Trinitarian dogma. My interest is in the 
metaphysical logic by which Thomas comprehends the origin and relations of human 
beings. As such, Thomas’ thinking was nurtured by his contemporaries of Scholastic 
philosophy, or metaphysics, who were also keenly interested in the properties of being 
qua being; the conflict between individual and universal; the procession of the divine 
Persons, the unity or lack of unity between the two natures of Christ, and, the 
fundamental origin of humankind. These aforementioned interests are with us today and 
the underlying foundation of the thesis’ subject matter also touches many of the same 
Scholastic queries. However, as convincing as many of the Scholastic theologians were, I 
prefer the metaphysical thought of the 13th century theologian Thomas Aquinas primarily 
due to his treatment of the human soul’s relations and the rigor of his commentaries on 
the works of other thinkers.  
The Aristotelian/Thomistic human soul is so structured that inherent in its being is 
the ability to form unities.53 For example, the human soul and the matter of the body, 
termed ‘signet-matter’ by Aquinas, form a unity called the hylemorphic composite.54 The 
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 The term ‘composite’ finds its source in Aristotle and refers to the union between the human body and 
soul. The composite of body and soul may be loosely regarded as ‘person’. The composition comes about by 
the human soul, which is the first act of being, in-forming human matter. The human soul is the forming 
principle of human matter and as such forms a unity which is the person. The unity of the soul to its signet 
matter is intrinsically ordered. In order for the soul to act on the matter of the body the body must be in 
potency to the act. In a sense it is a blank slate on which human existence is written. Aquinas and other 
Thomistic thinkers frequently employ the analogy of the seed which is in potential to a tree.  Potency and 
act are modes of being. The seed is potentially a tree. A tree is a seed fully in act. If we reduce the notion of 
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inherent ability of the human soul to form unities is part of its formation as imago Dei 
which includes the interrelations and unity of the divine Persons of the Trinity. The Trinity 
forms relations amongst themselves only through unities since as such they exist with the 
same hypostasis. Since human beings are crafted in the imago Dei, I demonstrate the 
metaphysical steps required to show how the human soul forms its unifying relation. To 
more fully apprehend how the human soul forms its unifying relation I employ the notion 
of the human soul of Jesus Christ as the instrumental exemplar cause55 elucidating Christ’s 
causal act by employing the genre of ontological speculation.56  Thomas Aquinas’ 
methodology implies a foundation for the dogma of Trinitarian theology which is contrary 
to the notion of “individual”. However, the Scholastic understanding of the individual, that 
is, a unit within a species, looms large in the arguments presented below.57  The method 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the seed further still we see that the seed is also potency, or primary matter, and act. At this most 
fundamental level the primary matter has the ability to contain all the potential of a tree and so for living 
beings, especially human beings, Thomas signifies such matter as signet-matter. Prior to the seed being 
formed by the parent tree, it is in potency to physical existence and therefore the parent tree inheres the 
principle of its vegetative soul.   
 
55
 The metaphysical concept of the human soul of Jesus as the instrumental cause is complex and 
controversial. The foundation for this notion is more fully developed later in the thesis. For the time being 
the line of thought is as follows. It is the human soul of Christ that is the exemplar after which all other souls 
are made in the imago Dei. The human soul of Jesus Christ therefore is the instrumental cause of all human 
souls due to a particular principle of the human soul and that is the principle of reciprocation of 
personhood, which I claim is the proper mode of identity and individuation.  
 
56
 Klaus Otte, “Speculative Theology,” in The Encyclopedia of Christianity Vol. 5, 2008. “Ontological 
speculation sets ideal and material being in an original relationship and relates the subject of consciousness 
to its object.” The thesis topic is the illumination of the ordinary human soul by the human soul of Jesus 
Christ and therefore fits neatly into Otte’s genre. As well, the thesis is not purely metaphysically ordered. 
The metaphysics, as it was with Thomas Aquinas, supports the foundation of the theology of the thesis. 
 
57
 R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy: An Explanation for Students (Westminster, Maryland: The 
Newman Press, 1959) Vol. 1. 155. Phillips emphasizes that the notion of the individual is critical to one’s 
understanding of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical methodology and philosophy. Although Phillips’ insights 
are taken from his 1959 published book, Chapter 12, this pertinent chapter ‘The Individual’ may be read 
from the following internet link: http://www.logicmuseum.com/authors/other/phillips-individuation.htm. I 
recommend reading this concise chapter as it will aid the reader to more fully understand the thesis’s 
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by which I develop the metaphysical concept of an “essential unity” and the ensuing 
conclusions brings my arguments, that the relation between the ordinary human soul and 
its body is an imposed and improper relation, into tension with the various Scholastic 
understandings of human nature.58  
The Scholastic discussions that involve the notion of the individual are attempts to 
unpack the properties of an entity that may be similar to, or different from another entity 
of the same, or for that matter of a different species. In the thought of Thomas Aquinas 
the principle of individuation is the potency of matter and its relation to the soul as the 
forming principle. From a biblical and metaphysical view, as will be seen later in the 
thesis, I employ an understanding of the fallen human being that stretches Thomas 
Aquinas’ teaching on the subject.59  
Thomas teaches that the proper object of the human intellect and therefore the 
soul, that is, what the human soul naturally tends towards, is “the quiddity or nature 
                                                                                                                                                                 
arguments. The Scholastic notion of ‘individual’ or ‘individuation’ is explored in Chapter 1 to set the terms of 
the ordinary human soul that forms a determinate individual, that is, a composite extended in space-time. 
The thesis concludes, in Chapter 3, with a startling metaphysical twist that the human soul of Christ contains 
a property (“… person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is 
nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity” (Summa theologiae IIIa Q2. A3) that builds a relation 
between his soul and glorified body of un-terminated dimensions.   
 
58
 An issue that is critical to my line of argument regards the definition of an essential unity? I define an 
essential unity as that which as a hylemorphic composite, of form and matter, forms a self-sustaining entity. 
Therefore Michelangelo’s marble statue of David is an essential unity. A dog composed of animal soul and 
matter is an essential unity. However I claim that the ordinary human person is not a visibly apparent 
essential unity. The clothes of animal flesh imposed by God at the separation of humanity from divine 
presence in Genesis 3:21 necessarily impedes, or hides the ordinary human souls forming ability to form an 
essential unity. In other words the animal flesh of the ordinary human is the potency implied by original sin. 
 
59
 Briefly, original sin is signified through the narrative found in Genesis 3:21 and apprehends the “garments 
of skins” metaphysically as Aristotelian potency and theologically as separation from God. These notions are 
further developed in the thesis.  
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existing in corporeal matter.”60 Thomas also teaches that “In the present state of life in 
which the soul is united to a passable body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand 
anything actually except by turning to the phantasms.”61 Duns Scotus agrees:  
“Our intellect understands in this present state only things whose species are 
displayed in the phantasm. This is so either because of the punishment of 
original sin, or because of a natural correspondence in operation between the 
soul’s powers, in virtue of which we see that a higher power operates on the 
same thing that a lower power operates on.”62 
 
Scotus presents an opportunity at this point for a peek into the latter sections of the 
thesis. I claim, along with Duns Scotus, that the imposition of the clothes of the skin of the 
animal prevents the human soul from its proper object as a consequence of original sin. In 
other words the human soul suffers an added potency that prevents the human soul to 
fully actualize the human composite which is absent in the historical Jesus.63 According to 
Aquinas the acquisition of knowledge by the ordinary human being is through the 
phantasms which link the material aspect of the mind, the brain, with the immaterial 
aspect of the mind, the soul. Ordinary human knowledge is acquired through sensory 
perception. The earthly Jesus did not acquire knowledge uniquely through the phantasms. 
Through Adam humanity chose to acquire knowledge through the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil. Jesus did not. “Where did this man get this wisdom and these deeds of 
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 Robert Pasnau, “Cognitio n,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams, 295 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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 The thought that Jesus Christ being fully human by wearing the same fleshy clothes of the ordinary 




power?” (Matthew 13:54) Jesus’ acquisition of knowledge is through his heavenly Father. 
Metaphysically the mode by which Jesus acquires knowledge is crucial to understanding 
his independence from his unity with his divine nature without falling into the popular 
heresies of Nestorianism or contrarily Apollinarianism.  Furthermore I argue for the notion 
that all relations enjoyed by the pre-lapsarian humans were with and through their 
Father-Creator and as such enjoyed the same knowledge acquisition venue as Jesus. The 
sinless human being did not relate with the world and each other through the power of 
God, nor his essence, but in a sense through his eyes.64 As such sinless humanity was 
endowed with a gift of clarity that enabled the human rational soul to fully actualize the 
human esse as “the perfection of perfections.”65 However such is not the situation with 
ordinary human beings who, through Adam, choose the perceptive-sensory path of the 
tree of knowledge of good and evil.  On the surface it seems the perceptive-sensory path 
of knowledge acquisition allows the ordinary human soul to follow a sub-energetic venue 
(esse naturale) as opposed to the energetic venue (esse intentionale) of God.  
 According to Aquinas and Scotus, the ordinary human soul functions to the lowest 
common denominator which in Scholastic terms refers to the present state of the human 
composite, the powers of the soul, which operate the body, do so by employing the least 
energetic powers. I contend that the Scholastic interpretation is a mirage. Whether it is a 
higher or lower power employed by the human soul to enact a bodily operation, the 
human soul is impotent to offset the separation from God caused by original sin. The 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae  Ia Q.14. A1, adversus 1. “Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, 
nor a habit, but substance and pure act.” 
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potency of separation is not an added privation to the human soul but rather an added 
potency to human matter. The notion of added potency or hypo-potency of matter66 in its 
relation to the human soul is crucial to understanding the mode in which I employ the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphic philosophy. In these instances therefore, hypo-potency 
human matter, which is joined to the soul in the act of creating the ordinary human 
person, as such does not allow human matter to strictly obey the ordinary soul.  The 
soul’s impotence to overcome God’s imposition of the clothes of the skin of the animal 
therefore requires the unique mode of sensory perception for the human soul to identify 
and individuate itself which implies a dominance of the human body over the soul. The 
ordinary human being therefore has put on the animality of the animals that were to be 
dominated.67 The shift in consciousness or reality for the human soul therefore is from a 
mode regarding the esse intentionale realm to the esse naturale realm. In other words the 
shift entails the means by which the human person distinguishes or individuates 
her/himself.  
 The common Thomistic metaphysical understanding of individuation concerns the 
relation between the soul and body. This relation defines how the human composite is 
individuated or, from a modern perspective, how the person achieves self-identity. In this 
understanding, the body’s corporeal senses control that which the human soul 
apprehends. Yes, the present human body functions as described by Thomas Aquinas and 
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 I employ hypo-potency as an increased potency since increasing negative quantities is more negation and 
the term hypo- signifies ‘sub-‘. 
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 I employ the term ‘dominated’ in a charitable fashion in that the Latin root is from dominus, domini which 




Duns Scotus; however, such was not always the case. The original human persons did not 
acquire knowledge solely through the matter of the ordinary human body since it is not 
the proper object of the human soul. “for God created us for incorruption, (sic) and made  
us in the image of his own eternity.” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) We were made to 
dominate matter, not to be dominated by it. Bluntly put, the human soul’s proper object, 
which brings with it questions regarding individual identity and awareness, and, at the 
same time its ability to know the universality of being (ens),68 is to know immaterial 
entities such as God, angels and human souls. The aims of such a complex metaphysical 
analysis of the ordinary human soul therefore must be coherent and comprehensive. In 
Chapter 2, I concentrate on the Thomas Aquinas’ treatise on human nature as it concerns 
the body/soul relation. 
  Chapter 2 commences with an understanding of how Thomas Aquinas views the 
ordinary human soul and its relations. Following Aquinas’ teaching is a difficult and 
tedious journey and prone to varying interpretations. The first leg retraces the pertinent 
questions of the Summa theologiae emphasizing the relation between the soul’s act of 
being and its esse as it relates to truth, and the potency of signet-matter.  The second leg 
requires that we travel back to the source of the soul’s origin, that is, “…human nature 
began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature.”69 We then 
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 The term ‘universal’ employed here is contingent on the degree of perfection. The more inadequate an 
intellect is the less it can apprehend and comprehend concepts (universals) and therefore must rely on 
individual examples. Because fallen human beings perceive through the senses, the ability to be aware of 
the universal is limited. The thesis places awareness of the human soul by another in the latter category. 
The sinless soul of Christ, however, is aware of another’s soulful condition. For more on this topic the reader 
is referred to the Summa theologiae Ia Q. 89. A1. 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae  IIIa Q. 16. A6, ad 1. 
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climb our way up to the creation of the human person as found in Genesis 1:26, 27 and 
3:21 respectively, and then we slide down the rocky and twisting path through the 
darkness of humanity’s first sin. Finally, we crawl through the maze of the metaphysical 
consequences to human nature of original sin.   
In order to comprehend the metaphysical construction and nature of the human 
soul involves however the dismantling of two metaphysical barriers. Dismantling the first 
barrier provides the reader with the metaphysical apprehension of the ordinary human 
soul’s relation with the extra-mental realm as understood by Thomas Aquinas. The second 
dismantling sheds light on the metaphysical impact original sin holds over the ordinary 
human soul and by extension over the ordinary human person.  Overcoming the second 
barrier prepares the reader for Chapter 3 in which the metaphysical category of relation, 
as it pertains to the intimacy within the Divine Persons, is developed as a model for the 
human soul of Christ to illuminate the ordinary human soul.   
A metaphysical understanding of the ordinary human soul is critical to the 
coherence and comprehension of the thesis. In Chapter 2 I rely on several ancient and 
Scholastic metaphysical concepts of the ordinary human soul by comparing the Thomas 
ordinary human soul with the thesis’ interpretation and construction of what is arguably 
the proper nature of the human soul. I take the position that the proper human body is 
exemplified in the pre-resurrected and sinless Adamic person of Jesus Christ. As such, I 
favour Aquinas’ claim that Adam was created with “a supernatural endowment of 
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grace”70 (emphasis added) cf., Genesis 1. My own sense is that humanity, as 
supernaturally endowed of grace is more intimately related to the Trinity than mere 
participation in the divine Being. My aim in Chapter 2 is to bring us to the realization of 
what humanity has lost through original sin and metaphysically re-construct the human 
soul along the priestly prayer of Jesus. (John 17:12-26)  
We shall see in Chapter 3 that the divine endowment of grace in the creation of 
the human soul infuses a special kinship71 with the Divine. As such, I claim that human 
souls are created to be endowed of grace. Specifically, the human soul, as the human 
composite’s forming principle, inheres kinship with the Divine as part of the soul’s very 
essence.  
Chapter 3 is a systematic depiction of the divine relationship of Father and Son and 
the reception of God the Father’s gift of generation by the Son and his reciprocating 
acknowledgment as Son.72 Chapter 3 also unpacks a metaphysical understanding of the 
generation, reception and reciprocation between Father and Son which is necessary to 
apprehend the relation between the human soul, endowed of grace, and the Triune God 
through the causal exemplar illumination by the Son. Furthermore, unpacking the relation 
between the divine and human natures inherent in the person of the Incarnated Word 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q. 95. A1, respondeo. 
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 Lawrence Dewan, O.P. St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2007), 39 
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 The thesis employs the notion of the Holy Spirit as the Bearer of Gifts between the Son and Father, which 




provides some appreciation to my arguments for a new understanding of the human soul 
which is based on a unique principle inherent in the human soul of Christ. 
“Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because “It is united to flesh 
personally,” and not that It is changed into the nature of flesh [...] its 
[flesh] natural properties remaining.”73 [emphasis added] 
The unicity between the divine and human natures is not without controversy. Richard 
Cross unleashes a serious apologetic regarding the metaphysical contortions the 
Schoolmen contrived, starting with Thomas Aquinas and finishing with Duns Scotus to 
comprehend the divine-human union.74 I interpret Richard Cross’ reading of Thomas’ and 
Scotus’ metaphysical arguments as leaning towards Aquinas. I also rely primarily on 
Thomas’ teachings but with some enlightenment from Scotus.  
Following the notions presented in the previous paragraphs, the atypical nature of 
how I understand the human soul’s nature and its relations, reside in how I understand 
the composition of the human body and soul. I claim that the distinction between body 
and soul is as potency is to act, and therefore I do not subscribe to the Platonic notion 
that the body is in an extrinsic relation to the soul. Furthermore I contend that Aristotle’s 
hylemorphic pattern of form and matter is the proper mode of understanding the relation 
between the human body and soul.  
 The Schoolmen who followed the Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphic philosophy 
maintained that the main operational power of the human soul functions to obtain 
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Press: Oxford UK, 2002). Cross for the most part agrees with the metaphysics of Aquinas. Furthermore the 




sensible knowledge and form it into concepts called intelligible species which then can be 
manipulated through the agent intellect (the will) or stored in the passive intellect 
(memory). Though I am not in complete disagreement with the Scholastic mode of 
cognition, based on my interpretation of Jesus earthly role, the seemingly divine 
attributes inherent in saintly souls, I suggest that a prior and primitive function of the 
ordinary human soul is the awareness of the truth-knowledge inherent in another human 
being’s soul.75  The human soul’s inherent yet unavailable ability to be aware of another is 
not the same operation as that which is required to acquire sensible knowledge; such 
sensible knowledge is acquired through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. To know 
truth absolutely through the senses is not possible since ordinary human knowledge 
acquisition is incomplete, acquired in the past and distorted by these very same human 
senses. This notion, which is based on the work of Aristotle, is summarized by St. 
Augustine of Hippo. “[P]ure (sincera) truth shouldn’t be sought from the bodily senses.” 
Augustine’s work is analyzed in a treatise written by Henry of Ghent.76 Ghent’s treatise 
suggests that all of the Scholastic masters from St. Bonaventure (1217-1274) to the 
successors of Henry of Ghent adhered to this concept. Further to this rationale, Augustine 
also argued that the ordinary human soul only knows the image of the other which is 
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 Henry of Ghent, “Can a Human Being Know Anything without Divine Illumination?” in The Cambridge 
Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts Vol. 3, ed. Robert Pasnau, 94-95 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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congruent to Philo’s assertion that man’s reason is an imprint of the divine image.77 In 
other words, the ordinary human soul perceives only an image of the true human person 
and is unable to be aware of its fullness of being. How could the human soul of Jesus 
Christ perceive physical and spiritual realities? Is the human soul of Jesus similar in 
construction to the ordinary human soul? What is the distinction between the Christ-soul, 
pre-resurrection, and the ordinary human soul that allowed Jesus to perform miracles 
seemingly at will?  
Scholastic thinkers constructed a difference in the relation between the ordinary 
human soul and its body, and the Christ-soul and its corporeal body. Such a rationale 
suggests a distinction in type regarding the corpus Christi and the ordinary human body. I 
claim such a distinction exists. Because of his sinless nature Jesus’ earthly body was not 
confined by the clothes of the skin of the animal (Genesis 3:21) which I claim is an added 
potency, a negation to the ordinary human body-soul composite. The added potency 
causes a distinction of personhood that conflicts with the biblical record of imago Dei. 
(Genesis 1:26, 27)  
The concept of personhood amongst the Schoolmen concerns the relation 
between the living human body, which is perceived as an individual, and its imperceptible 
human soul (mind) that conceptualizes in a universal type mode. Notably the most 
famous theologian of the Scholastic era, Thomas Aquinas, taught that 
“… the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a 
quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter, and through such nature of 
visible things it rises even to some knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs 
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to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporal 
matter.”78 
In the same article of the Summa theologiae, Thomas claims that the human intellect is 
midway between the sensitive soul, that which allows human beings to perceive the 
natural world, and the intellect of the angels who perceive the immaterial and the 
material world immaterially – “the human intellect holds a middle place”.79 Thomas also 
teaches in article 7 that human nature exists in corporeal matter.80  
The Scholastics conceptualized the matter of the body as potency that is reduced 
into actuality by the human soul. Thomas also teaches that the human intellect holds a 
middle place between brute animals and the angels in composition and intellect. 
However, and I put this forward to demonstrate the direction of the thesis, humanity was 
created as the steward of the natural (esse naturale) universe. Considering humanity’s 
stewardship and the Divine Second Person of the Trinity’s union with humanity through 
his Incarnation, one would consider that the proper human soul81 is somewhat more 
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 Thomas Aquinas and all Scholastics including modern day Thomistic thinkers view matter as that which 
individuates, and that the human soul knows the created world through the phantasms. Human matter is 
that which perceives the natural world and therefore according to my argument there is potency imbedded 
in human perception. Designated matter is another but conveys more accurately the Thomistic term for 
human matter through which human beings perceive in the sensible world but also limits the act of the 
form. The human body further limits the forming act of the human soul due to the skin of the animal given 
to humanity in Genesis 3:21 imparted by God after the fall. The human body increases the potency of the 
pre-lapsarian human matter and therefore the human soul is unable to overcome this added potency. 
Although perhaps controversial, one could interpret John 9: 1-41 as Jesus signifying through the potency of 
mud his dominance over both created matter and the sightlessness of human perception which is analogous 
to humanity’s inability to see Truth/awareness. This argument is developed later in the thesis. The term 
‘brute’ is Aristotle’s name for non-rational desire. 
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 For ease of reference the thesis will employ the term ‘proper human soul’ as univocal to the original 
Adamic soul and except for the union with divine essence, enjoys common attributes with the human soul 
of Jesus Christ.  
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dynamic than midway between brutes and angels. Brute animals cannot offend God 
because of the absence of free-will, and the angels have chosen not to offend. 
Furthermore, humanity has been given a second chance but not through the immediate 
return to the pre-fallen human body.  
Humanity’s second chance carries with it the unenviable distinction of an epi-union 
with the brutes.82 Employing Philo’s thinking the epi-union of soul to body is nothing more 
that the dualist notion of separated states of being whereby the matter of the body is that 
which will be discarded at death and thusly free the human soul. Or, one may surmise the 
body-soul epi-union as humanity’s divinely imposed garment of the animal skin and 
therefore argue that the same state existed with the body and soul of the earthly Jesus. 
Such an attribution of separated matter in relation to the Christ-soul is certainly a 
Nestorian-based heresy. In contrast to the dualist-type heresy, Thomas Aquinas finds the 
source of his philosophy from the thought of Aristotle that is grounded in a unity between 
body and soul which, for the ordinary human, the garment of animal skin. Instead of this 
specific Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphic union I ground my thesis in the concept that 
ordinary human beings have a bipartite hylemorphic union; body, soul but also a negation, 
an added potency, which is the garment of the skin of the animal.  
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 I employ the term ‘epi-union’ to denote the additional potency, a potency that floats above the natural 
human potency which is received at humanity’s act of creation, of the clothes of the skin of the animal that 
habits humanity after the fall. (Genesis 3:21) Clothes by design ‘float’ above the person wearing them and 
although depict the shape (the form) of the person are not inherently natural to the person and hinder 
one’s perception of the enrobed being. I take the term epi-union from the scientific term ‘epi-genetic’ that 
refers to an enzyme or genetic peptide that ‘floats’ above the gene that performs the expression of its 




The Aristotelian hylemorphism of Thomas Aquinas finds its expression in a 
particularly critical facet of Aristotle’s teaching. Contrary to Plato, who separated the 
divine Idea, the perfect form from matter, Aristotle envisaged matter participating in the 
divine form. Thomas encapsulates for us his thinking on Aristotle’s insight:  
“… form is something divine and best, as object of appetite. It is divine, because 
every form is something of a participation by likeness if the divine act of being 
‘divini esse’ which ‘divine act of being’ is pure act: for, each thing just to this 
extent is actually ‘est in actu’, that is, inasmuch as it has form. It is something 
best, because act is the act of perfection of potency and good …”83  
In order to maintain the Aristotelian unity of being, Thomas crafted his treatises on 
humanity as though it is the proper state of humanity’s being which is contrary to my 
interpretation. From my analysis of Genesis 3:21 I conclude that the human soul-body 
relation suffers the additional potency of the clothes of the skin of the animal. In other 
words, the epi-union of the clothes of the animal, the brute, distorts the image of 
humanity.84 Contrary to my thinking Aquinas treats the present state of the human body 
as its proper state. In my view the added potency, which may also be understood as a 
further distancing from God, necessitates the human soul to acquire assistance from 
matter to individuate itself. Aquinas believed that it is natural for the human soul to be 
individuated by its matter. In tension with Aquinas I claim that the original human soul, 
having a higher degree of governance over the body, would not have relied solely on the 
relation with the body for identity nor to individuate itself since “the body was entirely 
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subject to the soul.”85 Therefore the supra-imposed potency forces the human soul to 
enact a mode of actualization for which it was not formed to enact perfectly. Instead, the 
original individuation mode of the human soul is through the act of the will, an act of 
intentionality, which is of the same ontological construction as the act of creation by the 
Creator, since human beings are created in the image and likeness of God. Genesis 1:26, 
27. 
“On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the 
will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, 
to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought." Therefore intention is an 
act of the will.”86 
By extending Augustine’s scheme to Jesus’ sinless human soul we are in a better position 
apprehend the nature of humanity. For such an apprehension we must determine the 
type of relation the human soul of Christ engenders with being, unity, and truth, and, with 
the ordinary human soul.  
Thomas Aquinas teaches that the nature of the human soul of the pre-lapsarian 
humans is not dissimilar than the soul of present day humans. We see from Genesis 1 that 
the initial relation between human beings and the Creator was meant to be a long-term 
stewardship of the Creator’s physical creation which includes immaterial modes of 
communication. With humanity’s fall from grace the ordinary human soul acquires 
knowledge through the senses. In its fallen condition, the ability of the human soul to 
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perceive truth is curtailed. The human soul is separated from God in a manner that 
reduces the soul’s ability to be absolutely aware of not only itself, and, the souls of other 
human beings, but of separated substances as well.87 Therefore humanity’s proper state 
of being is univocal with the human nature of the pre-resurrected Jesus Christ. Jesus’ 
human soul did not suffer the overburden of the potency of the flesh of the animal. In fact 
Jesus’ human soul enjoys priority through its unity with his divine nature. As we shall see 
in Chapter 3, since Jesus did not taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil, his knowledge acquisition process does not follow the same operating principle as 
the ordinary human soul. In other words, the human soul of the earthly Jesus was not 
subject to the errors inherent in the ordinary human sensory perception process. The 
earthly Jesus acquired his knowledge of the world through the divine or intentional mode 
of knowledge. Jesus acquired such knowledge through the eyes of his Father:  
“I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. … the intelligent 
being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the 
idea of the thing known is in the knower. […] Since therefore God is in the 
highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q[7], A[1]), it follows that He 
occupies the highest place in knowledge.”88  (emphasis added)                           
 
Understanding the metaphysical differences between the ordinary human soul and the 
Christ soul may resolve the dichotomy of the two soul’s knowledge acquisition processes 
and therefore provide the illumination of the ordinary human soul I seek. Let us recap the 
preceding entailment. 
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Thomas and other Schoolmen studied the human person in its present fallen state 
as the proper mode of being.89 In tension with this understanding, I maintain that 
humanity’s proper mode of being is a union of the sinless human soul and its  designated 
matter which enjoys attributes that have not been nullified by the ordinary human soul’s 
fall from Grace. The degrading potency of the epi-union of the clothes of the animal skin 
imposed by God prior to humanity’s expulsion from the Garden, causes a diminution of 
the soul’s powers due to the epi-layer of potency, and not from a degradation of the 
soul’s inherent principles and powers. Humanity’s animal-skin garment prevents the 
proper and full reduction of the potency of matter which was to be more fully actualized 
in the fullness of the imago Dei.  In a similar but more adventurous vein, I claim that the 
relation between the human soul of Jesus necessitates an absolute awareness of the souls 
of whom he ministered during his earthly presence since he did not suffer the distancing 
potency of the clothes of animal skin.90  
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 To emphasize, the animal skin is analogous to the distancing of the human soul from God. If one regards 
creation as an ontological continuum, with pure potency (primary matter) on the left and angels on the 
right, the human condition was shifted at the fall from being more on the left side of this continuum to 
being more on the left. We read in Genesis 2:7 “… the LORD GOD formed man from the dust of the ground…” 
which can be analogically interpreted as being formed by the same matter-foundation as the totality of the 
earth itself which in metaphysical terms is fully actualized. I conclude therefore in this creation mode the 





Thomas asserts that the main purpose of the human intellect is to know or 
understand that which human beings sense. However, Jesus was quite able to acquire 
knowledge of the things invisible, such as the state of the soul of the Samaritan woman. 
What are the attributes of his human soul that provided such awareness? Contrary to 
Jesus’ human soul being the primary actor, most would propose that the divine Second 
Person commands Jesus’ act of being aware by communicating His commands to the 
passive human nature of Jesus. Rather, I take the stand that Jesus’ soul functions in an 
active mode of intra-soul awareness. The act-of-being-aware is the normal or proper 
actualization attribute of not only Jesus’ human soul, but is an attribute of all human 
souls. The difference being that human souls subjected to the consequences of original sin 
are entombed in the garment of the skin of the animal thus voiding the ability of being 
aware of spiritual beings. The act-of-being-aware, such as Jesus’ ability to be absolutely 
aware of his or other human souls, necessitates a special relation with the Trinity. In 
contrast to the ordinary human composite, which is individuated through the relation of 
body and soul, the human soul of Christ is, by necessity, in a formal relation with the 
Trinity and, is in a causal exemplar relation with the ordinary human soul.91  I claim that 
the human soul of Christ is the instrumental cause of the exemplar metaphysical 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia Q. 14. A8. “On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not 
because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, 
therefore they are." We can apprehend from St. Augustine’s teaching, which St. Thomas agrees with, that 
God employs his intellect to create. What is important to the theme of the thesis is that there is a priority of 
events. The knowledge of ‘what it is to be human’ lies within God’s intellect. This knowledge once united 
with his will creates the essential unity called a human being. However, as will be shown further in the 
thesis, there is a principle that is primary to the Divine Son and that is the principle of reciprocating love. It is 
the principle of reciprocation that forms essential unities between beings that are fully in act and it is the 
Son Who is primary in the reciprocating principle as the causal exemplar for humanity to reciprocate the act 
of love of being created. I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that it is the human nature of Jesus that is the 
instrumental cause of reciprocation in the human soul.  
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operation that allowed the human soul of Christ to be fully aware of the soul of another 
with the Son being the primary exemplar cause,92 not in a direct hand-to-instrument 
fashion, but, in a general-to-specific mode. The reciprocating and exemplar relations 
employed by Christ are unpacked in Chapter 3.93 We will see, starting in Chapter 2, the 
mode of cognition of the ordinary human soul by unpacking the Schoolmen’s 
understanding of cognition theory as is clearly expounded by Thomas Aquinas and 
compared to the thesis’s hypothesis of the additional potency imputed to the human soul 
at the fall.  
The Metaphysical Construction Blocks of the Thesis 
The main arguments of the thesis are sufficiently complex that they require a 
skeletal frame onto which to grow the flesh of the thesis. Therefore, this section provides 
the reader with an overview of the metaphysical chromosomes that I employ to construct 
the thesis’ ontological speculative aspects. This section consists of five parts that do not 
necessarily follow a logical sequence as they are intertwined to the extent that if one part 
of the frame is missing the whole skeletal foundation becomes incoherent.   
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 Gregory Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes (Washington, DC: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2008), 2. Gregory Doolan determines that a critical theme of exemplarism is the notion of 
similitude between the origin of the created being and the degree of likeness of the image to which the 
created being enjoys. According to Doolan Aquinas states that proper exemplarism is that it acts as a 
principle. Therefore the first exemplar is the principle by which the images are made, as in several 
photographic prints of the same negative. The prints are images and not exemplars. Therefore there is only 
one exemplar for one idea. The critical element for the thesis is that the human soul of Jesus Christ is the 
exemplar of the divine Son, and for the believing Christian, the ordinary human soul is an image of the 




Firstly, I introduce the reader to the grounding pillars of metaphysics regarding the 
inter- and intra-relations of simple and composite rationale beings. I also introduce the 
reader to the origin of the human rational soul and the rational human composite. An 
overall theme of the first part of this section is the unicity of the relations and their 
degrees of reality. Essentially Thomas Aquinas defines reality as the degree to which a 
thing can be distinct. I formulate metaphysical construction blocks that prepares the 
reader to appreciate the mode by which the human soul participates in its own act of 
being and therefore its relation with its Creator.  
Secondly, I present the mode of intertwined relations of the intentional and 
natural realm whereby simple and composite beings exist. The apprehension of the 
intentional and natural realm of existence provides the means for the reader to discover 
the notions of distinction, individuation and personhood. I follow the Aristotelian-
Thomistic teaching that the human soul is the principle of the first act of being and 
therefore has specific relations both in the created realm, the realm of corporeality, which 
requires the employment of perception to gain knowledge and to be aware of one’s 
surroundings, and, the spiritual realm, which requires apperceptive94 relations. These 
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 Immanuel Kant expressed the notion of transcendental apperception which makes experience possible 
and it is where the mind and the world come together which is not unlike Franz Brentano’s concept of 
intentional inexistence. However, the thesis employs the term ‘apperception’ as not employing the 
perceptive senses as one would use the word apolitical to denote non political but as “fully conscious 
perception: an immediate apperception of a unity lying beyond” (Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Edition, 59) that 
in this instance is NOT employing the senses. Furthermore the above-mentioned quotation from Paul’s 
Letter to the Ephesians 1:17, the ‘spirit of perception’ may be interpreted as apperceptive awareness, or to 
borrow from Kant, a transcendental apperception of a different order. Apperceptive awareness which, with 
regards to the human soul of Christ, is that property that allows his human soul to be fully and directly 
aware of the ordinary human soul. It is the apperceptive operation that explains Jesus’ ability to be aware of 





realities in Thomism, which are linked in the human mind and are extensions of the first 
two, is esse naturale, the world to be perceived and its partner esse intentionale, the 
realm of the mind that perceives the world. The unicity of these metaphysical realities 
and substances with regards to the human composite do not enjoy the same ‘oneness’ or 
harmony as the human nature of Jesus Christ. Therefore I examine the degree of 
distinction in the third section in order to appreciate the metaphysical substratum 
supporting these concepts. 
Thirdly, I analyze the intentional and real modes of distinction. Specifically I 
compare the realities of the mind with the realities of the brain. Here I bring together the 
seemingly diverse metaphysical construction blocks to better understand the human 
soul’s relations and modes of reality. I employ the modern terms de re and de dictum 
modes of reality to demonstrate the separation between the intentional and natural 
realms of existence.95 I also introduce the notion of the unifying relations inherent in the 
Christ soul which is consistent with his divine nature and is imaged into the ordinary 
human soul at its creation.  I ground my arguments in Thomism to formulate a fresh 
understanding of the unifying power of the Christ soul on the reciprocating principle of 
identity and love inherent in the Second Person of the Trinity. The principles of identity 
are then imaged into the human soul during its act of being. Citing Aquinas, the human 
soul of Christ, and ordinary human souls are created in the image of the Trinity. 
“An image of the Trinity is found in the soul not only with respect to the soul’s 
powers, but also with respect to its essence; for the one essence of the three 
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persons is represented in the soul, although in a very imperfect way. Moreover, 
if the soul were its powers, its powers would differ from each other in name 
only. Consequently the distinction between the Persons which is found in God, 
is not adequately represented [in the soul].”96 
Fourthly, I develop, in an analogous fashion, the notion of the exemplar act the 
artist employs in creating an objet d’art, as a means to demonstrate how the divine-soul 
fusion is unified through the notion of divine exemplarism as it relates through the Father, 
as the Divine Artist, and the Son as the Exemplar cause of humanity’s act of being. In this 
part I crudely develop the concept that primary matter and an immaterial form of 
memory have sufficient common attributes that in the creative act of the human soul 
they are not only convertible but necessarily interchangeable.  
Fifthly, I prepare the reader for Chapter 3 which is the most difficult exercise in the 
thesis. In Chapter 3 I analyze and re-formulate Thomas Aquinas’ logic regarding the 
relation between truth, goodness and being, which according to Aquinas are convertible 
to each other. Aristotle, Augustine and others, contend that the human soul’s perception 
of truth is distorted due to the potency of the body impeding the perceiving principles of 
the soul. I take this notion further by demonstrating that it is the added potency of the 
clothes fashioned from the skin of the animal that impedes the soul’s ability to fully 
actualize the body. Therefore the sensory perception apparatus of the fallen human 
dominates and limits the human soul’s powers more so than for an unblemished soul. As 
stated in footnote 93 above, Immanuel Kant’s notions of perception and transcendental 
apperception that regard the mental-physical relations along the same lines as Franz 
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Brentano’s intentional inexistence are not in line with my thinking. Instead, I define the 
human soul’s power of apperception as an unimpeded awareness of the human soul. I 
adapt Kant’s concepts of transcendental apperception by concluding that the ‘spirit of 
perception’ (St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians 1:17) is in effect an apperceptive 
awareness. Instead of perceiving through the distorting lenses of the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil, the perfect soul perceives through the spirit of perception, the eye of God. 
The Christ-soul enjoys the proper human soul’s power of apperceptive awareness. Human 
souls that are able to perceive through the spirit require a different metaphysical 
understanding than the present Thomistic view of the human soul.  Apperceptive 
awareness is the property that allows the human soul to be fully and directly aware of 
other human souls and of its origin and Creator. It is this awareness operation that 
explains Jesus’ ability to be conscious of the condition of the soul of the Samaritan 
woman. Let us now turn to the metaphysical construction blocks of the thesis. 
Metaphysics is the intellectual inquiry that animates theology, the science of God. 
Metaphysics is the study of origins, cosmology, and, the study of being qua being, in other 
words, ontology. Human beings are creatures with two origins. The first progresses out of 
eternity for “human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of Divine 
Nature” (Summa theologiae III Q. 16. A6, adversus 1).97 The second origin regards 
humanity’s corporeal nature at the creation of the physical universe. The human soul 
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straddles the two realms of reality; the human soul is the mode through which eternity 
and the finite are united. 
Thomistic philosophers and theologians are realists in their view of the world. The 
term ‘real’ is another word for ‘actual’ that provides Thomistic thinkers with the 
hylemorphic view that existence is the actualizing of primary matter. Thomism views the 
creation of the universe as a creatio ex nihilo event.98 I interpret the biblical account of 
creation in Genesis 1 as the Divine Being willing Himself as an intentional self-
communication of His goodness.99 The miracle of the creation of the universe is the 
creation of a dimensioned entity from the dimensionless existence of eternity.100 
Metaphysically the creation miracle may be appreciated as a Being of pure Act Who 
produces a creation that includes potency which is contrary to the Being’s essence. At the 
very instance of creation the infinitesimally small universe seems to be in an inherently 
contradictory mode of being. One may imagine the initial and unformed universe being in 
a state of almost complete potency, yet in another sense seems to be fully actualized.  
The universe is becoming.101 One might imagine the Creator taking a miniscule 
piece of eternity (which is impossible but is employed metaphorically) and crafting it into 
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 The literal translation is ‘out of nothing’. However, this does not mean that the universe was created with 
nothing, but prior to the creation of the universe nothing existed, which fits well with the Inflationary Big 
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space-time. During the initial 10-43 to 10-34 of a second, the universe expanded with a 
velocity beyond imagination. In other words one could postulate that at such a velocity 
time has not yet been created.  As the expansion of creation slowed, the universe’s mass 
grew until it reached the relation we now know as space-time with its light-speed limit on 
velocity, yet contains non-local properties.102  In an analogical sense one can visualize the 
enormous velocity during the inflationary expansion of the universe as ‘eternity velocity’ 
hitting the brakes of corporeal existence and slowing to time-limited reality. In our world 
reality103 is determined through the human soul’s ability to perceive the anteriority of 
beings. Concrete beings are distinguished by and are related to others by their situation in 
four-dimensional space-time. However, the souls of human beings are created in eternity 
where anteriority and concreteness are non-existent. Therefore, the relation between 
eternity and the eternally grounded creation of corporeal existence is an intentional 
relation since the universe is in a necessary relation with its Creator.104  
The intentional relation then is a relation between eternity and corporeity, which 
may be seen as a relation between de re and de dictum modes of existence, or, in regards 
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 I am taking a narrow approach regarding reality due to the scope of my thesis. The modes of reality by 
which Thomists view truth, existence and so on, defines their underlying philosophy. As will be seen in 
Chapter 3 I argue for ‘truth’ to exist in the soul as part of its forming principle not only in things. 
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to the person, a relation between the brain and the mind, or, in general Thomistic 
metaphysical terms between esse intentionale and esse naturale. We can therefore state 
unequivocally that both the divine Creator and the created exist in intentional and natural 
dimensions; the Creator and created are in relation to the created order by supposition 
and to eternity by necessity. I also assert that the relation between the two realities of 
esse intentionale and esse naturale is the purview of human beings; it is the mode of 
stewardship of humanity on behalf of the Creator.   
“I answer that, there are two ways in which a thing is said to be 
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to 
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the 
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: […] Accordingly as to 
things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of 
absolute necessity, but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine 
will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its 
proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we 
will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary 
relation to its proper and principal object […] But God wills things apart from 
Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. … Hence, 
since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things since no 
perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart 
from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by 
supposition…”105 
 
And from Genesis 1: 26: 
“[…] and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of 
the air, and over the cattle, and over the cattle and over all the wild animals of 
the earth,b and over every creepy thing that creeps upon the earth.” 
A footnote to the Genesis 1:26 passage remarks that the notion of image, likeness and 
dominion is a democratization of the power of God: “humanity appears godlike [which] 






equips humans for godlike rule over the fish, birds and animals.”106 We shall return to this 
shortly as it lays a biblical foundation for the thesis’ assertion that the clothes made of the 
skin of the animal is an added potency, or if you will, an added substance, that 
overburdens the actualizing power of the human soul. In regards to the natural order, 
Aquinas reasons that substance is the limiting principle to the actualization act of the 
forming principle.  
Substance is one of the ten Aristotelian categories, for example, quantity, describe 
such limitations.  
“Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have 
said above (Question [7], Article [1]) forms according as they are the more 
immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity.”107 
With these words Thomas describes a crucial property of forms, such as, the human soul. 
Unfettered by human matter, the human soul as form can stretch to limitless possibilities. 
In a sense the human soul as the forming principle of the human composite, is at home in 
eternity. Proper matter, the signet-matter of the human person, may be converted into 
glorification. The unpacking of this notion however is best left for Chapter 3. 
As mentioned previously, eternity is existence with neither spatial nor temporal 
limits. Therefore, that which differentiates one eternal being from another can only be 
the relation and the priority of relation between eternal beings. Because the two divine 
beings, the Father and Son are hypostatically univocal “in God the substance contains the 
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unity; and relation multiplies the trinity,"108 it is relation that personifies God the Father as 
being prior in being to the Son. The Son, by being posterior to His Father necessitates a 
reception of divine Being (Ens). The love of reception of Being necessitates the 
reciprocation from the Son of His Sonship. By acknowledging His reception of Being (Ens), 
the Son inheres and therefore personifies his own and unique principle of reciprocation. 
In this manner the individuation and personification of both divine beings are 
acknowledged. The unique reciprocating principle inherent in the Sonship of the Second 
Person also plays a role in humanity’s fall from grace. The first humans failed to 
reciprocate the covenant of their existence by denying the right of God to be humanity’s 
source of all knowledge.  
 However, the Second Person of the Trinity is not just God, but God-man. The 
unity and complimentary of the two natures of Jesus under the aspect of one person, an 
aspect of faith for believers, invites significant challenges as to how one understands the 
unity of the two natures into one hypostasis,109 that is, “the real distinction between 
essence and existence [esse+.”110 Modern thinkers have converted this scholastic 
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soul with the matter of the body yielding a human composite of rationality and animality. 
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distinction into the distinction between de dictum and de re.111 De dictum relates to 
intentional, and de re relates to the term intensional, ‘a belief’ respectively.112 Instead I 
follow Thomas Aquinas’s meaning of intentional, that is, ‘to stretch forth’.113 Employing 
the de dictum/de re terminology presents the notion that the ordinary human person 
adheres most attributes in a de dictum mode (that is they are accidental because of the 
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clothes divinely made from the skin of the animal).114 In contrast to the ordinary human 
being, the pre-resurrected Christ person inheres his attributes in a de re mode (that is 
they are essential since Jesus was born without sin) and inheres all attributes in a de re 
mode post-resurrection, that is, in his glorified body state.115 Bluntly put, I assert that 
there are attributes to the ordinary human person, such as the haecceitic property, that 
are foreign to the pre-lapsarian being and the Christ human person.116 Even more bluntly, 
the separation of humankind from God has its dire consequences. The overburdening of 
the ordinary human soul by the flesh of animality causes the dynamism of the soul to be 
insufficient to fully actualize itself in both the de re and de dictum modes.  The 
overburden prevents the soul from enjoying an apperceptive awareness of the essential 
natures of other human persons and prevents it from forming proper essential unities; 
the human soul is not only separated from God, but also from other separated spiritual 
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beings due to the individuating thisness or haecceitic privation acquired from the potency 
of the animality of ordinary human matter. In contrast to the ordinary human soul, the 
human-Divine union inherent in the person of Jesus Christ is defined as a perfect unity 
according to the Council of Chalcedon (451).117  
 Relations between ordinary human persons involve the individuating properties of 
matter. The proper Thomistic understanding of the ordinary human person is that the 
human “person signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual 
of a rational nature.”118  Gylua Klima proposes that two modes of distinctions for 
extended beings (persons). The first mode is that of an instantiated body in space-time. 
The second pertains to life. Whether or not the human soul is separated from the body it 
shares the genera of a life-being. The human soul shares with all intellectual substances 
the genera of rational. The Trinity identifies themselves through their personhood which 
is related to intentionality, which is related to will and to love since intention and love are 
acts of the will. The intentional act of generation by God the Father to the Son and the 
intentional act of Eucharistia by the Son’s reciprocation processes from this union a life-
Being. I claim that this same model, although imperfect and necessitates graciousness 
from the Trinity, functions for the perfected human soul as well. The separated human 
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soul must also identify itself through personhood since the individuation of matter is no 
longer present. The human soul of Christ, which generates a glorified body, identifies 
itself through its personhood as well.  
“The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead--not, indeed, an 
inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an 
instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act.”119 
In contrast to divine beings, the ordinary human person, as a created creature 
individuates and identifies him/herself through the individuating potency of signet-matter 
inherent in a physically organized body. A consequence of original sin is an increase in 
potency and therefore the physicality of this matter dominates. The relation of the soul to 
God recedes from its natural relation to one that is contingent on the soul’s free-will as 
dominated by matter more so than prior to humanity’s first sin.  
Borrowing from John Wippel’s understanding of Thomas’ teaching on the relation 
between the ‘true’ and the ‘good’ Wippel emphasises that the “*t+rue perfects … its 
species, whereas goodness … in terms of the existence it enjoys in reality.”120  Humanity’s 
fall through original sin did not cause an imperfection in our intelligible species, the 
human soul, but instead adversely impacted on the perfection of our existence. Prior to 
original sin the actualizing power of the human soul dominated the proper union of body 
and soul; matter did not limit the actualizing power of the soul to the same extent as it 
does post original sin.  
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The human intelligible species however is wounded in a certain manner since it 
knows and understands reality through the distortion of the now overburdened material 
senses. The ordinary human sensory knowledge acquisition process necessitates the 
employment of the phantasms to know and understand the created order. The hypo-
potency generated by the fall necessitates the human soul to individuate itself through 
the privation of haecceitic (this) matter. The human soul, in its present state relates its 
matter imperfectly, which is in a hypo-potency state relative to its state prior to the fall, 
and therefore requires matter to individuate itself. In order for matter to be individuated 
requires an individuating principle termed “the haecceitic ‘thisness’ principle.”121 Due to 
the overburdening of matter, the human mind requires the material human brain that 
employs the phantasms to acquire knowledge of the world.  
By individuating and communicating with the external world through the thisness 
of haecceitism and the phantasms of the brain respectively, human beings also identify 
themselves through these very same modes. Haecceitism and the phantasms work in 
conjunction with the human soul instantiating or extending itself in space-time through 
the potency of the matter of the body. The following discussion is critical to 
understanding the aims of the thesis and it regards employing an analogy based on the 
inter- and intra-relations and personal identity of the Trinity. 
Thomas teaches that identity within a species follows a univocal predication. 
Human beings in the present state of existence identify themselves through the 
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individuating relation of the soul to matter. In contrast, the identity of each of the Persons 
within the community of the Trinity is one of univocal predication. Because of their simple 
form the members of the Trinity are known through their distinctive personhood which is 
an intentional distinction as elaborated through Richard Cross’s understanding and the 
comprehension of certain Scholastics such as the Franciscan’s Richard of Middleton (c. 
1249 – 1302) and William of Ware (unknown, he flourished 1270 – 1300).122 Cross 
concludes that Duns Scotus views intentional distinction as relating the mental and extra-
mental realities, which within eternity are realized through priority of being (ens). 
The metaphysical concept of intentional reality and intentional distinction inscribe 
a tension. The intellectual soul may consider being (ens) in three modes of existence. The 
first is a being that exists in reality and in the intellectual soul. The second is being that 
exists mentally only, such as when a Scholastic student contemplates the being (ens) of a 
chimera. Chimeras may exist in reality, but likely not. Chimeras are beings of the mind. 
The third mode regards logical concepts such as mathematical operators; ‘2+4=6’.  
A problem that my thesis encounters concerns the second mode of existence. The 
notion of God as pure Act, totally simple and therefore an intentional Being, requires an 
act of faith to move the concept from ens rationis to ens reale, the realm of reality. The 
connector between these two realms, according to my viewpoint, is due to a particular 
truth-aspect, found during the creation of corporeity.  
                                                     
122
 Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford UK, 2002), 277. The Triune God’s act of intentionality is the act of divine will stretching forth 




“Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or 
accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards is 
being …”123  
As we have already seen, the Creator creates through an intentional act of the will and as 
an intentional act, is the cause of distinction in all created rational beings. The intentional 
power of the proper human intellectual soul is what differentiates it in eternity and in 
corporeal reality from other rational beings. The connector between the two beings of 
intentionne and reale is the act of existence that all human souls provide through their 
intentional acts of existing. This connection or relation, which is unique to human souls, 
has its point of initiation in the Word of God.  
The relation of the Word, unified to his human nature, and, the instrumentality of 
the human soul of Jesus is further developed in Chapter 3. However, it is advantageous to 
the reader that I address these concepts in more detail here. The specific metaphysical 
concept of interest is that of exemplar causality which brings to light the third aim of the 
thesis. I hold the view, which is contrary to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching, that two beings 
fully in act under certain conditions can form an essential unity. In order to demonstrate 
my viewpoint I must also re-interpret the common agreement within Thomism regarding 
the state of the phantasms and those who follow haecceitism as an individuating 
principle. 
The hypotheses that knowledge can be obtained without employing the 
phantasma, and, that haecceitism is not a perfecting principle in matter, are related to my 
argument concerning two being fully in act may form an essential unity. In order to 
                                                     
123
 Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae Ia Q. 16. A1, respondeo.  I follow Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that God 
subsists the created order which is not dissimilar to the modern notion that God is panentheistically related 
to the universe. Truth being convertible with being is a concept I employ in the creation of the human soul. 
65 
 
demonstrate the metaphysical relation of an essential unity with the human soul, I 
develop theological, metaphysical and persuasive arguments regarding my concept of 
Christ as the causal exemplar for humanity.124  
I speculate that the haecceitic dysfunction is a consequence of original sin since 
God created us for incorruption, (sic) and made us in the image of his own eternity.” 
(Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) Instead of employing a perfected human being in his Treatise 
of Man it seems to me that Thomas Aquinas employed the metaphysics of the 
imperfected (sic) relation of human body to human soul to develop many arguments in 
the Summa theologiae, for example, Ia, Q 76, and, IIIa Q. 2. A1, respondeo.  Earlier I made 
the case that it is not the imperfection of the human soul that is the consequence of 
original sin, but the relation of the soul to existence. Instead it is the soul’s relation to esse 
naturale and esse intentionale that are impacted by original sin.  
The human soul is made to actualize a specific degree of potency just as a 
particular type of engine is manufactured to fly a jet aeroplane. An engine made to 
operate a sub-compact car, although proper to this particular car is impotent to properly 
move a jumbo jet. So to it is with the human soul and its present body.  I interpret the 
human body-soul relation imperfection, not as degradation in the nature of the soul, but 
in the increased degree of potential in the signet-matter of the individual human body. 
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The human soul is incapable of perfecting the added jumbo-weight of its present body. As 
such, this imperfection may be seen as a degradation of the relation between the ordinary 
human soul and the perfection of its body. My notion of the human soul of Christ as the 
being fully in act and the ordinary human soul as being in potency is supported by John 
20:19 whereby Jesus appears to the apostles passing through solid doors and walls. 
Quoting Origen, expressed for a different purpose, “And so, what is corruptible in us must 
be clothed in holiness and incorruptibility; and what is mortal must be clothed, now that 
death has been conquered, in the Father’s immortality”.125(emphasis added) Origen’s 
wisdom clearly demonstrates the mode of being that the ordinary human soul-body 
unicity lost by tasting the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The ordinary 
human soul does not suffer in itself any material corruption. Instead, the human soul 
suffers in its relations with and through the esse naturale and esse intentionale realms. 
We know from Thomas Aquinas that “… spiritual immutation [change] takes place by 
the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence.”126 
The exchange between the immuter and receptor is distorted because the exchange flows 
through the imperfect perceptive apparatus of the ordinary human being. However, what 
is a spiritual change?  
Spiritual change may be considered in two modes. The first is through Thomas’ 
process of cognition; the phantasms acquire sensible knowledge and the intelligible 
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species abstract the form of the object being perceived. The second manner, which is of 
interest here, is as Christ who spiritually changes the sinning soul by mediating for us to 
move from the shadow of the tree of good and evil towards the illuminating love of our 
Father. If we return to the Thomas-Christ event of the upper chamber, Christ is the 
immuter and it is the form of the Christ-soul that enacts the immuting function by 
avoiding the tree of knowledge of good and evil and proceeding through the knowledge 
source of his heavenly Father. Continuing along this theme, the Thomas-Christ 
coincidence may be considered as the Glorified Christ informing the communicant’s soul, 
in this instance St. Thomas the Apostle, through an exemplar act.127 John F. Wippel, in 
commenting on Aquinas’ proof’s of God’s existence, argues the following” 
“[N]othing is moved except insofar as it is in potency to that which it is 
moved. But something moves insofar as it is in actuality, since to move is 
nothing else but to reduce something from potency to act. And something 
can be reduced from potency to act only by some being in actuality. [I]t is 
not possible for the same thing to be in act and in potency at the same time 
and in the same respect but only in different respects.”
 128  
 
Wippel’s logical entailment presents an interesting entry for my arguments. Thomas 
Aquinas asserts that if the potencies of two beings are dissimilar, the being more in act 
may actualize the lesser. In order for one human soul to actualize another human soul 
that is also in perfect unity with its own signet-matter, and for it to also actualize human 
matter, requires not only a distinction129 between the potencies of the two beings, but, at 
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least one of the souls necessarily must enjoy access to the Trinity and thusly avoid the 
vagarities arising from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Further development of 
this tantalizing gem must be left to Chapter 3. However, before we leave this section 
another query must be answered. How does the Christ-soul, as a causal exemplar inform 
another soul? 
  I respectfully request the reader to maintain the event of Thomas the Apostle 
‘entering’ the wounds of the Glorified Christ as a binate image; one being moving towards 
the other from blindness to awareness and the other moving a being from potency to act. 
The movement of Christ towards Thomas is an apt image that provides an introduction for 
my notion that the Father as the Divine Exemplar Artist, the Son is the exemplar cause for 
human creation, and the human Christ is the instrumental exemplar. The individuation of 
the ordinary human soul and its separation from the Creator due to the fall is removed by 
the act of the Son through the instrument of his own human soul. Aquinas clearly portrays 
his notion of God as the Divine Artist.  
 “The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all 
creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now 
the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the 
fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must 
be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating.”130 
 
By substituting the human soul for the art of the artificer, Aquinas crafts a very specific 
picture regarding his concept of where the human soul resides before it is created. The 
knowledge of the human soul, and the knowledge of how to create a subsistent human 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Jesus is a truth-maker and that his soul’s substance communicates existence to his accidents and I contend 
to the human souls who seek him as well. 
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soul, is in the intellect of the Artist. The composition or blueprint of the uncreated idea of 
the soul is in the mind of the artist as the idea or the plan of an objet d’art.131 In a similar 
vein the human soul is co-artist with the divine Artist because the human soul informs the 
potency of the matter of the body through the hylemorphic union as its first act of being. 
The human soul, as the forming principle, actualizes. That is, the soul brings into existence 
the essence of the human composite or in modern terms, the ‘person’. In created entities 
real distinctions exist between the esse and essence. The distinction attributes of the 
glorified body I argue is an intentional distinction which is imputed in the soul as our 
likeness to God. My concept of intentional distinction requires that an inequality exists to 
Godfrey of Fontaines’ axiom that “whatever happens to one *act+ happens to the other 
*potency+ or existence and essence.”132 I hold that Godfrey’s notion of potency-act 
equality is incoherent since the ordinary human composite functions in its present state 
of reality employing the clothes of the skin of the animal. Although the purpose of the 
thesis is not to demonstrate how, metaphysically, the Glorified Christ’s Body is 
instantiated in space and time and also resides in the eternal realm such a Body requires a 
different mode of distinction133 than that of the ordinary human body. The Evangelist 
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John enlightens us: “What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of 
all people.” John 1:3b, 4.  This distinction is the fullness of the life-Being of Christ. Thomas 
Aquinas adheres to the Aristotelian philosophy that it is the relation of the human soul to 
the body that individuates or in Godfrey’s thinking distinguishes it.  However the human 
soul, as the human composite’s forming principle, stretches from within eternity into 
corporeal reality. The human soul is a similitude of God himself especially during his 
creative act. (Genesis 1:26, 27)  We see from John that all life flows through the Second 
Person of the Trinity, which includes Jesus’ human soul. This similitude is life and human 
life is the light of Christ. The paradigm of Christ being the source of humanity’s life and 
humanity demonstrating the Christ-life as light brings us to a crucial apex of how I will 
craft, in Chapter 3, the human soul’s relation with the human soul of Jesus Christ. I put 
forward the thought that the potency, human matter, in unity with the human soul is 
disproportionate as finite entities are with eternal beings. The human soul after all is 
gifted through the Father with eternal life. If we are to believe that Jesus Christ has 
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conquered death then we must conclude that there is an inequality to Godfrey’s axiom. 
The inequality resides in the life Christ offers as opposed to the present life we now 
project through the lens of the garment of the flesh of the animal. The life offered by 
Christ is more than the pre-lapsarian existence of our first parents and if this is so then the 
human soul must be crafted with the attributes that will accept this life to be.  Contrary to 
the glorified Christ’s knowledge acquisition which is directly through his eternal Father, 
the present human composite is not spiritually aware of its eternal grounding. Our life 
experiences are through the sensory perception of the tree of knowledge of good and evil 
and therefore there is a total eclipse of the light shining directly from the Father through 
his Son to the human people. Citing question 4, article 1 of the Summa theologiae, and by 
expanding on Thomas Aquinas’ teaching that “there is an infinity which pertains to form 
as such, an infinity standing on the side of perfection […] in contrast to the infinity 
pertaining to matter and imperfection”, Lawrence Dewan characterizes the human soul as 
that which enjoys certain types of eternal relations.134 Dewan continues his analysis by 
emphasizing that existence is the most perfect or metaphysically, the most formal mode 
of any being.  
One may envisage from Dewan’s and Aquinas’ analysis three modes of formality. 
The first is God as pure esse subsistens; the second regards the human soul that shares or 
participates with God in its own act of being and though imperfectly, the human soul also 
enjoys esse subsistens, and, the third regards artifacts, such as a statue that is sculpted by 
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an artist and such beings do not enjoy the same type of esse subsistens. The differences in 
the three modes are their degrees of actuality and the degrees of freedom in the 
deployment of the will. The deployment of the will, the Scholastic active agent and a 
principle and a power of the human soul necessitates a similitude to the creative 
intentional act of God.  
The active agent functions through its power of intentione. According to Aquinas 
the human soul has the power of intention: 
“For the operation of sense requires a spiritual change, by which an intention of a 
sensible form comes to exist in a sense organ.”135  (emphasis added) 
The etymology of the word intention is critical in order for us to appreciate its full 
understanding.  Intention finds its source in the Latin verb intendere, ‘to stretch forth’. 
Intentionality is a subset of the will which is a power of the soul. The term ‘intention’ (n.) 
is a mental concept, an object of knowledge.  However, Aquinas teaches that the divine 
Being knows through his own Essence and therefore the creative act is an intentional act, 
a stretching forth of the divine Will, which also requires a relation with the object in the 
divine memory which is in the form of the human entity to be actualized. The human soul 
however, as a similitude of God, at one time enjoyed the intentional existence of not only 
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sensible entities but purely simple entities as well, such as God and the angels. Employing 
intentional objects in my arguments brings with it the difficulty in the metaphysical 
concept of individuating, or, distinguishing between intentional objects. It is not possible 
for another ordinary human being to distinguish an individual’s mentally bound 
intentional states without applying to the powers of the senses.  
Previously I identified the problem of the inability of the human soul to be 
spiritually aware of another human soul because of the supra-added potency caused by 
original sin. The redactor of 1 John 3:2 agrees: “when he [Jesus] appears we shall be like 
him, for we shall see him as he is.” (emphasis added) Furthermore, Thomas Aquinas 
differentiates the notion of “ideas as exemplars and as likenesses *which] makes it 
possible to solve the problem whether there are ideas in God of genera, species and 
individuals.”136 Drawing on Leo Elder’s analysis of Aquinas’ teaching it is evident that ideas 
in Thomas’ teaching are acquired knowledge as opposed to divine ideas as exemplars 
which are the divine Artist’s principle of creating individuals. We know from Genesis 2: 19 
that the Creator endowed “the man” (sic) with the power to name all the creatures of the 
earth. The naming of the creatures necessitates a knowledge and awareness that 
demonstrates a sharing in the creative act. It also denotes humanity’s stewardship of the 
earth. Stewardship inheres a relation. A steward is in a trust and true relation with the 
master and that which belongs to the master.  I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that the Son, 
because of his relation as Son to the Father is the principle of exemplar causality for 
humanity and that the human soul of Christ is the instrumental exemplar cause for 
                                                     
136
 Leo Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990), 245. 
74 
 
humanity is the model for the divine Creator’s steward. However, if I am to demonstrate 
that Christ’s human soul is the instrumental cause for humanity then the pure potency of 
primary matter must considered. 
Primary matter presents a difficulty for my arguments. Primary matter is that 
which exists prior to being formed and which is constant through change of all created 
beings. If primary matter is the unique underlying potency for creation of the composite 
of body and soul, then the relation of humanity to Creator, in the act of creation, is more 
distant than what is generally proposed by Aquinas.  
“Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, 
unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our possible intellect has the same 
relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in 
potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural 
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible 
objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and 
in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands 
other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it 
understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the 
intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the 
order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through 
Himself.”137  
An analysis of this quotation allows me to claim that there is a relation or perhaps more 
clearly a similitude of potentiality between memory and primary matter. Thomas teaches 
that in the ordinary human soul there is a forward-looking relation between the passive 
intellect and the object to be known that is similar to the soul’s relation to primary 
matter. Aquinas conceives primary matter as pure potency to natural things. In other 
words, primary matter has the potential to become whatever it is actualized into, either 
by the soul, or, by nature. The possible intellect in Scholastic terminology is the 
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storehouse of concepts as opposed to the passive intellect which is the storehouse of past 
events. Memory waits passively to acquire, through the phantasms, the intelligible 
species, which is the sensory perception of the thing perceived. Therefore, until the 
passive intellect is actualized by the thing perceived it is in potency to it as primary matter 
is in potency until it is actualized into being (esse). Employing this same rational I claim 
that the possible intellect performs in a similar but nobler138 manner. The possible 
intellect, which is the imagination is immaterial in its substance and therefore resides as 
part of the human soul. I am not arguing for now that the possible intellect or primary 
matter is univocal or even equivocal as concepts but instead that they share similar 
aspects. Their similarity is grounded in a particular type of memory that I claim is 
immaterial and is pure potency, and, is constant to the point whereby it may be in certain 
aspects, analogous to primary matter. Earlier I quoted Aquinas that “…human nature 
began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature.”139 Can we claim 
that in an analogous sense God conceptualizes the quiddity of human beings in his 
suppositum? And, that this concept or idea of what it is to be human is accessed by those 
human souls who have not been touched by the tree of knowledge of good and evil so 
that they can maintain their intimate kinship with God. How can this be? 
We know from Aristotle and Aquinas that form is prior to both matter and the 
composite of form and matter. Form actualizes the potency of signet-matter which is 
matter that can be sufficiently actualized that it can be reduced from the pure potency of 
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primary matter140 into an individuated human composite. The human composite requires 
a spiritual (the immaterial soul) form, and signet-matter to form the human person. The 
human forming principle and the signet-matter that will become the individuated human 
body, require a special type of memory. That type, which is a universal, is such that it is 
what-it-is-to-be human or the quiddity (the whatness) of humanity. This particular type is 
the memory of what it is to be human that resides in the suppositum of God. Instead of 
being a forward-looking relation this type is a prior-, or posterior-looking relation. In other 
words this relation looks back to the true quiddity of humanity as it resides in the 
suppositum of God. This memory of what it is to be human is an exemplar for the creation 
of all human souls and the perfection of their esse.  
The justification for these relations is through the analogy of this type of memory 
being actualized into individual human beings. I rely on the Thomistic philosopher 
Lawrence Dewan O. P., to unpack the relation of “kinship between form and act of being 
within the creature.”141 
However before I continue, another controversy regarding the use of intention 
(v.tr.) must be considered.  Thomas Aquinas teaches that in the present state it is the 
relation between matter and form that individuates the composite being. How would a 
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separated soul or glorified body individuate itself? Building on the previously mentioned 
exemplar causality I am arguing that the aforementioned specific type of memory that 
grounds the nature of the human soul is as an intelligible-exemplar from Christ which is 
inherent in the soul’s first act of being that images its likeness to God through the Artistry 
of the Divine exemplar.142 The Divine intentional (stretching forth) acts, which in Christ, as 
the Word, Who expresses the will of God in the created order, as an exemplar-unity, is 
therefore a necessary condition for the forming operations of the ordinary human soul.143  
 “Now the primordial principle of the production of things is the Son of God, as it 
says in John (1:3): “All things were made through him.” He is, therefore, the 
primordial exemplar, which all creatures imitate as the true and perfect image of 
God. Hence it says in Col (1:15); “He is the image of the invisible God, the 
firstborn of every creature, for in him all things were created.” But in a special 
way He is the exemplar of spiritual graces, with which spiritual creatures are 
endowed, as is said to the Son in Ps 110 (v. 3): “In the splendors of the saints 
before the morning star I begot you,” namely, because He was begotten before 
every creature through resplendent grace, having in Himself as exemplar the 
splendors of all the saints. But this exemplar of God has been very remote from 
us at first, as it says in Ec (2:12); “What is man that he could follow the king, his 
Maker?” And therefore He willed to become man, that He might offer humans a 
human exemplar. And therefore He willed to become man, that He might offer 
humans a human exemplar. ”144 
Aquinas concludes that Christ is the exemplar of spiritual graces. He asserts that it is the 
form of the object that is received not the object itself such as when colour is received in 
the eye the eye does not acquire the colour. The exclamation by Thomas the Apostle “My 
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Lord and my God” is received by Thomas from Christ not as the form of the object Christ 
but as the forming exemplar of spiritual grace. I base my reasoning on Thomas Aquinas’ 
teaching that “spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being 
received”.145 During Thomas the Apostle’s encounter with Christ, the Glorified Christ’s 
essence becomes apperceptively transparent to Thomas. My concept of Christ being the 
exemplar cause and Thomas the Apostle’s exclamation necessitates an acquisition of a 
truth, not the acquisition of an intelligible species such as colour. In this instance Thomas 
does not perceive Christ through the lens of the tree of knowledge of good and evil but 
through the primal acquisition process inherent in all human souls. In this instance the 
Apostle’s soul is re-united with the mode of its original access to God’s memory of what it 
is to be human. Thomas is changed by the reception of the form of the Christ-soul to the 
point whereby he knows, absolutely, that Jesus Christ is the Incarnated Word. The human 
soul is the forming principle as the first act of being and it is this act that participates in 
the human creation act of God.  Furthermore, Aquinas teaches that truth is conformity 
and that it cannot be known through the senses and therefore the Thomas-Christ 
coincidence is particularly illuminating:  
“Augustine says that ‘we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the 
senses of the body’. First, because ‘whatever the bodily senses reach, is 
continually being changed; and whatever is never the same cannot be 
perceived’.”146  
Therefore understanding the ontological relation between the transmittal and reception 
of truth is of particular importance to the validity of my arguments.  
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Leo Elders, cites Thomas Aquinas: “[t]ruth must be the ultimate end of the 
universe [extends this notion to] truth is the summit of reality, for it is being come to 
awareness and conscious possession of itself.”147 Both Aristotle and Aquinas assert that 
there is a specific relation between what is known and the knower.   
"For knowledge occurs according to the thing known is known in the knower. But 
the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the 
knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of its own nature. If 
therefore the mode of anything’s being exceeds the mode of the nature of the 
knower, it must result that the knowledge of that thing is above the nature of the 
knower.”148 
The proper and perfected functioning of the human soul requires that the soul conforms 
to truth. Aquinas teaches that “truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing, 
and hence to know this conformity is to know truth.”149 As the knowledge of truth 
embeds the human soul through the intentional act of the intelligible species, the 
stretching forth of the mind seeking truth, enters into a relation with the truth it seeks 
once that particular truth is known as being true.150 Aquinas teaches that a thing can be 
named only to the limit that it is known.151 Following Thomas’s agreement with Aristotle, 
an entity is known to the degree by which its principles are known.152 Knowing the 
principles of a substantial entity speaks to knowing the being’s innermost self. The human 
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person’s first principle is the soul. Knowing the principle of an entity via an abstraction 
process153 of its sensible properties leads to an incomplete understanding the entity’s 
nature. Such a process leads only to a limited physical awareness and an even more 
limited spiritual or absolute awareness.  To properly know or to be spiritually aware of the 
principle of a substantial entity requires a different cognition process. The acquisition of 
the knowledge of the principle of a substantial entity is what I term the spiritual or 
apperceptive awareness of the human soul; it is a truth-event and follows a different 
cognition path than that of the ordinary human being.  Aquinas also teaches that what is 
sensible cannot be perceived as truth.154 I argue that the sensible cannot be perceived as 
truth because of a temporal separation between the sensitive stimuli being received in 
the past only, and the rational human soul existing in the ever-present reality of the divine 
Being.  The gap between the temporally bound substance of the body and the immaterial 
nature of the human soul prevents the ordinary human soul from acquiring the spiritual 
awareness of another human soul and other spiritual substances such as angels. The 
earthly Jesus on the other hand did not acquire knowledge solely through the sensory 
cognition apparatus of the human body since he was without original sin. Jesus’ 
knowledge acquisition apparatus by-passed the spatial-temporal mode which is necessary 
for the ordinary human soul due to the tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil.  
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The remainder of the journey is to bring us to a more complete apprehension of 























Prefatory to Chapter 2. 
“I answer that, "To think" … is more strictly taken for that consideration of the 
intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the 
intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of 
sight. On this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not 
called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes what we 
know and takes form there from, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God 
must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is 
nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way thought is, 
properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet 
perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the 
mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs 
to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the 
sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an act of the 
deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.”155 
(emphasis added) 
Without admitting to an overly prideful stance of the place of humanity in the 
order of the Divine creation, I claim a personal stand regarding the intellect of angels and 
the intellect of the stewards of God’s temporal creation, the human being. I believe that 
the intellects of these two created and rational beings are created for differing purposes 
and therefore cannot be properly compared. Humanity was created with the ability to be 
the Master’s stewards in caring for the temporal order; angels are God’s messengers. In 
order to be faithful stewards humanity required intellectual powers that allowed for 
humanity to freely follow the will of the Creator. The structure and essence of the angel-
being is such that acquiring knowledge is an instantaneous event and I claim as 
messengers so structured as to be unwavering in the discourse. The structure and essence 
of the initially created human being was such that acquiring knowledge and 
communicating that knowledge was also an instantaneous event, but with the object that 
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humanity was to steward the natural order. Both beings require such instantaneity in 
order to know and fulfill the will of God. Humanity, in breaking its covenant with the 
Master was separated from the divine Being in such a manner that the intellectual soul 
was prevented to enact its ability to be naturally aware of the Creator, and, to be 
naturally aware of all created beings. Instead humanity requires the employment of the 
phantasms to acquire knowledge and to communicate. Phantasmal operations also 
require a corporeity, the human brain that individuates the human person, which, once 
again, is a haecceitic separation of humankind from the Creator.  
As cited above, acquired knowledge of individuals is gained or actualized through 
the powers of the sensitive soul which is an added potency due to humanity’s original sin. 
Humanity’s original sin blotted out its natural memory of the source of its quiddity, the 
source of where the initial essence of human nature resides. I conclude the prefatory to 
the chapter leaving a final yet conflicting word to Thomas: 
“But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and 
most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with 
regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is 
written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the 
fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we 
are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand 
is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently 
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CHAPTER 2   THE HUMAN SOUL 
And then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
likeness and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds 
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and 
over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth. (Genesis 1: 26) 
He *Adam+ said, “I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, 
because I was naked; and I hid myself;” (Genesis 3: 10) 
And the LORD GOD made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and 
clothed them. (Genesis 3: 21) 
   
The three biblical passages noted above encapsulate the journey of the human 
soul from beings endowed with dominion to beings fearful and hiding from God, to beings 
whose souls are entombed in the garment of the flesh of the animal. The human soul, 
separated from God, fell from a spiritually endowed being to that which is weakened and 
individuated by the corporeal garment. A plausible understanding of Genesis 3:10 is that 
the pre-lapsarian entities of Adam and Eve were sufficiently dynamic to represent 
themselves as visible beings formed with luminous bodies.157  With their expulsion from 
the Garden, the illumination of the first human bodies was, so-to-speak, extinguished. The 
extinguished state of the illuminated human bodies is the foundation for Thomas Aquinas’ 
understanding of the present state of human beings: 
“*S+oul, flesh, and bone belong to the notion of man.”  
     (Summa theologiae Ia. Q. 29. A3, ad 3)  
 
He then defines the human soul citing Aristotle: 
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“For he writes, “We have now given a general answer to the question, What is 
soul? It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the account of a thing.” 
(412a8-12), that is, the substantial form of a physically organized body.”158 
Thomas elaborates:  
“The soul is that by which we first live, feel, move and understand...”159  
 With these three quotations Thomas Aquinas brings into sharp focus the composition of 
human beings and the role of the rational human soul. The next quotation however picks 
up where the Hebrew bible ended. 
  “I am the Way, the Truth and the Life.” (John 14:16) 
Jesus as Truth strikes at the heart of my aims for the thesis. My aim is to demonstrate, 
metaphysically, how the human soul of Jesus Christ illuminates the ordinary human soul. 
Therefore, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide a common understanding of the nature 
and relations of the ordinary human soul by primarily applying the metaphysical thought 
of Thomas Aquinas as found in the Summa theologiae.  
  I commence with modern and philosophically grounded definitions of the human 
soul. In the next section I provide a synopsis of the relevant sections of the Summa 
theologiae which permits the reader to obtain an apprehension of the rational soul’s 
construction. Following Thomas’ understanding of the human soul I then provide a 
relatively in-depth and complex treatment of the essence of the soul and its relation to its 
first act. Also, I point to tangents of the human soul’s relation with the Christ-soul in 
anticipation of Chapter 3.  In order to appreciate that the human soul is burdened with 
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the added potential of the clothes of the animal, I briefly elaborate on the origin of the 
human soul, original sin and the metaphysical consequences of original sin. I conclude 
Chapter 2 by suggesting a fresh understanding of the human soul as is supported by the 
Augustinian and Thomistic notion that the memory of what it is to be human resides in 
the divine suppositum. We now turn to the pertinent questions of the Summa 
theologiae.160  
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the soul as “the spiritual or immaterial part 
of a human being or animal, often regarded as immortal.”161 The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy defines the soul as “an entity supposed to be present only in living things.”162 
And, the Encyclopedia of Theology, The Concise Sacramentum Mundi considers the soul as 
“the constitutive element by which human existence is capable, by nature, of attaining 
selfhood…it is one of his principles of being.”163 The first two definitions present the 
concept that there is a real possibility that the human soul is subjected to a temporal 
framework. In other words, as death fatally corrupts the physical body, so ends the 
existence of the human soul. 
Contrary to the finite view, I take the stand that the human soul is the principle of 
being and therefore is grounded in eternity. Specifically, Aquinas asserts that the soul is 
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the first act of being. That is, the human soul gives esse or existence to the human 
composite of human signet-matter and soul. In this vein the human soul, as the principle 
of being, and, subsequent to its first act, initiates the intellect to think, the body to act, 
and the mind to love. Citing Dionysius, (Coel.  Hier. xi) Aquinas assigns three criteria to the 
human soul as “divided into essence, power, and operation."164 The human rational soul 
has three minor principles: the receptive agent, called memory; the active agent, the will, 
and, inherent in the will, love, which is perfected by divine grace. The human soul is also 
subsistent; “as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in 
another.”165 Therefore the Thomistic human soul is an image and similitude of God. Unlike 
God the human soul requires the union with its body in order to fully define its nature, its 
personhood and its essence166. However, before I unpack the contents of the chapter, it is 
advantageous to lay a common foundation of the structure of the human soul as taught 
by Thomas Aquinas.  
Synopsis of the Summa Theologiae Pertinent to the Thesis, Prima Pars, ‘Treatise on 
Human Nature’. 
Introduction to the Section  
The work of Thomas Aquinas is vast and extremely complex to the point whereby 
all who attempt to apprehend and comprehend his thinking frequently arrive at differing 
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interpretations. My aim in this section is to provide the reader with a clear understanding 
of the construction and relations of the ordinary human soul as taught by Thomas 
Aquinas. In order to achieve this aim the following section provides the reader with a 
peek into questions applicable to the ordinary human soul found in Thomas’ magnum 
opus, the Summa theologiae. After a brief and general introduction I follow the order 
Thomas employs starting with question 75 and ending with question 87. My method in 
this section is to abstract the pertinent arguments, provide commentary, and then 
introduce my own or others’ interpretations of Thomas’ thinking.167  
The Aristotelian – Thomistic understanding of the ordinary human soul has been 
minimally popular with theologians and philosophers alike. Scientists and the ever 
impressionable public have concluded that the atomists of ancient Greece are correct 
after all; the human soul is material in its nature and succumbs to the same fate at the 
body at death, that is, nonexistence.168 
In tension with the dualists and the materialists, the pivotal argument for the 
thesis is based on two metaphysical foundations that rely on an immaterial soul. The first 
is with regards to how philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have employed the notion of 
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individuation169 as articulated by Duns Scotus as the haecceitic principle. The second is 
with regards to the phantasma and Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that all knowledge is 
received by the rational soul through the phantasma. These metaphysical notions are 
improperly employed by ancient and medieval philosophers due to a lack of 
comprehension of the nature of the created order. Without a proper understanding of 
these notions an understanding of the human soul’s relations is incomplete, even 
erroneous. It is therefore imperative that I lay a common foundation of terms and logic as 
modern philosophy has corrupted many Scholastic definitions.  
Following Thomas’s teachings, the human soul is composed of three intrinsic souls; 
the rational soul, the animal soul and the vegetative soul. Each of the souls is essentially 
present in the whole soul. However, the animal and vegetative souls do not function after 
the destruction of the body. We will therefore concentrate our efforts on the human 
rational soul, its principles, its powers and its operations. The first critical principles of the 
soul are its being (ens) and essence;170 the principles of the soul cause the powers, which 
reside in the brain, to function which in turn cause the body to operate. The operations of 
the soul cause the movement of the limbs, allows the mind to see, and causes the eye to 
perceive and so on through all the human composite’s sensible operations. 
The first aspect of being is of particular importance to my arguments since it 
relates to the ontological reality of the human person. Thomas teaches that being can be 
understood in two ways. The first is through Aristotle’s ten categories, substance (primary 
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i.e., individual, not secondary, i.e., universal), quantity, qualification, relation and so on. 
The categories support truth in propositions, which is the second way. For example, 
consider the phrase ‘Socrates is white’ which functions with a dual purpose for the 
apprehension of the two aspects of being. The first regards the object of this sentence as 
we see that white, and by inference the other Aristotelian categories, are accidental 
(contingent) in their own nature. The existence or being (ens) of the ten categories is 
dependent on the existence of a substantial being such as a chair, or a cat or a person. 
The difference between these two beings is that the first exists extra-mentally while the 
second exists mentally or intentionally. Essence therefore is the common foundation to a 
genera or species. Whereas Socrates’ essence or his form is derived by the perception 
process employing the ten categories only, the intentional being is created in the 
imagination and does not exist in reality per se but in the spiritual realm of the mind. In 
this manner then all beings of the same species enjoy something (their essence) that is 
common to all members of that species. However, and this is the fundamental attribute of 
essence, being (ens) is actualized into existence by essence, the entity’s form. Therefore in 
this manner existence is also termed esse, to be.  Finally, and this concept is employed 
further in the chapter, essence, as the form of the entity, also conveys truth because of its 
convertibility to being (ens).171 Nevertheless the soul’s power to be fully aware of truth is 
curtailed as a consequence of original sin.  
In concluding the introduction to this section, I emphasize that Thomas asserts 
that matter, by employing principles of potency, limits the acts of the human soul and this 
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includes the actus essendi (act of being) and its “principle of identity.”172 We know from 
Genesis 3:10-21 that the first human beings enjoyed a more intimate and dynamic 
relation with God, and each other, due to a special mutual awareness through the 
principle of identity. After the imposition of the fleshy garments and the attainment of the 
knowledge of good and evil, all relations changed. Through the pre-lapsarian couple’s 
choice to acquire knowledge through the tree of good and evil, humanity lost its intimate 
and natural mode of community with the Triune God. As I show later, the individual 
members of the Trinity are known through their personhood yet are hypostatic in nature. 
Instead of a relationship with the Creator’s community, humanity chose to allow the 
Serpent to introduce a mode of individuation that is subjected to the vagarities of the 
natural order and is foreign to humanity’s proper mode of being. Contrary to the fallen 
Adam and Eve, the earthly Jesus who was also born without sin, had a keen awareness of 
himself, others and dominance over creation. The fleshy garments of the ordinary human 
being limit one’s ability to ascertain truth and Truth and therefore properly participate in 
the communal life of the Trinity. Jesus enjoyed the original human body as did Adam and 
Eve who initially enjoyed and knew their original bodies – “… flesh of my flesh …” (Genesis 
2:23) and naturally knew God. We now turn to the pertinent questions of the Summa 
theologiae for Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the human being. 
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Question 75: The Nature of the Human Soul 
In Ia. Q. 75 Thomas examines the nature, essence or quiddity (the whatness) of the 
soul: He defines the human soul as the first act of being or principle of life which means 
that the soul’s first purpose is to participate in the creation of the human being. In a 
converse manner Aquinas states that “the act of a body *is+ having life potentially.173 He 
also teaches that “life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement” and 
that these actions are incorporeal or immaterial in their source which is the soul. The 
fundamental treatise for Thomas is that the soul is “an act of the body” or the soul 
initiates movement by the body, whether it is physical movement, such as moving the 
limbs, or, immaterial movement, such as acquiring knowledge. Movement in Thomas’ 
metaphysical realm is to move from potential to actual. As it is with the angels, the 
construction of the human soul is "divided into substance, power, and operation."174 
Thomas continues by stating that the human soul is that which initiates movement 
in the human brain and because it is a principle of movement it must also be subsistent. In 
other words the soul can exist on its own as a separated substance or as a part of the 
composite of the human person comprising body and soul. In this sense Thomas likens the 
soul to the intellect or mind. Therefore, contrary to Platonism Thomas asserts that the 
rational soul is insufficient without the human body. However, he does make a distinction 
between an individual person, such as Socrates, and that signet matter (common matter 
that has been individuated or formed into a human being) is that which individuates one 
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person from another. The human soul signifies or informs the matter into the human 
person. Therefore according to Aquinas the relation between body and soul distinguishes 
or individuates the person. Thomas’ particular mode of distinguishing the individual 
human composite of body and soul is founded on the theology arising out of the tree of 
good and evil. I argue that this mode is not the proper mode of individuation of the 
human composite. A metaphor is necessary to better understand my argument. 
Thomas employs the example of a signet-ring forming a seal on softened wax that 
signifies or represents a king, or, for that matter, any person. The ring images the 
softened wax. The ring changes the un-formed or potentiality of the ‘lump of wax’ into a 
‘being’, in one instance an intentional being, that causes movement and imparts 
knowledge to those who recognize the significance of the seal. In the other instance the 
seal is also a natural being; it exists in space-time. As a natural being it does not enjoy the 
same power as the intentional being. It is in this sense then that Thomas states that the 
soul is the form of a physically organized body. It is in this sense that we may understand 
the proper human soul as the seal of the Creator in the created universe as the Creator’s 
stewards.  
Unlike the wax employed in the above example, the signet-ring, comparatively 
speaking, is indestructible and incorruptible. The human soul, as the signet-ring of the 
body, is incorruptible and indestructible. Finally, an important aspect of incorruptibility is 
that the proper human soul, the proper human intellect, conforms to truth. Thomas 
makes a startling comment in answering the objections of article 2. He states that the 
human soul has the ability to “know the natures of all corporeal things.” He qualifies his 
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statement with “whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own 
nature” which suggests that human beings cannot know the true nature of other human 
beings which seems to be contradictory.175 On this point I part company with Thomas’ 
conclusions. The Adamic couple, Mary the mother of Jesus, and, the human Jesus himself 
seemed to know, or be aware of the true nature of the other. Thomas conclusion is that 
the human mind or human intellect knows its own corporeal nature because the mind is 
immaterial and is not per se part of the body; it is however, united to it, which brings us to 
another difficulty.  
According to Aquinas, by its very nature the human soul cannot know other 
human intellects directly but only indirectly through the human body’s accidents. If we 
turn to Scripture the redactor of the Gospel of John informs us that Jesus knows his sheep 
as his Father knows him (John 10: 14-15) suggests that the human soul of Jesus is aware 
or knows the substantial form of the individuals of his flock through the eyes of his 
heavenly Father. Is Jesus’ human soul different than the ordinary human soul? Or, is it the 
imposed accidental properties of the original sin that prevents the ordinary human soul to 
be more fully aware of its own essence and that of others? The answers to these 
questions and the relation of the Christ soul to the ordinary human soul are more 
completely developed in Chapter 3. 
The next important question concerns the relation of the soul to the body.  
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Question 76: The union of body and soul 
  
 The mode by which the body and soul are unified in Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysic 
is what differentiates Thomism from all other philosophies.176 My interpretation of the 
mode of the body-soul union is the point that introduces the most tension concerning 
Thomas’ teachings. Thomism is founded on the Aristotelian philosophy that the proper 
composition of the human person is that of a hylemorphic union of corporeal body and 
immaterial soul. In this union Thomas and Aristotle refer to the corporeal body which is, 
in my interpretation, the matter signified as the garment of the flesh of the animal worn 
by fallen human entities. Humanity’s imposed garment camouflages the true aspect of 
human nature.  
 Thomas commences Question 76 with an assertion that the intellectual principle is 
the form of man and is united to it. According to Aristotle human beings understand 
because the intellectual principle is their form and as such equates soul with the 
intellectual principle. The intellectual principle initiates the operation of the intellect. 
Aquinas continues by adding that “knowledge is a form of the soul” and draws a logical 
inference; nothing can move unless it is in act,177 that is, it is not in potency. By definition 
the soul is the principle of act of the body. The soul is a substantial form that not only 
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subsists in itself, but also gives subsistence to the signet-matter of the body. Therefore 
the soul is the primary principle of everything the body accomplishes especially 
understanding. He then adds that as the form of the body, a requirement of the soul is to 
be conscious of being aware that one is aware of one’s own awareness. He concludes that 
because one understands and one senses, then “in some way *the soul+ is united to the 
body.” Thomas explains that the union of the immaterial soul is united to the body 
through the intelligible species, which reside in the possible intellect – the store-house of 
ideas, concepts but not memories. Memories, the record, in this instance, of past events, 
are stored in the passive intellect which is also linked to the phantasms which reside in 
the corporeity of the brain.  
A crucial aspect of Thomas’ cognition theory is relevant for my thesis. 
  
“ […] knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings [animals, 
therefore the animal soul] in that the latter possess only their own form, while 
the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other 
thing; for the species [idea, concept] of the thing known is in the knower.”178  
In other words Thomas states that the human mind abstracts, from the object perceived, 
an intelligible species of that object. Abstracted species resemble universals in their 
mental composition. However, in the present state the human soul can only abstract 
sensible objects and not immaterial substances. In tension with Aquinas I claim that the 
soul is created to be naturally aware of soulful-type substances, but are hidden from view 
by the clothes of the flesh of the animal. This notion, which is a consequence of original 
sin, is further unpacked at the end of this chapter. 
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 Following Aristotle again, Thomas assigns the same logic to the nature of human 
beings. We know the nature of an entity by what is does. Tigers are carnivores because 
they hunt for meat; human beings are human beings because their proper operation is to 
understand, to be rational. Entities (species) take their natures or essences as their form 
and the proper form of human beings is the rational soul. In comparing the human being 
species to the feline species as an example, the more a species is removed from the 
matter (potency) of its body, the more “noble” it is, which means the closer to God it is.  
Again, a consequence of original sin is the reduction in the nobility of human nature is 
also investigated at the end of the chapter. 
Question 77: The Powers of the Soul 
The powers of the soul are those powers that direct the operation of the soul to 
move the human body and are distinguished into five categories: "the vegetative, the 
sensitive, the appetitive, the movement according to place, and the intellectual."179 It is 
the intellectual power that is of interest for it is also termed ‘soul’ which does not, 
according to Thomas, reside in matter but is united to it. The essence or nature of the 
human intellectual or rational soul is to act, which is the rationale for Thomas to assert 
that the first act of the soul is to cause the reduction of matter from potentiality to 
actuality. Act implies movement and Thomas looks to the four dimensional existence of 
the created world to define the matrix within which the human soul is.180 The powers of 
the soul are as numerous and as varied as there are operations of the human body. The 
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most obvious operations are seeing, hearing and tasting. The less obvious are, for 
example, digestion, endocrinal activities and hepatic functions.     
 Although I follow Thomas regarding the general direction of the movement of the 
human composite, that is, towards ultimate happiness which is found in God, Thomas and 
I are not as congruent as to which powers enact such movement. Thomas understands 
the soul’s intentional nature as the will’s power of thrusting forth into the dimensioned 
universe. (Note that the term ‘will’ represents a principle of the soul, but can also be 
employed as a power of the soul as well. The will and intellect have the unique relation of 
joining the immaterial with the material.) I take a more adventurous stand and look to the 
Thomistic power of intentionality as a relation that is not only inherent in the very 
essence of the soul, but is also anchored in the suppositum of God where the origin of 
humanity resides. Perhaps I have elevated the notion of intentionality, a subset of the 
will, to a principle over and above what it is metaphysically capable of performing. 
However, I claim that it is the divine intentional act that stretches forth in the creation of 
the universe. The human soul, as a similitude and steward of God, is endowed through 
and with and in God, with this bi-directional intentional attribute. To peek further into my 
development of the human soul, and with regards to the human soul’s origin, one could 
say that the soul requires a firm launch pad and divine fuel (divine grace in the act of 
creation) to thrust itself forward. The human soul’s launch pad is the memory of what it is 
to be human and in this manner the relation of will and intellect are joined into the 
human reality. With the terms of this question established let us return to Question 77. 
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Question 77 starts with the concept that the powers of the human soul are not of 
the same order as the soul’s essence since power and act are not of the same genus. With 
regards to the soul, its act is its substance. Act denotes a portion of potentiality. In other 
words, as the soul actualizes matter, a movement from potential to act, and since 
matter’s essence is pure potential, it is in the soul’s essence to reduce the matter of the 
body from potential to act. Knowledge and love are essentially inherent in the soul and 
therefore the human soul employs these two principles in its act. The soul’s power, which 
is directed to its specific act by the will, is not only known by the relation of its act with 
the object of the act, but also through an intentional relation inherent in the act with the 
object as enacted by the totality of the intellective soul. The ultimate end of the 
intellective soul is ‘truth’. The veracity of these relations are Thomas’ mode of 
determining truth in the act; truth in Thomistic terms is conformity of subject to object 
being understood as being the same; Socrates is white, for example.181 The perception of 
truth however is of another matter since the intellect as a principle acts through the 
powers of the soul, which are contingent on the corporeity of the body, which has a 
certain degree of potential, which may equate to error. Aquinas asserts that “substantial 
forms … are unknown to us, but are known by their accidents”182 which I claim is a 
consequence of original sin thus diminishing the nobility of human nature. An example of 
a noble feature of the human soul is to perceive truth. Although the perceived truth that 
Socrates is white on the surface seems to be known truthfully, what is not known is 
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Socrates inner truthfulness. What is not known for certainty, as an example, is his 
rationale to choose death. Socrates’ inner nature is camouflaged by the garment of the 
skin of the animal he so willingly discarded. The concept of truth inherent in the human 
soul is further investigated at the end of the chapter. 
 Aquinas then establishes his notion that the separated soul does not enjoy all its 
powers as it does in being united to its body. Some powers are shared with the sensitive 
nature of the soul and therefore function solely in the composite of body and soul. The 
separated soul cannot taste for example. However all of the principles that are essential 
to the human composite are inherent in the human soul. For example, the blind person 
can see only potentially because the principle of seeing is in the human soul but the 
operation to see is in the eye. Aquinas makes a distinction between the soul as a sentient 
being that feels, something rough or smooth, which is through the body versus the 
mindful act of feeling happy or sad which reside in the soul. The powers of the soul, that 
are solely of the soul, such as feeling happy or sad, “belong to the soul alone as their 
subject; as the intelligence and the will”, which the soul retains even after being 
separated from the body which occurs after death. The sensory feeling of roughness or 
smoothness is perceived through the body’s perceptive senses and pass through the 
phantasm to the brain from which the human rational soul or mind may extract the 
acquired knowledge for future use.  
Question 78: Preamble to the Intellect 
Question 78 prepares Thomas’ students for the more complex question 79.  
Aquinas has divided question 78 into two main sections. The first provides an 
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understanding of the corporeal powers and the second prepares the reader to better 
understand Thomas’ teaching regarding incorporeal powers. Thomas establishes the 
distinction between an extrinsically oriented intention and an intrinsically oriented 
intention as that which requires the brain-mind relation for the former, and a mind-only-
property for the latter. It is in the latter that my argument becomes speculative.  
In question 78 Thomas presents the transcendental183 nature of the intellective 
soul which is based on his understanding of cognitive process of intentionality in 
corporeal experiences.  The main feature of question 78 is to assist in the apprehension of 
intentionality as it relates to the immaterial world of the mental and divine. As Thomas 
has demonstrated elsewhere, corporeity or matter is to the soul as potency is to actuality. 
As we proceed through question 78, it becomes evident that two distinctive intrinsic 
understandings184 of the term ‘intentional’ emerge.  
As mentioned previously, the human soul is immaterial and a subsistent being. All 
three Aristotelian souls harmoniously subjugate the matter of the body to their powers. 
These souls also provide a causal relation between the intrinsic and extrinsic principles as 
efficient causes are to instrumental causes which, for example, provides for self-
locomotion. Citing Avicenna Thomas distinguishes five interior powers that are inherent 
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to the sensitive soul "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and 
memorative powers."  
Situating question 78 within the context of the thesis, and, although more 
adventurously than Thomas’ view, a proper intentional and intrinsic function of the 
human soul is to form an awareness of another human soul.185 “For the intellect, as we 
have seen above (Question 78, Article 1), has an operation extending to universal 
being.”186 The human soul was not created with the intent to acquire knowledge through 
the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The human soul is designed to communicate with 
and through God. The present matter of the ordinary human composite limits the human 
soul’s natural ability to be aware of the other soul’s presence because it is rooted in the 
individuation principle rising out of the tree of knowledge. Thomas teaches that a relation 
between the mind and an external, four-dimensional object truly exists; he also teaches 
that an awareness of a mind-to-mind as a subject-object entity that is not only immaterial, 
but exists only as two unconnected intellectual souls. In tension with Thomas’ teaching I 
argue that the perfected or proper human soul could enjoy an awareness of other 
intellectual souls. Such awareness would be acquired through God and the harmonious 
and unifying gifts of the Holy Spirit as did the earthly Jesus and the pre-lapsarian Adam 
and Eve. 
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Returning to the specifics of question 78, according to Thomas the human 
sensitive soul is rudimentary in its operation and he compares most of the sensitive soul’s 
powers to that of other mammals. Interestingly he asserts that animals have the ability to 
know intentions of other animals, not through the senses, but perceived by the estimative 
power; sheep naturally know the intention of a wolf. Such intentions in human beings are 
stored in the memorative power faculty of the sensitive soul, where the memory, the 
abstracted form of past events reside. The animal and human being mode of intentional 
behaviour differ because such intentional abilities, in the animal, are natural to its being. 
In contrast human beings construct a coalition of ideas to understand the intention of the 
other. Human beings think by combining processes of the physical brain with the 
processes of the immaterial mind to form concepts. The intentional thinking of another 
being and memories that reside in that particular being’s brain are stored by the 
memorative power and the formed intention is shared by the brain and mind. We can 
place Thomas’ teaching into a more modern framework.  
Certain aspects of an animal’s DNA/RNA structure provide animals with the ability 
to determine the intentions of another, although experience in the animal’s environment 
is also required. Science has shown us that with regards to all animals, including human 
beings, the memory of what it is to be that particular animal or human resides in the 
DNA/RNA structure. The DNA/RNA structure is nature’s means to transfer natural 
knowledge from parent to child. In metaphysical parlance the origin of knowledge for the 
child resides potentially in the parents and then actually in the child, who then is 
potentially the origin for the next generation and so on. In an anthropological sense 
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human generation is a similitude of the creative act of God as Father. Residing within the 
suppositum of the parents is the corporeal memory of what it is to be human. The mental 
or soulful intention of the parents, in their generative capacity, is to stretch forth as a 
survival technique of the species, or for a believer, to fulfill the goodness of having 
children. (Genesis 1: 28) The concept of intention in this specific case is different than the 
formerly defined meaning of intention as one who is logically apprehending another 
being’s intentions, or, the modern understanding of one who intends to drink a glass of 
water. Instead, I prefer the meaning of the term ‘intention’ as employed by the 
Scholastics, that is, to stretch forth. The term intention is characterized as a metaphysical 
relation between potency and actuality and not the movement from one physical position 
to another. Therefore the concept of intentionality is that which is primarily directed from 
the mind towards an immaterial entity. 
The ultimate happiness for the believing Christian is the Triune God through Christ 
as mediator. The inference here is that the intentional act is one of relation. Thomas 
Aquinas and other Scholastic thinkers consider intention as a stretching forward of the 
intellectual soul. In order for there to be a proper relation with any intentional act it must 
be rooted in the past so that its forward stretching mode is done so with certainty.  
Mortimer Adler states that “it is the immateriality of the power of conceptual 
thought that must be posited in order to explain the mental acts that cannot be 
adequately explained in neurological terms alone.”187 Adler proceeds to demonstrate 
quite forcefully that Thomas Aquinas differentiates between intentional acts that are in 
                                                     
187




the brain-physical world and intentional acts that reside solely in the mind but extend into 
the physical world immaterially. The former are the ‘intentional’ acts of perceiving, 
memorizing and imagining, whereas the latter are intellectual intentional acts such as 
conceptual reasoning, judging and logical reasoning.   
Question 79: The Intellectual Powers 
 Thomas starts this strategic question by affirming that the human soul’s intellect is 
a power and not its essence. As such the act of learning or acquiring knowledge is not 
immediate either for the corporeal bound human soul or for the separated soul. The 
distinction of the intellect as a power demonstrates that there are activities within the 
human soul that are initiated by the differing genera within the soul, such as the 
appetitive soul and the intellectual soul. Each of these souls perform their own function 
but in harmony, theoretically, with each other.  
 Although question 79 regards the intellectual power of the human soul, there are 
critical metaphysical assertions that Thomas presents to the reader. In his respondeo to 
article 2 Thomas describes the nature of being (ens) as being passive with regards to the 
intellect.  
“First, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which 
belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination, as when 
water loses coolness by heating […] 
 
Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive when something, whether 
suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it.  
Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what 
is in potency to something receives that to which it was in potency without 
being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potency to 
act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to 
understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the 
intellect, as we have seen above (Question 78, Article 1), has an operation 
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extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in 
act or potency by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect 
to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is 
that of the act of all being, and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence 
of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause.” 
(emphasis added) 
Aquinas advocates that the human soul inheres the specific ability or power to determine 
whether it should act in a passive or active mode of learning. The degree of passivity is a 
function of the source of the knowledge. The intellectual soul, because in its present state 
acquires knowledge through the tree of good and evil, is primarily passive in its learning 
mode. The intellectual soul absorbs the stimuli presented to it through the phantasms. In 
the more perfect realm of the sinless soul, acquisition of knowledge I conclude is in an 
active mode. The sinless soul sees through the eyes of God; it is therefore actively seeking 
or perhaps more accurately turning towards God for knowledge. 
In his response to the objections Thomas describes a property of the human soul 
that is rarely discussed. Thomas’ intent in this article is to articulate the inferences and 
meaning of an entity, a thing, that is passive. In modern terms, for the most part passivity 
refers to being ‘receptive’. The property that Thomas describes in article 2 illuminates 
how the human soul suffers additional potency and vice versa enjoys additional degrees 
of actuality depending on its relation to the Divine intellect. Two aspects regarding the 
human soul’s nature must be considered. 
The first and most crucial aspect as it pertains to my arguments is that it is possible 
for the nature of the ‘thing’ to be altered either negatively or positively; the soul may be 
affected by more potentiality, or by more actuality. In its present state the ordinary 
human soul does not enjoy the constancy of the Triune God but instead is rooted in the 
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vagarities of the tree of knowledge. The soul that moves closer to God, gains in actuality, 
and the converse is also true. The second refers to the suitability of the act. In other 
words the act of taking something away is irrelevant to merit or demerit. The removal 
may refer to removing something negative like blindness or the contrary, taking away 
sightedness. However, most fundamental to my argument is the relation the soul has with 
the Divine Being. The original sin of humanity changed the nature of the relation of the 
human soul with its body. The nature of the human soul does not change. Rather it is the 
soul’s power to form relations and to actualize entities with added degrees of potency, or, 
potencies that are immune to the acting principles of the human soul. I further develop at 
the end of this chapter my thoughts regarding the impact on the soul’s power to be fully 
endowed with its proper being as a consequence of original sin.  
 The next teaching of Thomas is again particularly difficult and vast. Therefore I will 
follow a strictly narrow and specific teaching of Thomas. The cognitive process of the soul 
to acquire knowledge, to understand what is acquired and to store the understood 
species is at the heart of Thomism. Firstly, the species that is received into the passive 
intellect is received in “the mode of the recipient.”188  The cognitive process is a series of 
potencies and acts until understood. Thomas’ reasoning is that until a perceived object is 
understood it not only is in potency to its full actualization of being understood, but until 
it is understood and for only “retaining species *ideas which are universals+”189 it cannot 
be part of the intellect. Furthermore, Thomas teaches that if included in the definition of 
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memory are past events, then it is not possible for memory to be part of the intellective 
soul because in this instance past events are set in concrete and are therefore considered 
as individuals.  The mode of acquiring knowledge of individuals is through the phantasms. 
 The phantasms, according to Aquinas, “are actual images of certain species, but 
are immaterial in potentiality.”190 Thomas’ employment of the term ‘certain species’ 
refers solely to that which the senses can perceive. The role of the phantasm is to abstract 
the form of the perceived object and store it in the passive intellect (memory). The 
passive intellect resides in the sensitive soul – the Schoolmen’s term for a part of the 
human brain. Therefore, quite brilliantly, Thomas asserts that the memorized or 
abstracted form of the entity is materially stored but is immaterially available (potentially) 
for the intellective (intellectual) soul, the human mind, to actualize through the agent 
intellect (the will). The abstraction process is only feasible with sensible or in Thomistic 
terms, ‘individual species’. The actualization of the in-potency immaterial abstracted form 
is the universalization of the individual into a universal entity. An example may clarify. 
 During the human sensory process of perceiving an animal, such as a horse, the 
image of the horse is stored in the brain’s capacity for memory. The image is quite 
specific, but prone to error or more accurately inaccurate recall. In order to employ the 
stored image of the horse the human mind logically re-constructs a mental image from 
the universal nature of horseness. The image of the re-constructed horse is in effect all 
horses and in this manner the human intellect can then manipulate, or, re-interpret, or, 
re-create the memorized object as required by the particular situation. For instance, an 
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artist will paint an equivocal image of the horse emphasizing those aspects of the horse 
the artist wishes to portray.  
 Thomas’ teaching on this subject is unpacked primarily in Chapter 3. However, in 
anticipation, the encounter with Thomas the Apostle with the risen Christ in the upper 
chamber (John 20:19) serves as a biblical lesson applicable to this particular abstraction 
process of Thomas Aquinas and furthers my argument regarding Jesus’ apperceptive 
mode of awareness of human souls. The Apostle encountered or perceived Christ as one 
who is. I propose that at least initially Thomas perceived the risen Christ through his own 
lens of the tree of knowledge. In this sense, Christ was perceived as an individual in space-
time which, according to Thomas Aquinas necessitates retention of the species of Christ in 
the memorative power which is not in the rational soul. Yet Thomas the Apostle instantly 
knew or more accurately was aware that Jesus is Divine, which is a universal concept or 
species and resides in the intellective soul. Aquinas clearly states that reception is in the 
mode of the knower. The Apostle’s instantaneous understanding of the Divinity of Jesus 
is, according to Aquinas, for the soul to “apprehend intelligible truth.”191 If we consider 
the degree of potency differential between the Christ soul and the Thomas soul, and, 
employ Aquinas’ Aristotelian teaching “Now nothing is reduced from potency to act 
except by something in act.” (Ia. Q. 79, A3. respondeo) we may be in a better position to 
more fully apprehend the metaphysical and real relation between the two souls.  At the 
fall of humanity, God added a degree of potency and thus the ordinary human soul’s 
power to actualize is insufficient. During his encounter with the risen Christ, the added 
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potency of the fallen signet-matter of Thomas the Apostle’s body, fell away or was 
bypassed by a communicatio Christi. In other words Thomas was necessarily unified with 
Christ to see as Jesus sees, to hear as Jesus hears and to know truth as Jesus knows Truth. 
The potency of the garment of the skin of the animal was discarded, at least momentarily, 
so that Thomas could perceive without employing the phantasm. In Thomas’ truth-
exchange with Christ Thomas’ knowledge acquisition was through God and not through 
the tree of knowledge of good and evil. 
Thomas the Apostle knew both the universality and individuality of the God-man 
and such a quandary requires faith to reconcile at the personal level. Metaphysically 
though, perhaps there is some illumination and therefore reconciling the seeming 
contradiction to Aquinas’ teaching is a daunting task and is left to Chapter 3. 
Question 82: The Will 
 The underlying purpose of the act of the human will is to seek happiness. 
According to Thomas, the human will is intentioned to seek God as the end of its desires. 
Obviously the atheist does not agree with Thomas. The atheist soul may consider as its 
primary happiness an ethical and moral approach to the human condition. Contrary to the 
atheist, some Christian souls may seek personal comfort as their primary happiness. 
Thomas differentiates the two approaches to happiness. The first is the will as acting 
necessarily, and the second is the will as acting contingently. The key to understanding 
Thomas’ teaching on the will is whether or not the particular act of the will enjoys 
“connection with first principles.”192  
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 The human soul’s first principles are in a causal relation with the soul’s first act of 
being which inherently, or perhaps out of necessity, have a relation with truth. The act of 
existence is a truth-kind, or, a truth-event. The act of existence therefore establishes a 
hierarchy of operations that determine under which circumstances the act of the will is 
superior to the intellect and vice versa.  
 The act of human existence is a two part causal event joining the agent of the 
cause and the beneficiary of the effect of the cause. Lawrence Dewan O. P. treats the 
relation between the cause and effect of human creation as a “relation between the 
creature’s substantial form and the divine act of being.”193 Dewan continues: 
“we must exhibit the kinship between form and act of being within the creature. 
There is a continuity, to be seen stretching from God as the subsisting act of 
being both to the creaturely form and to creaturely act of being.”194 
Independently Anthony Kenny, paraphrasing Aquinas, is of the same mind as Dewan and 
notes that the “activity of the will is the will’s tending towards the extramental (sic) reality 
as it is in itself.”195 Dewan’s and Kenny’s thinking regarding the employment of the divine 
will and the creature’s will follow a common scheme. Both wills stretch forward; as both 
wills tend towards something, each are true to their essences; both wills exhibit a feature 
of continuity between the mind and the extramental; both wills are related as artist to the 
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art, the divine Artist being the causal exemplar of the art. Consequently, the human soul 
must choose between that which is nobler and that which is less so. The distance from 
God the human soul chooses is proportional to the degree the human soul is able to enact 
the proper use of its will. If the object of desire is nobler than the human soul then it is 
better to enact the will, than the intellect, since love is an act of the will and not the 
intellect. The converse is also true. The causal exemplar relation between God the Father, 
the Son and the human soul of Christ, and, the ordinary human soul as it pertains to the 
intentional nature of the act of will is further addressed in Chapter 3. 
Question 84: How the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It.  
In Question 84 Thomas considers the operation of the soul through the human 
body, specifically the relation of the human soul to the phantasms through which the soul 
is in relation to the external world. The substance of question 84 is complex especially due 
to the issues it raises concerning Thomas Aquinas’ cognitive process of employing the 
phantasms. Aquinas is correct in his teaching regarding the employment of the phantasms 
which today we would call images for the ordinary human composite. Phantasma are 
more than just images; they are the carriers of sensory perception and present the 
perceived image to the intellect. The intellect then causes the phantasm to be intelligible. 
The phantasm functions between the sensory and mental realms of the human composite 
of body and soul. The phantasm is also the contact with the tree of knowledge. However, 
instead of focusing primarily on question 84, I intend to employ support from question Ia 
Q. 14. A13 of the Summa theologiae which demonstrates a possible knowledge 
acquisition process of sinless human beings. Previously I introduced the notion of de re/de 
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dictum distinction as a modern understanding of the Scholastic modes of reality to 
demonstrate the separation between natural and the intentional realms of existence. 
Question 14 addresses, in part this distinction. The relation of de re and de dictum 
propositions and understanding the Scholastic use of these terms and how it relates the 
perception or certainty of truth are necessary to my arguments concerning the human 
soul’s relations. If I am to remove the process of acquiring knowledge through the 
perceiving lens of the tree of knowledge, I must replace it with a credible and coherent 
philosophy. However, prior to diving into these complex relations, we will start with a 
synopsis of question 84 and the pertinent articles. 
Knowledge acquired by the body “is immaterial, universal, and necessary.”196 
Citing Aristotle, Thomas speaks of the newly created soul as “a tablet on which nothing is 
written.”197 And, citing Augustine, Thomas concludes that the soul cannot be aware of 
itself through the senses. The soul is ignorant of itself since it is not possible for it to know 
or be aware of any thing that is in potency; that part which is in potency is non-existent. 
Furthermore in article 3 Thomas asserts that the human soul is in potency “to all such 
species.” Augustine states that “we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the 
senses of the body.”198 To apprehend Thomas’ inference that the human soul is in 
potency regarding knowledge of material entities, one must dive into the heart of 
question 84, which is article 7. Thomas brings to light a critical aspect of his cognition 
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theory. “In the present state of life … it is impossible for our intellect to understand 
anything actually except by turning to the phantasms ... [which] is the likeness of an 
individual thing.”199  
Phantasms are inherent to the cognition process of Thomas and accordingly 
provide two essential cognition services. Firstly, the phantasms acquire the perceived 
external stimuli for the human soul. Secondly, the phantasms make the received stimuli 
available for the intellect to transform the stimuli into information that can be understood 
which is  
“the proper object of the human intellect […] a quiddity existing in corporeal 
matter. [W]e apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. 
And, therefore, for the intellect to understand […] it must turn […] to the 
phantasms in order to examine the universal nature existing in the individual.”  
Furthermore, trying to understand, but not completely succeeding, the intellect “forms 
certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples.”200 (emphasis added) Thomas’ 
enlightenment of intellectualizing by way of examples provides the student with the 
foundation for the next step of learning by which he describes the rationale for using the 
phantasms. In order to apprehend through the operation of understanding, the human 
intellect abstracts the quiddity or nature of individual being from the phantasm.201 The 
nature of an individual thing, that which it is, is its quiddity. In this sense then the quiddity 
is not stored as an individual entity, but as a universal species which can then be 
employed to construct complex notions. Universal concepts are not stored in the 
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corporeal part of the human but instead these types of phantasms reside in the 
immaterial part of the soul-body composite; it is stored in the phantasia, the Scholastic 
term for ‘imagination’. The human soul acquires specific knowledge through the physical 
phantasms, stores and manipulates these specific episodes and individual beings, either in 
the passive intellect, the memory power of the brain, and stores the abstracted universals 
in the phantasia, the imagination center of the mind. From these storage houses, the 
agent intellect, the thinking part of the soul, abstracts the intelligible species, or idea, 
from the passive intellect and/or the phantasia to think. In the metaphysical relation 
between the ordinary human soul and the Christ soul, I believe that in certain events, 
such as the encounter Thomas the Apostle had with the risen Christ, and, the earth-bound 
Christ had with the Samaritan woman (John 4:7-26) employment of the phantasms is not 
contingent on the action of the sensible soul. In these instances the Christ soul, before 
and after rising from the dead, knows not through perception but through his relation 
with his divine Father just as the first humans communicated with God before they tasted 
the fruit of the tree of knowledge.  
“Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself […] 
Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in 
which they are subject to the divine knowledge […] but not absolutely as 
considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known 
by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the 
thing [de re], or to the saying [de dictum]. If it refers to the thing, it is divided 
and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If 
understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This 
proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."  
 
The issue Thomas faces in the above discourse is that a de re proposition of a composite, 
such as the composite of the body and soul of human beings, is inherently false. 
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Knowledge gained through the phantasms, as has been previously stated, is also 
inherently false. We know from the Gospel narrative of John that Jesus knew the truth 
hidden in the composite of body and soul of the Samaritan woman. We know from 
Genesis that God knows Adam and Eve, and, Adam and Eve knew God, naturally. Neither 
God nor Adam and Eve acquired such knowledge through the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil. Aquinas would distinguish between a de re being and a de dictum being as “with 
forms that are separable…” which I understand to include forms that are contingently or 
potentially separable.  
““Everything known by God must necessarily be,” is usually distinguished, for 
this may refer to the thing, or to the saying […] [T]his distinction holds good with 
regard to forms that are separable from the subject; […] in forms that are 
inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I 
said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known 
by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be not 
known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is 
known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import 
an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself 
(even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands 
under actual knowledge; thus material being is attributed to a stone in itself, 
which is not attributed to it according as it is known.”202 
 
Scholastic metaphysical thinkers employ de re distinction in a real mode and in logical 
propositions. C. J. F. Williams comments that the former interpretation is foreign to 
modern semantic or epistemic philosophy. Theologically speaking however, there is a case 
for de re knowledge to be truthful if one bases this supposition on biblical narratives.203 
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In the above reply to objection 3 regarding the falsity of knowledge from the 
reality of the composite, the human soul has taken a backward step due to original sin 
and now must interpret reality through the tree of knowledge of good and evil.  
Furthermore, prior to the their disobedience the pre-lapsarian humans named 
the animals and therefore contrary to the teaching of Thomas and the Philosopher, the 
natural state of the newly created human being is not a blank slate but acquires 
knowledge through a veil of potency that blinds the human soul. In a seeming reversal of 
his teaching, again building on Augustine’s work, Thomas affirms that “the intellective 
soul knows all true things in the eternal types.”204   
My concept of added potency of the garments of the skin of the animal is the 
present reality of humanity. The added potency is, in a sense foreign to the original 
human soul, and unpacking this concept in Chapter 3 may provide a metaphysical and 
spiritual apprehension that provides a more meaningful relation with God.  
Question 87: How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself  
 The fundamental understanding of question 87 is that the human soul does not 
know itself through its own essence. The human soul understands itself as it understands 
corporeal substances, that is, through the Aristotelian principle of likeness-knows-
likeness. In order for the soul to know likeness, the object must be in act, and therefore, 
as being, it is also true. Thomas makes the point that the human soul cannot know 
primary matter (which is matter in pure potency) unless it has received form, i.e., the act 
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of being. Thomas teaches that intellectual beings know themselves by their essence, but 
in the order of intellectual species there is a hierarchy of being, essences and 
understanding through a being’s essence.  
 God knows himself and all others through his Essence perfectly; angels know 
themselves through their own essence perfectly and others as well but imperfectly; the 
human intellect, directed towards substance, that is matter, is in potency to “the genus of 
intelligible beings.”205 Therefore the human soul knows itself only through its act. 
However, as stewards and having been given the power to name animals and to know 
God, an underlying principle of identity must exist in the human soul which is unique 
amongst all creatures. The principle of identity is not only a participation in God through 
our created likeness, but is necessary for human beings to function as God’s stewards. 
The soul’s principle of identity, as with many other soulful principles, is somewhat 
impotent against the added layer of impotency imparted at the fall by God. The added 
potency not only prevents us from direct communication with God, but also prevents us 
from being truly aware of the quiddity of all beings which I assert is fundamental in 
humanity’s stewardship role. Although we still have the right of naming, we do so in a 
handicapped fashion. 
 Recall that ‘act’ of the human soul is a process of abstracting a species or idea 
from a sensible object during the sensible process of perceiving, which are stored as 
phantasms and then through the agent intellect is actuated, made to exist, in the possible 
intellect, the imagination, which is that part of the mind that actualizes i.e., understands. 
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The rational soul knows itself according to a causal instrumentality of the abstracted idea 
or intelligible species which are necessary to light-up the possible intellect, i.e., the 
imagination of the mind since we no longer acquire divine knowledge directly to light-up 
the possible intellect. The agent intellect, the will, employs the phantasma, not the 
specific phantasm, but the process of phantasy, to act as a causal instrument for 
understanding.  
“And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an 
exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.”206 
 
The act of perceiving we may therefore apprehend as being joined with the exemplar, the 
intentional principles, and, power which is brought into operation through the sensory 
apparatus of seeing, hearing, touching and tasting. Stimuli are always received by the 
brain as knowledge from the past. In other words, scientifically speaking, all stimuli, 
received by the senses in the operation of perception, promulgates as a wave function. 
And, since there is a duration, for the wave to travel from the object to the perceiving 
organ and then to the brain and then to the totality of the mind, even if it is infinitesimally 
small, the object is known only in the past tense. The operative power of perception is a 
critical metaphysical notion for my thesis. Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotelian 
orthodoxy that perception is the abstraction of the whole, that is, the universal through 
the phantasia.  The haecceitically impeded soul being instantiated locally apprehends 
primarily through the material and immaterial phantasms and phantasy.  The human soul 
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is not necessarily instantiated nor extended locally, but may operate in a nonlocal but 
extended determination. We know from biblical accounts of Jesus’ glorified body that 
there is the possibility of a purely locally extended instantiation. John Wippel provides 
powerful interpretations on Aquinas’ rendering of indeterminate and determinate 
dimensions with regards to individuation.207   
“Thomas never changed his mind concerning the kind of dimensions involved in 
individuation. [H]e defends designated matter as considered under determined 
dimensions [and] he just as clearly allows this function to be fulfilled by matter 
… at least under indeterminate dimensions.”208 
Wippel continues. Later in his life Thomas concluded that matter is individuated solely 
under determinate, that is space-time, dimensions. Although the thesis is in tension with 
Thomas on this point, the critical underpinning of Thomas’ theory of designated or signet-
matter is that it is a partner in the individuation of the entity. Once signet-matter has 
been informed by the soul, it follows the informing principle of the soul. As previously 
stated, glorified bodies seem to enjoy the principle of indeterminate and determinate 
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The Essence of the Soul, its Relation to its First Act and to Truth. 
Now that Thomas Aquinas’ view of the human soul is completed, in order to set 
the stage for the remainder of Chapter 2 I now introduce a very complex treatise on how 
Thomas understands the distinction between essence, quiddity, and esse, that is, actus 
essendi for created beings. I claim that it is at the level of humanity’s very being and 
essence that humanity’s soul was ‘punished’ by God after humanity’s original sin. For 
clarity I am not stating that the nature of the human soul was altered but that its relation 
to matter, truth and knowledge was altered in order to fit the choice of the Adamic 
couple. The mode of acquiring knowledge in the sensible world is such that it is somewhat 
foreign to the human soul. Thomas attacks the Aristotelian problem of the 
interchangeability of truth and being by relating truth and being to God at the very 
beginning of the Summa theologiae. Thomas writes:  
“On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental 
quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His 
existence.”210 
Since truth and being are interchangeable, existence cannot be an accidental factor in the 
substance of the subsisting uncreated nor created rational entity.  We learned in the 
previous section that being and truth, as it relates to existence, are interchangeable in the 
metaphysical theology of Thomas Aquinas. We also learned that the human soul cannot 
know the truth of being except through the senses. We also know that the pre-
resurrected Jesus Christ had an ability to be aware of the soul of another human being. 
One may argue that it is the proximity or unity or overburdening of Christ’s divine nature 
over his human nature that provided the necessary powers for Jesus’ human soul to be 
aware of soulful type substances. However, if such is the case then any rationale for the 
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human Jesus to be the mediator for humanity to the Father is incoherent.211 
Metaphysically Jesus’ human soul enjoys de re, i.e., direct, relations with the ordinary 
human soul just as he enjoys a direct relation with the Second Person of the Trinity. 
Contrary to Jesus, and because of humanity’s fallen nature, the ordinary human soul 
relates to other human souls and the Trinity is a de dicto, i.e., indirect but dependent 
mode. We are in relations to others through the soul’s perceptive powers. 
   Perhaps an analogy is in order to more fully comprehend Thomas’ point. We know 
and understand that the sun at noontime and the sun at dusk is the same existing object. 
We may acquire this knowledge first hand, de re, by seeing the sun traverse through the 
sky. Or, we may believe the testimony of one who has witnessed, de dicto, the day-long 
event. Or, we may logically determine that the noon day and latter day sun is the same 
being. From Thomas’ teaching above we can assert that the sun possesses the truth of its 
own being; the sun at dawn is the sun at dusk. The issue that faces the perceiving human 
being is that what is perceived at noontime does not seem to be the same object 
perceived at dusk. The copula, the sun is yellow versus the sun is red does not denote the 
same be-ing. There is an ambiguity here – three human beings, one perceiving the sun at 
noontime and the other at dusk, another throughout the day, may differ in their 
apperception212 of the truth-kind. One has a direct relation, de re and the other an 
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indirect relation, de dicto.213 Regardless, the perceiving human souls are fooled because of 
their relation to the potency of their own matter. 
“Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing 
is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is 
implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. 
Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; 
and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is.”214 (emphasis 
added)        
Metaphorically speaking, the bright, life-giving sun at noontime is the sinless human soul 
exemplified by the human Jesus. The cooler, less life-giving sun of dusk exemplifies the 
fallen human soul. The substance, that is, the substantial form of the souls of the two 
beings is identical. However the human soul lacks the dynamism to pierce through the 
added layers of earth’s atmosphere which is analogous to the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil, and therefore perceives the red and bloated evening sun. Based on the previous 
analogy, we now turn to a being that is animated. 
As one observes other human beings one apprehends, although subconsciously 
perhaps, several obvious but relative truths: regardless of colour, or size or shape we are 
of the same species, some are male, and some female, some with grey hair, and others 
may enjoy highlighted hair. Truth obtained from one’s observations depends on one’s 
perspective. The abstraction of who another is from the visual observation necessitates a 
second order operation. In other words the human mind or in Thomistic parlance the 
intellective soul performs the conscious determination to judge, formulate concepts and 
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arrive at a conclusion of the quiddity of the perceived individual. Irrespective as to how 
acutely one observes another, it is not possible for the human mind to be fully aware of 
other human beings let alone the particularity of their human minds.215 The ordinary 
human soul employs its imaginative power to judge and understand that which is ‘the 
other’. According to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, what we see in the first instance, we 
see truly. The received stimulus is a spiritual reception of a material form as a “spiritual 
change”216 in the human soul. Aquinas teaches that the operation of perceiving requires a 
physical change taking place in the sense-organ, and a mental event taking place in the 
rational soul. Aquinas is guided by Aristotle’s notion that corporeal activity cannot affect 
the incorporeal soul except through the composite of body and soul. Although this is 
basically true, some tensions face this interpretation.  
Notably, all sensory perception occurs in the past – what we see, hear, taste and 
feel has occurred – the received stimuli did not occur in the present. In one sense past 
perception of stimuli is a true reality. However, by the time the human brain receives and 
records the stimuli and re-interprets the data time has passed and the reality has 
changed. Not only does the sensation take time to reach the human sensory apparatus, 
but human beings do not have the ability, as many other animals do, to see in the 
ultraviolet, to hear in the ultrasound and to sense minutely present odours. Therefore 
human beings miss much of what the physical world offers. In other words human 
perceptive abilities cause incompleteness in the ability of the soul to form relations. 
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The human soul logically connects the received stimuli and the stored memory 
through the agent intellect to form a species i.e., a concept. In opposition to the 
perceiving act, whatever human beings contemplate in the mind occurs only in the 
present.217 Human beings can think about the past and dream about the future but 
human thoughts are forever in the present. Extending this concept to awareness of one’s 
being, awareness of one’s environment and awareness of another human being’s intrinsic 
essence, human beings are aware-of-their-own-awareness, solely in the present tense; 
human beings are unaware of the awareness of other human beings. Thomas Aquinas 
addresses these two modes of truth and the gap between true truth and less-true truth. 
The distinction between the two is complex, and, is present in the words of Jean-Paul II: 
“The words "I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself" (Gn 3:10), 
witness to a radical change in this relationship [God and humanity]. In a way, 
man loses the original certainty of the image of God, expressed in his body.218 He 
also loses to some extent the sense of his right to participate in the perception 
of the world, which he enjoyed in the mystery of creation. This right had its 
foundation in man's inner self, in the fact that he himself participated in the 
divine vision of the world and of his own humanity.”219 (emphasis added) 
The absence of the original gift of participating in the true perception of the world also 
prevents the human soul from the awareness of not only the truth of nonhuman entities, 
but more seriously the inability of the human soul to be aware of one’s own substantial 
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form and the form of other subsistent beings.220 Generally Thomistic thinkers rely on the 
following determination of Aquinas to describe the proper mode of human knowledge 
acquisition.  
“human souls differ from superior substances inasmuch as the human soul’s 
intellective power, by its very nature, must acquire its immaterial knowledge 
from the knowledge of material things attained through the senses.”221 
 
My response to Thomas’ view of this matter is as follows. The human soul is designed to 
communicate with its Creator, which is evident throughout the opening verses of Genesis. 
As such I claim that the human soul must have the ability or soulful principle to be able to 
acquire non-sensible, that is, divine knowledge. I believe that it is only in this manner that 
the Adamic couple could communicate with God, and unfortunately with the Serpent. 
Even after the betrayal the first human sinners still could properly dialogue with God. This 
communicating ability brings with it the power to properly abstract essences which are 
not prevented due to humanity’s covering of the garments of the skin of the animal   
Although one may think one has abstracted the essence of another human being as 
Thomas claims, one can only do so only partially. One cannot abstract another’s own self-
awareness and therefore is left with an incomplete notion or even a falsity of who the 
other person is. One’s own self-awareness resides in the immaterial soul where the ever 
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present reality of the passive intellect intermingles with the active intellect.  Thomas, 
citing Aristotle brings into play the notion that the human soul, specifically in this 
reference, the human intellect, is as a blank slate: “On the contrary, The Philosopher, 
speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is 
written."222 Aquinas makes the argument that the human intellect learns through sensory 
experiences only. Sensory experiences, which are transcribed to the passive intellect 
through the phantasms, are in the worst case inherently erroneous, or incomplete and 
prone to interpretive falsity. Acquiring knowledge through the phantasms prevents the 
natural ability of the human soul to be aware of immaterial entities whether it is mentally, 
psychologically, or physically sourced, as was shown in Chapter 2. The perception of 
another person, according to Aquinas, is the perception of a rational person, an individual 
who is understood as a composite of body and soul, which is also defined as a substance. 
Therefore, human beings are presented with a difficulty in obtaining truth; it is not 
possible to be aware of another human being’s self-awareness which resides in the 
human rational soul. As metaphysics is the study of being as being, it also entails 
awareness as awareness; human beings are aware that they are aware. However, from an 
epistemological stance there is a falsity imbedded in our awareness of the other. An 
ontological falsity is inherent in our ability to be aware of our own and other’s being qua 
being. The ordinary human soul is unable to be fully aware of another because we are 
extrinsically broken; we are clothed in the flesh of the animal and are separated from 
God.  
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 Humanity’s original mode of participation in the perception of the world grounds 
the foundation of the thesis: God created the human soul to be in communion and to 
communicate intimately with him. The design of the human soul is such that as God’s 
stewards it perceives the natural order most truthfully through the Divine’s lenses. 
Human souls that are unfettered by the limiting power of original sin enjoy a perception 
of creation different than the souls bound by original sin. Contrary to the sinless soul the 
ordinary soul’s bloated distance from God, caused by original sin, alienates humanity from 
God which, at least partially, limits the human soul’s ability to properly and consistently 
discern between right and wrong, truth and falsity.223 The soul’s vehicle to acquire 
knowledge and therefore its ability to discern, to understand and to judge requires one 
internal and one external metaphysical power.   The first power is inherent to the human 
soul and powers the human sensory apparatus but is created to acquire knowledge 
through it intimate relation with its Creator. The second is external to the soul and this 
power is inherent in esse naturale and drives the tree of knowledge of good and evil 
through which error-prone knowledge is transmitted.  Even though these metaphysical 
powers are contained in the same knowledge acquiring system, one receiving the other 
transmitting, their functionality is distinct. A temporal gap exists between the reception of 
knowledge and its transmission. Furthermore, the human sensory process of knowledge 
acquisition and the tree of knowledge’s process of transmission inheres another gap. Both 
the sensory acquisition and the tree of knowledge’s knowledge transmission relate solely 
to individual or specific knowledge whereas the human soul functions with the universal. 
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The gap or distinction between how the ordinary human mind functions with the brain 
results in the ordinary human being cognitively functioning in error.  
Thomas Aquinas teaches that with regards to the intellect, the power of the soul 
to acquire knowledge and therefore truth, necessitate two modes of cognition to properly 
function.  
“…because sense has singular things for its object, and intellect has the 
universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes 
before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our 
intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of act. But everything 
which proceeds from potency to act comes first to an incomplete act, which is 
midway between potency and act, before achieving the perfect act.”224 
(emphasis added) 
 
The process by which the ordinary human intellect (soul) proceeds from potency to act 
takes time, needs to be experienced and is error prone. The human intellect by acquiring 
knowledge via the tree of knowledge is unable to acquire knowledge through the Divine 
knowledge of the created order. Therefore, as the human soul apprehends, it can only 
proceed through varying degrees of potentiality which consists of the procession from a 
total lack of truth (an unknown) to truth as far as the human soul may achieve truth.  
Truth may be understood in two ways. Truth may be apprehended either as it resides 
formally and inherently in substantive entities, or, truth may be conceptualized 
intellectually or logically. Thomas teaches that the former concept inheres in a creature’s 
being and in its esse, and therefore is intrinsic to the individual. In this sense, truth, good, 
and, being are convertible.  
“The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (A.1). But the true 
that is in things is convertible with being as to substance, while the true that is 
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in the intellect is convertible with being as that which manifests with what is 
manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already 
(ibid.). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, 
as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth 
and being differ in idea.”225 
And, from Article 4 of the same question, 
“On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in 
some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore 
the true is prior to good.  
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to 
suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking 
absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true 
is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself 
simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as 
being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from 
the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true 
regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite [original righteousness], 
the true must be prior in idea to the good.”226 
 
Thomas presents notions, such as God is not contained by any limiting factors, and then 
extends his thinking to human composites in which, as Aristotle defined substance is a 
limiting principle to the actualizing act of the human soul. Aristotle’s ten categories, for 
example, quantity, quality and relation, describe these limitations. However, the pre-
lapsarian humans were not limited in the same manner or to the same extent as ordinary 
human souls are bounded. Adam and Eve were created with an incorruptible body as is 
narrated in Genesis 2:17 “but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not 
eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die” and “God created us for incorruption, 
(sic) and made us in the image of his own eternity.” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:23) Certainly 
accidents such as quality and relation would not have limited the pre-lapsarian beings as 
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ordinary human beings are limited.  Therefore, the first humans enjoyed a proper human 
body; a body that was devoid of all sin; a body, because of its closeness to God, enjoyed 
an original righteousness and did not suffer the same effects of disease etc., nor were 
they naturally attracted to concupiscence.227 The pre-lapsarian body, because of its 
closeness to God had the power to self-illuminate; that is, it had dominion over its 
environment which included an innate awareness of the essences of other beings. True 
stewardship necessitates the attribute of self-illumination. The pre-lapsarian awareness of 
another being’s essence would not have been the same universal awareness as ordinary 
human souls. No, the pre-lapsarian soul would know specifically the other.  
 “Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more 
contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a 
greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima 
iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form 
comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question [7], Article 
[1]) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly 
to a kind of infinity.”228  
 
In Thomistic terminology matter is the potency that is to be actualized through the 
actualizing principle of the human soul. I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that the 
human soul requires the causal exemplar act of the Son through the instrumental 
cause of the human soul of Christ to enact the human soul to sufficiently reduce 
the potency into a fully actualized human person. I also point out that according to 
Aristotle “the soul is in a sense all things.” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola employs 
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Aristotle’s insight and summarizes how the human person processes and 
understands acquired knowledge.  
“And if our unity is purchased by the enslavement of a reason submitted to the 
rule of the law of the members, that will be a false unity, since thus we shall not 
be true. For we are called and appear to be men, that is, animate beings living 
by reason; and yet we will be brutes, having for law only sensual appetite. We 
will be performing a juggling trick to those who see us, and among whom we 
live. The image will not conform to its exemplar. For we are made in the likeness 
of God, and God is spirit (John 4:24) but we are not yet spirits, to use St. Paul's 
words, (1 Corinthians 2: 14; 15:46) but animals. If, on the contrary, by grace of 
truth, we do not fall beneath our model, we have only to move towards Him 
who is our model, through goodness, in order to be united with Him in the 
afterworld (sic).”229   
 
“And so, what is corruptible in us must be clothed in holiness and 
incorruptibility; and what is mortal must be clothed, now that death has been 
conquered, in the Father’s immortality.” 230 
The Origin of the Rational Soul  
 “[…] Adam, who is a type of the one who was to come.” (emphasis added) Romans 5: 14b.
  
Citing Aquinas who cites Augustine,  
“Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to which 
the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is 
fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual 
creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.”"231 
 
Thomas Aquinas, citing Augustine of Hippo, defines with great elegance the 
thought and soul of the thesis and specifically an aim of this chapter. We cannot 
understand the construction of the human soul without understanding its origin.  Just as 
St. Paul writes that Adam is a type of the Jesus, so too are all human beings. 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia Q. 55. A2. 
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Approximately one thousand years prior to Johannes Gutenberg inventing the type that 
would image the verbal word, Augustine proclaimed that humanity is typed after, through 
and in the Word made visible. The exemplar image of the Christ forms first the human 
soul and then, in the moulding of the clay, forms the matter of the body.  However, the 
matter of the pre-lapsarian and Jesus-like bodies differs from ordinary humanity, as 
Aquinas noted above, that the formers appetite seeks the good, rather than 
concupiscence. Human beings enjoy an innate desire to acquire knowledge. How does my 
scheme that the ordinary human soul’s inability to absolutely seek the good, since truth is 
veiled in the shadow of the tree of good and evil, play out with Aquinas’ metaphysical 
methodology?  
Thomas strictly follows the order and analogy of being, such as, Aristotle’s axiom 
regarding the analogy of proportion, analogy between common concepts and analogy of 
proportionality; form is prior to matter; principles are prior to powers and powers are 
prior to operations; the priority of substance over accident; potency is reducible through 
act; univocal is more substantive than equivocal, and in the order of acquiring knowledge, 
sense is prior to phantasy and phantasy is prior memory and memory is prior to 
imagination which is prior to the will. And, stretching between the immaterial (mental) 
and physical worlds, in likeness to its Creator, is the intentional nature of the human will. 
Thomas’ cognitive process just described is void of the modern concept of awareness of 
the self or being inherently aware of the other.  
Thomas affirms the inability of the human soul to be fully aware in the Summa 
theologiae IIa-IIae Q 8. A1, respondeo: 
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“Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which 
human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the 
accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial thing; … under likenesses and 
figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because intelligible things is enclosed 
within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and 
effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa.” (emphasis added) 
The human soul is created to be aware of that which is hidden within. I claim that the 
caching of the human soul Thomas affirms above is the free-choice of humanity to 
perceive the sensible world through the tree of knowledge of good and evil. In order to 
perceive such a mode necessitates the garment of the skin of the animal, a gift from God, 
otherwise humanity would be blind and lost not only spiritually but naturally as well. 
Humanity’s spiritual salvation, for the believing Christian, flows from the Incarnation of 
the Word who is also the Type that forms the human soul.  
Augustine’s inclusio cited at the beginning of this section describes four images 
and/or acts regarding the term ‘type’.232 The first mention refers to the model that names 
or fashions the creature.233 The second regards the type or exemplar that is in the Word 
prior to the creation of the creature; the type therefore exists from eternity and is the 
substance of the Word. The third acknowledges that the imprint or the similitude of the 
knowledge or the pattern is in the intellectual soul. And, finally, it is the soul that forms 
the creature. What definitively is the type and where is it in regards to the human soul? 
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“Mortal, raise a lamentation over the King of Tyre, and say to him, Thus says the 
Lord GOD: You were the signet of perfection, full of wisdom and perfect in 
beauty. You were in Eden, the garden of God;” (Ezekiel 28: 12, 13a) 
 
 Ezekiel acquaints us with the notion that the divine Being signifies creatures with gifts as 
a signet-ring signifies the ring-bearer. The transfer of the gift of being follows the same 
signet-ring mode of operation. Humanity, as the signet-ring of God, is fashioned through 
the form or type of the Christ-soul. What would be the most precious gift a divine Being 
could give? It is esse, to be. 
Aquinas determines after Aristotle, that  
“being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things 
since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above 
(Question 7, Article 1).”234  
 
Furthermore, referring back to the Augustinian citation, Thomas presents a clearer 
apprehension as to how created intelligence functions.  
“I answer that, The word intellectus (understanding) implies an innermost 
knowledge, for intelligere (to understand) is the same as intus legere (to read 
inwardly). This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect 
and sense, … while intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a 
thing, because “the object of the intellect is what a thing is," as stated in the 
book on the Soul.”235 
Continuing therefore on this theme we apprehend that in some manner the human soul 
inheres in the intelligible species of the divine Being and it is the Word that types or 
signets the creature. The signeture (sic) of the Word is in an analogous relation to the de 
dictum mode of reality as the Word stretching forth to and imprinting the Word’s image 
on the de re mode of reality specifically the human soul. Lawrence Dewan’s analysis of the 
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kinship between the form and the act of being, regarding the human soul and its relation 
to reality, sheds light on how we may better apprehend the origin of the soul. 
Lawrence Dewan O.P. reinforces several of Thomas Aquinas’ teachings: in 
creatures the substantial form and act of being (esse) are different; there is a relation 
between the created substantial form and the act of being of the creator; the creature’s 
act of being is the most formal and most interior act it can perform, and, since the act is 
an interior act, it is an act of the intellect. Dewan asserts that in the act of creation, the 
divine being creates through a causal exemplar relation that stretches forth or intends 
from the mind of God to the creature’s form and to the creature’s act of being (esse). We 
know from Elder’s reading of Thomas that the divine ideas are in two modes, one as 
knowledge and the other as exemplar. The creature’s form is inherent in the Creator’s 
essence, the source of divine ideas as knowledge and extends forth from the Creator 
during the intentional and exemplar act of causing the creature’s act of existence, its act 
of being. Furthermore, as has been noted earlier: 
“Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a 
perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is 
common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from 
another.”236  
 
The distinction between individuals pre-exists in God as well. For there to be distinction 
there must be degrees of potency, and in God, since there is no potency, the distinction 
resides in the intentional nature of the divine’s individuating act of creation. Dewan then 
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concludes that “the form has the ontological status of potency relative to the esse.”237 
Potency in this sense means prior – the form actualizes or causes esse. The form pre-exists 
in God as Aquinas asserts that “the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of 
participation in the divine perfection.”238 Participation in the divine perfection can only be 
in the Creator’s creative act of existence of the creature. Therefore the form is nobler 
than the effect which is the esse (existence) of the entity. The form is the intellectual part 
where the sin of sensibly acquired knowledge occurred. Because the human form is 
anchored in the divine suppositum it is the soul’s free existence that is impounded and the 
intellectual soul is imprisoned in the realm of sensory perception.  
We can now answer the question posed above regarding the definition of the type 
and its whereabouts. The type is the immaterial intellect and it is placed as an identity 
principle in the human soul modeled after the person of Jesus Christ. Furthermore 
Augustine continues to provide guidance:  
“Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of 
profound and infinite multiplicity. And this thing is the mind, and this am I 
myself […] So great is the force of memory, so great is the force of life, even in 
the mortal life of man.” “this thing is the mind, and this I am myself”. 239 
Augustine concludes “[…] so you [Christ] are not the mind itself. For you are the 
Lord God of the mind.” 240  
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Aquinas follows with: 




“Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a 
perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is 
common to all [in the case of the human beings it is human nature that is 
common to all; the soul is what makes human beings what they are.], but also 
as] regards what distinguishes one thing from another.”242 
 
The entailment I envisage from Augustine’s and Thomas’ rationale is that it is the original 
human body, the human signet-matter, and not the garment of the skin of the animal that 
is primordially unified with the soul. As such, the human soul is imperfectly adapted to the 
divinely imposed potency of the garment of the skin of the animal.  Since the soul is a 
perfection it is incongruent in its relation with the human body veiled with such added 
potency. The original human body that God created, that “was very good” (Genesis 1:31) 
is no longer visible to the ordinary human eye. This visual negation requires a new mode 
to distinguish one human being from another; the new mode is through the haecceitic 
attribute that follows God’s gift to humanity of the garment of the skin of the animals. 
Coupled to the haecceitic individuation mode, which is also a separation from God, is the 
sensory acquisition of knowledge through the phantasms. Let us then turn to the origin of 
humanity’s ill-conceived mode of knowledge acquisition through the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil. 
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The Roman Catholic doctrine of original sin is found in the canons and decrees of 
the Fifth Council of Trent celebrated in June of 1546.243 The Tridentine doctrine concludes 
that through the failure of the first human beings, humanity, with obvious exceptions, is 
devoid of a natural relation with God. The Council asserts that the “guilt of original sin is 
remitted” through the Sacrament of Baptism. However, some of the consequences, such 
as the soul being bound to a corporeal body, and that in the “baptized there remains 
concupiscence, [which according to the thesis is the separation from God via the flesh of 
the animal] or an incentive [to sin].”244  Robert Adams provides an excellent comparison 
and understandings of the Catholic, Reformation and Kantian view of original sin. The 
Reformers and Kantian theologians and philosophers differ from the Catholic 
understanding; however, their views are not without merit but cannot be treated here.245  
Original sin can be understood in a metaphysical context according to several 
Catholic thinkers. Scripture tells us in Genesis 3 that humankind’s sin was a breaking of a 
covenant with the Creator; Adam and Eve were not to eat of the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil. The relation of the first humans to their Creator prior to 
tasting of the fruit of the tree of knowledge falls upon their responsibility as stewards of 
the garden. The unique aspect of the first humans as stewards, since they were in a 
                                                     
243
 The Council of Trent: The Fifth Session: The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of 
Trent, trans. J. Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), 21-29. 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct05.html (accessed 31 March 2011). 
 
244
 Ibid., Section 5. p. 23. 
 
245
 Robert Merrihew Adams “Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philosophy and Theology,” in A 
Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology, ed. Oliver Crisp, 229-253 (New York: T&T Clark, 2009). 
140 
 
natural relation with the Master of the garden, would not toil by the sweat of their brows. 
Instead, their stewardship work is of an intentional nature. Intention in this sense is in 
similitude to the Creator’s intentional act of creation, that is, the act of stretching forth. 
The act of intention is therefore the mode through which the immaterial soul meets the 
physicality of the corporeal world and forms relations with it. Inherent to the human soul, 
due to its likeness to God, is its ability to steward God’s creation through the mental or 
the soul’s intentional power. Instead, we see in Genesis 3:17 that upon the fall God willed 
that “in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life.” The first human’s sin is in a sense a 
sin of self-idolatry; they would be like God. And since their relation with God is one of 
stewardship of the physical order, the punishment is designed to fit the crime. The 
punishment, as Jean Paul II rightly points out, is a loss of humankind’s sense of his (sic) 
right to participate in the true perception of the world. Humanity obtained what it wished 
for and now human beings acquire knowledge and relate primarily through the distortion 
of sensory perception, and, tame the earth through the sweat of the brow.  
Metaphysical Consequences of Original Sin 
“And the man and his wife were both naked and were not ashamed.” (Genesis 2:25) 
“But the body of the first man was not a burden upon his soul, for the body was 
not corruptible.”246 
These two quotations, the first from Genesis and the second from Thomas Aquinas 
support the metaphysical speculation of the thesis. The first speaks to the relation 
between human beings, and the human soul’s relation with the Creator as well. 
                                                     
246




Metaphysically the nakedness and lack of shame of the pre-lapsarian couple points to an 
awareness and innocence that is justified as being true.  
The second quotation supports the first: the pre-fallen soul enjoys a body that is in 
such harmony with the soul that in relation to the soul the body does not harbour 
burdensome potency.  
Throughout biblical history one may find three presentations of the human soul 
and in a sense three degrees of corporeal potency: the first is the pre-lapsarian persons of 
Adam and Eve, with, as suggested by John Philoponus, illuminated bodies;247 the second is 
the fallen or corporeal body of the present human person that suffers the most potency, 
and finally the glorified body of Jesus Christ that enjoys the fullness of act and signet-
matter with the least degree of potency.248 
Philosopher Lawrence Dewan provides insightful commentary on the inner kinship 
the soul must enjoy to be fully personified.249 Dewan teaches that the student of the 
metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas should look for being (ens) in the “faces … as 
regards its most evident appearance to us … in sensible, generable and corruptible 
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substances.”250 Dewan presents several quotes, notably three from the Summa 
theologiae, Ia Q. 88. A1 and A3, and, Ia Q. 84. A1 which seem to contradict the direction 
of the thesis. We shall look at Q. 88. A3 and leave it to the reader to reference the others 
including those noted by Aquinas below as each follows the same vein.  
Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even 
immaterial created substances (1), much less can it understand the essence of 
the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first 
object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according 
to the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made": while the first object of our 
knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper 
object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages.” (84, 7; 85, 8; 87, 2, 
ad 2)  
Aquinas clearly asserts in the above passage, and those referenced by him, that the 
proper object of the intellect is to understand material things. The term proper refers to 
the most fitting or most ideal form or function of the human intellect. My argument with 
Thomas on this point is that I believe the proper object of all human souls is, as stewards 
of the Master’s physical creation, is to reciprocate, through responsible stewardship, to 
God for being created. Furthermore, I believe I have a valid point in stating that 
humanity’s fall does not eliminate the original proper object as stewards; it is just more 
difficult to perform. Let us turn to the following entailment to elucidate my thinking.  
Arguably the redactor to the Acts of the Apostle would have concluded that the 
Apostles understood something of the Spirit of God after the first Pentecost. Mary the 
mother of Jesus would have understood something about the Spirit of God. After the visit 
of the angel Gabriel, Mary’s first object would have been the Incarnated God she bore. 
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Mary, born without sin, one could say enjoyed the same human existence as the first 
parents who fell so quickly into sin. In most respects my arguments are congruent with 
Aquinas and Dewan. However, an added degree of potency is layered onto the faces 
which hinder the truth-of-being as a consequence of original sin. The epi-layer of potency 
forms impediments onto the human soul. It is the added potency we see in the faces of 
other human beings and it is this added potency I claim is that which prevents human 
beings from a true clarity of abstracting the essence of immaterial and material entities. 
However, given the additional potency, Dewan’s insights regarding the kinship relations of 
the human soul are still pertinent and valuable to my argument. Therefore it is 
advantageous to unpack his work.  
The fallen state of the ordinary human soul limits its intentional behaviour; the 
fallen human soul is incapable of truthful perception and awareness, and, it is also a being 
without sufficient dynamism to be a “being fully in act.”251 The ordinary human soul’s 
incapacity, imparted by God on the first beings as His response to their disobedience, 
requires that the fallen or ordinary human soul interact with the created universe in a 
perceptive or sensible mode. Once again, let us return briefly to the words of Jean Paul II 
regarding the consequences original sin. 
“He also loses to some extent the sense of his right to participate in the 
perception of the world, which he enjoyed in the mystery of creation. This right 
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had its foundation in man's inner self, in the fact that he himself participated in 
the divine vision of the world and of his own humanity.”252 (emphasis added) 
The human soul’s powers are hindered by the additional potency of matter in two ways. 
The first involves the lag of perceptive stimuli being received and the ensuing inability for 
human beings to know truth with certainty. The second, since truth is convertible with 
being, (ens) humankind losses a degree of self- and other awareness, including God. In a 
very unfortunate limitation due to humanity’s first sin, the human soul is unable to 
perceive the unity enjoyed and inherent in the created and eternal dimensions. The soul is 
unable to apperceive the essential unities formed by beings fully in act. The human soul, 
not being sufficiently dynamic to overcome the burden of original sin, can only form an 
essential unity with its own signet-matter, which is the principle of its individuation and 
alienation.   
In metaphysical parlance the divinely imposed incapacity in effect prevents the 
human soul from reaching the fullness of its actualization. The potency-act relation with 
regards to human beings is the vehicle by which the corporeally bound intellect may 
differentiate between change, perception, and non-change and truth as self-awareness of 
being.  
Jean Paul II notes in the above quotation that humankind’s proper perception of 
the world is grounded in the human soul. The ordinary human or sensible perception is 
the purview of the matter of the body through the venue of the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil. Jean Paul II is also presenting the notion that the human soul proper 
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perceptive vehicle is through the eyes of God and that this soulful attribute is present 
during the creation of each and every human soul. Shortly I will show that it is a truth-
event through the divine Logos that is the Exemplar of the human soul’s acknowledging 
act.  
The term matter in Thomism is defined as not containing any degree of 
actualization until is it actualized by the form. We can visualize the actualizing of matter 
through an example of an artist sculpturing a statue out of stone. The stone, in relation to 
the completed statue is in a state of pure potency. It is in effect just a piece of unformed 
rock. The artist, prior to commencing the work, creates an image of the completed object 
in his/her mind. In this example the image of the statue in the mind of the sculptor is the 
exemplar of the statue and the mind of the sculptor is the causal exemplar and his/her 
hand with the chisel is the instrumental cause. The finely crafted sculpture was then 
placed in an exquisite garden for all to admire. Then, because of a disagreement the 
sculptor enrobed the sculpture in a sack-cloth hiding its beauty. The analogy with creation 
of humanity and the subsequent fall is obvious. Let us examine this analogy of the fall of 
the human illuminated body in metaphysical terms. 
The first act of the human soul is to be.  Thomas states that the “human soul 
contains the body.”253 Therefore the perfecting act of the human soul is, to be, esse, 
which is in an essential relation with the corporeal body. To be, as a perfecting act, cannot 
be made intrinsically less actual. Matter, as potency, limits the forming act to be of the 
ordinary human soul, not a defect in the human soul. Matter is more distant, and to 
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employ Dewan’s thinking, in my scheme the present soul/body relation is in a less 
proximate kinship; the relation has fallen from parent child to first cousins. Just as the 
relation between cousins is less ordered than between siblings, the fallen matter of the 
human person is less ordered as well and functions in a more chaotic fashion. The 
ordinary corporeal body is an effect from a divinely imposed distancing from God which 
increases the proportion of non-being relative to the being in act. 
“The more a creature approaches in likeness to God the more it has of being, 
[esse] and the more it recedes from God the more it has on non-being.”254  
The metaphysical factors limiting the fallen human soul are three-fold: the first is 
the proper non-being or limiting function of essence as a proportional yet positive 
perfection of the firstly created human composite which is represented by an illuminated 
body. The second regards essence as potency which limits humanity as finite beings 
which, again is represented by an illuminated body. These two essences are intrinsic 
relations and are proper to the pre-lapsarian or illuminated body and the corporeal body. 
However, following Genesis 3: 21, the Divinely imposed limitation of the non-being of the 
skin of the animal now entombs the soul of the fallen illuminated person. And, as an 
extrinsic potency, and as a distancing from God, increases the human composite’s non 
being properties. The extrinsic non being may be seen as being extrinsic in the sense that 
it belongs to the Triune God to expunge the ordinary human soul’s fallen status in order 
for it to be freed from the imposed potency of the corporeal flesh. Thomas comments 
that the soul contains the body.  
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“Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains 
them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the 
soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, 
by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; 
inasmuch as they are contained by Him.”255 
The supra-imposed extrinsic non being of the human composite may also be apprehended 
as the ordinary human soul is incapable of knowing extrinsic truth either ontologically or 
epistemologically.256 The human soul is partially alienated. The aid to the human soul’s 
extrinsic alienation is the placing on the human mind the band-aid of the phantasms in 
the ordinary human cognition process. This is not to conclude that the original humans 
did not employ the phantasms, but rather, their use of the phantasms was in support of 
the true kinship the human soul had with its Creator.  I ask that you consider this 
question. Did the Glorified Body of the risen Christ employ the phantasms during his 
earthly presence? Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo teach us (Ia Q. 89. A2) that 
“when the soul is separated from the body it understands no longer by turning to the 
phantasms but by turning to simply intelligible objects – the soul apart from the body has 
perfect knowledge of other separated souls.”257 In this scheme Aquinas clearly follows the 
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Aristotelian concept of spiritual formation and in which my schemata also entails in-
formation, the forming of an essential unity. In order for an ordinary person to perceive 
the immaterial or spiritual aspect of the form it must be received through the phantasms 
and must reside in the passive intellect. Such a reception however is through the veil of 
the tree of knowledge of good and evil not through the clarity of the eyes of God. Thomas 
describes the act of receiving the sensible form in his Summa theologiae Ia Q.78. A3.  
“[…] immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural 
immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its 
natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. 
Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, 
according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of 
color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the 
operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of 
the sensible form is effected in the sensible organ.”258  
This entailment clearly places Thomas and I at odds to each other. Instead, I 
conclude that all human souls are created in such a manner that aphantasmal 








                                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused... Therefore to make it possible for human souls to 
possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to 
bodies…It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by 
turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to 
understand in another way.”  
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Conclusion to the Chapter 
“Augustine argues that [...] the soul animates the body not be being 
spatially diffused in it, but by a certain vivifying intention (quadam 
vitali).”259 (emphasis added) 
Augustine, so clear in his own conversion, generates for us a vivid image as to the 
mode of animation of the human body; it is a vivifying intention.   
Chapter 2 provided the apprehension that the Creator and created relate in a 
mode of ontological continuity. God and humankind stretch their beings from the inner 
sanctum their minds to the reality of God’s Creation. Human beings are not Gods, but 
were given primordial gifts as godlike. Humanity has squandered its right to employ these 
gifts. Because humanity has squandered its gifts, Aquinas admits that “it is easy for us to 
be deceived by the phantasma.”260 The thesis therefore turns the page to the next 
chapter whereby, quoting St. Paul who realizes  
“that he was the result of the Lord’s building from within *and+ we are the ones who 
speak from without, but he [Jesus] builds from within. We notice the fact that you 
are listening, but he *Jesus+ sees our thoughts. He *Jesus+ … opens the mind, and 
bends the perceptions to the act of belief”  
brings us to the apprehension that we require an action from Christ to once again enjoy 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE HUMAN SOUL OF JESUS CHRIST  
 
“I did not say that the Son was one (person) and God the Word another; I said 
that God the Word was by nature one and the temple by nature another, one 
Son by conjunction.”262 
 
Introduction to the Chapter 
The common understanding of Nestorianism is that the two natures of Christ are 
not unified in one person. The above quotation, attributed to Nestorius, brings the thesis 
full circle to the beginning where I described how Philo of Alexandria introduces the 
notion that the Logos is distinct from God. The conversations regarding the unity of the 
Christ-natures or their distinction between Nestorius and other Patriarchs of the time are 
complex and perhaps conclusions were erroneously attributed. Aloys Grillmeier, SJ 
concludes that perhaps Nestorius was misunderstood. Grillmeier continues to quote 
Nestorius. 
“Even before the incarnation the God-Logos was Son and God and together with 
the Father, but in the last times he took the form of a servant; but as already 
previously he was a Son both in name and in nature, he cannot be called a 
separate Son after taking this form, otherwise we would be decreeing two 
sons.”263 
 
Attempting to reconciling eternal existence with temporal reality, or, attempting to 
describe, metaphysically, the unity between the Infinite and the finite natures of the 
Second Person of the Trinity, may lead to considerable difficulties since semantics tend to 
confuse how one may interpret not only the definitions of the Infinite and finite persons 
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of Jesus Christ, but also the relation between his two natures. Modern scholars comment 
that prior to the Nestorian controversies Cyril of Alexandria also grappled with the Logos-
sarx unity or lack thereof, due to difficulties in finding appropriate language and 
conflicting biblical exegesis regarding the divine-human relation of Jesus’ human soul. The 
gap between the notion of a divine Son and a human Christ, a notion that is so prominent 
in Greek mythologies and fostered by Philo of Alexandria, was narrowed through the work 
of Athanasius who asserted that “the divine and human meet only because of a free act of 
a loving God.”264 Just as Cyril, Nestorius and others seem to have difficulties in defining 
the unity of the two natures of Christ in one person, so may the thesis suffer the same 
difficulty in defining, in precise metaphysical terms, such a complex unity. It is best 
therefore to start and end at the origin of the meeting place of divinity and humanity. 
  A general aim of Chapter 3 is to reconcile, metaphysically, the seeming 
incongruence of unity between the Christ soul and the human being’s soul. Clearly the 
unifying relation between the Son and the ordinary human soul of which the thesis is 
about to explore, is not intended to elevate humanity into Gods, but rather to better 
apprehend that the first humans were, in a manner of speaking, gods created in the 
imago Dei. 
To digress briefly, unity requires relation which requires a reciprocating principle in 
order for it to function fully. Previously I have argued that the Holy Spirit as the Bearer of 
Gifts, accounts for the perfected relation between not only the Divine Persons but 
humanity’s relation with God.  
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The term relation is one of Aristotle’s ten metaphysical categories. The majority of 
metaphysicians, agreeing with Aristotle’s original concept of relation, attribute relation as 
an accident in the priority of being since accidents are contingent on their underlying 
substance and are apprehended through an immediate abstraction by the phantasma 
converting the stimuli through a second order mental operation – “relation is a distinct 
additional accidental entity, a reality outside the mind.”265 Instead, I propose that the 
category of relation is more than just an additional accidental entity, a reality outside the 
mind; I propose that there is a relation-type that is an essential component of the human 
soul and is therefore necessary, and being necessary, is primal in its order of being. In this 
particular instance the relation-type is not an accident/substance relation. The 
dependency of the accidents on substance is, for the human composite, a consequence of 
the increased distance from God the human soul suffers due to original sin. Just as 
relation defines the Persons of the Triune God, the proper relation between created truth 
and divine Truth determines the mode of not only existence of the human composite, but 
also the degree of intimacy with God. Shortly I develop my concept regarding the nature 
of truth and its relation with Being and Truth.  
The specific purpose of Chapter 3 is to construct a metaphysical relation between 
the Christ human soul and the ordinary human soul that enhances our understanding of 
the ordinary human soul. If I am to formulate conclusions to the thesis’ hypotheses I must 
develop a coherent understanding of the metaphysical relation between truth and Truth 
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as it relates to the human soul of Jesus Christ in his primal act as participating in the 
exemplar cause on the human soul’s act of existence. 
The remaining body of Chapter 3 is divided into five sections as follows: 
 Eternal/temporal relations, the Word and sarx as a unifying factor, John 
1:1; 5:36; 17.  
 The unity between the dyothelite wills of the Incarnated Second Person 
of the Trinity. 
 Sense-perception, awareness and truth. 
 Relative truth, sense perception and absolute truth. 
 Truth-exchange and the Christ-soul as the causal exemplar.  
In order to respond to the hypotheses of the thesis we must evaluate and 
apprehend the Aristotelian – Thomism view of the relation between eternal and universal 
Beings, and, beings that commence in eternity, reside for a time in the created universe as 
individual beings and then return to eternity. Both of these entities, one as Creator, the 
other created, share attributes or in Thomistic terms, share genera.  
The shared genera of each of the above mentioned beings are termed ‘rational’, 
‘intelligible’ and ‘subsistent’, although in varying modes. But then there are distinctions 
such as; the One is Intelligence Itself; the others have intelligence. The One is one; the 
others are individuated, yet many. The One is Being; the others are created beings. The 
One is Truth; the others necessitate truth in the act of their own creation. Attempting to 
compare between a Being that is Eternal and beings that are finite and yet have the 
attributes to participate in eternity is not an easy task. The remaining sections of the 





Eternal/temporal Relations, the Word and Sarx as Unifying Factors, John 1:1; 5:36; 17 
  The metaphysician John McTaggart (1866 – 1925) expressed the relation 
between eternity and time as such: “the relation of Eternity to Time is very simple. It is 
simply the relation of a truth to the subject-matter of the truth.”266 Eternity is not 
timelessness, nor is it defined as infinite. I define eternity as that which does not yield to 
limits; eternity is an ever present reality, esse in praesenti. However, the controversies 
and abundant literature regarding the philosophy of time and the relation of time to 
eternity are vast and although relevant to the subject matter of the thesis, require a 
simple stand. Therefore I am taking the position that the relation between time (creation) 
and Eternity (God) is the relation of Truth, as Christ, to the subject-matter of that Truth, 
the human Jesus, and, by a special relation to humanity. My thesis therefore avoids, not in 
a cowardly fashion, the controversies that lie in the various theories of eternity. We are, 
after all, regulated for the time being to temporality and can only conjecture as to the 
attributes of eternity. Just as Thomas Aquinas cautions us with regards to the existence of 
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God “…that God exists is not self-evident.”267 I propose that in a similar manner that an 
eternal realm  exists is also not self-evident.  
The sole mode of understanding the properties of reality within eternity is through 
the relations within the Triune God. Although an analogy employing relations between 
finite beings is not the most plausible means to understand the relations with the three 
Persons of the Trinity, it does present a credible image sufficient to assist in the 
comprehension of the next argument in the thesis which is to demonstrate relations 
between God and human beings.  
To set our understanding for the analogy of being within eternity I assert that 
priority of being (ens) is known through the category of relation, not in an 
accident/subsistence relation but in an entitative mode. The Son proceeds from the 
Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from Father due to the union of love between the Father 
and Son.268 
“Procession […] is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for 
example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains 
in him.”269 
Thomas continues his argument by asserting that an external procession necessitates a 
distinction from the source of the procession, but contrarily, an internal procession is 
univocal. Therefore one can argue that the internal procession is the common hypostasis 
of the Triune Persons, and the external procession includes the attributes of each of the 
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Persons and also the unity of relation with creation, specifically human beings. Let us now 
turn to the analogy.  
Similar to the relations of the Trinity, but only equivocally and imperfectly in the 
present state, human relations are also determined in two modes, internally and 
externally intentioned. The first mode regards changes in the motion270 of things and is 
associated with esse naturale. The second mode regards relations that are associated with 
esse intentionale which are relations inherent in the intentionality of the human soul.    
The first property to apprehend of the esse naturale mode is that relations 
initiated from the temporal world can become entrenched in eternity.  The children of 
parents are always the children of their parents. Of course human parental relations are 
different than the paternal-filial relation of God the Father and God the Son. The relation 
of the human parent to child is indeterminate of the will of the child. The parent’s status 
as parent is indeterminate of the wishes of the child.271 The parent-child relation is also 
independent whether or not love is a factor in the relation. The corporeal human relation, 
esse naturale of parent-child is dependent on the pro-creative act of the parents. Parents 
do not beget their children. Corporeally they are in an extrinsic relation with them. 
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However, the parent-child relation is also an intrinsic relation, an esse intentionale 
relation.272  
The concept of parent-child relation as an esse intentionale relation may be 
considered in two modes. The first mode regards the parent-child relation as an 
intelligible relation that is a real relation and in this sense the parent-child relation is not 
distinct since they are of the parent-child genus. For example, five members of the Smith 
family are, at this level of knowledge, indistinguishable. We do not know if both parents 
are included, or if the grandparents are also members or how many siblings are included. 
On the other hand, once the members have been personified the relations become 
intelligible and from an external view the relations within the family are regarded as real 
and distinct. To this extent the analogy is reasonably proportionate to the relations within 
the Trinity but falters on two points.  
The first misstep concerns the reception and reciprocation of substance and 
personhood. The reception and reciprocation of Being and Personhood of the Son 
requires a complex discourse and is presented later in the thesis. The second regards the 
hypostatic union of the persons of the Trinity. Human offspring share the same substance 
as their parents since they are in a general mode hypostatically united with their parents, 
but they do not share in the same unity. The underlying substance the children share with 
their parents is the DNA of the parents. The children are more intrinsically unified to their 
parents then the parents are to each other. The parents are not hypostatically unified but 
are unified through their intentional act of parenting and relational being as parents. Nor 
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is the human soul created with the same substance as God. Thomas defines his concept of 
substance as follows. 
According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is spoken of in two ways. 
In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, […] [it] 
means the substance of a thing; in this sense substance is called by the Greeks 
(οὐσία), which we may call essence. In another sense substance means a 
subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken 
in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it 
is called the suppositum. It is also called by three names signifying a reality – 
that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a 
threefold consideration of the substance thus named. As it underlies some 
common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular 
man is a human natural thing. […] As it underlies the accidents, it is called 
hypostasis, or substance. What these three names signify in common to the 
whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational 
substances.273 
 
The unity inherent in the Trinity is due to the complete lack of potency whereas within the 
present human hypostasis potency, and therefore disunity abounds. I previously argued 
that the hypo-potency of the human substance separates and overburdens the human 
soul’s power to form relations in its initial and in its ongoing act of existence. However, at 
the level of the human soul, a unity common to all rational beings exists. Human children 
participate in the genes of the two parents, but the human soul of the child is unique to 
that child and to the Creator of that child’s soul. The relation of the act of being of the 
human soul is primarily between the Trinity as Creator and the human soul as receptor of 
its act of existence, and secondarily, through its participation in the parental genes, in the 
act of becoming.274 Therefore, contrary to the relations of the Trinity, the human parent-
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child relation is not a receptive relation. Father Norris Clarke SJ brings some light to this 
concept in reference to the Trinity:  
“[…] receptivity is a positive ontological perfection. [that describes] […] the 
inner interpersonal life of the Trinity, where we find that giving and receiving 
are integral and inseparable aspects of the very fullness of perfection in the 
loving communion of persons within the unity of one divine nature […]”275   
The created human soul is finite and not in perfect unity with divine nature, as is Christ’s 
human soul, but it still proceeds from the Trinity in a particularly unique act of creation. 
Thomas teaches that “[w]hatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily 
distinct from the source […]”276 The metaphysical separation between the source and the 
created thing creates sufficient distinction between God and the human soul that the 
human soul cannot be hypostatically one with the Trinity. Still, there is a relation between 
the Source and the finite being.  
The relation between the Creator and the created human being may be 
apprehended as an outward procession that emanates into creation through an 
intentional act of the divine will. “So what proceeds in God by way of love, [an act of the 
will] does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit.”277 Just as 
children inherit the likenesses of their parents in the act of becoming, the human soul 
inherits a likeness from God in the soul’s act of being.278 Aquinas argues, quite 
convincingly, that “likeness […] belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, 
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but because likeness is the principle of loving. [T]he one begotten [the Son] is the 
principle of love.”279 Returning to Thomas’ definition of substance he concludes that 
substance is an expression of an intention. Divine intentions regarding humankind, or in 
my jargon, that the memory of what it is to be human, the quiddity or the essence of 
humanity, resides in the suppositum of the One Who is Triune. Before proceeding to the 
role in the human act of being that the Son plays, we must more fully apprehend the 
concept of principle of love and its place in creation. 
The term ‘principle’ in Scholastic comprehension is that which initiates. The human 
soul, as the principle of the human composite, is the first act of being as demonstrated in 
Chapters 1 and 2. The human soul is that which initiates existence of the human person. 
God the Father is He Who initiates the generation of the Son, which is an act of love. 
Thomas differentiates the divine act of generation from the divine act of love. Generation 
of the Son is a procession of the very Being of His Father. The procession of love is the 
procession of the Father as the Holy Spirit. In order for the procession of the Holy Spirit to 
be, the Son must receive the Being of His Father, as cited by Norris Clarke above. 
However, and contrary to human parent-child relations, the Son, as the principle of 
receiving love, must reciprocate the received love of His Father in order to identify or to 
acknowledge His Personhood as Son.280 
 The Second Person of the Trinity, to be the Son, necessitates reciprocation [after 
Clarke, which is not a distinction because of cause and effect but “the very fullness of 
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being itself as Persons-in-communion”+ to the love of His Father. Aquinas teaches that like 
reciprocates to like. Through His unique principle of reciprocation, the Word is the model 
for our act of existence. The Word, Who is fully in act, and fully unified with His human 
soul and enjoying the communion of divine substance necessitates a single Source but 
dual channels of existence from the Source. The Source of the divine Son is the Being of 
the Father; the source of the human soul united to the Son is the human substance that 
resides intentionally in the suppositum of the Triune God as the memory of what it is to 
be human. The relation between the essence of being human and its existence in the 
suppositum of God speaks to a reality that is a power and an awareness of oneself. As 
Augustine makes clear… 
“Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of 
profound and infinite multiplicity. And this thing is the mind, and this am I 
myself […] So great is the force of memory, so great is the force of life, even in 
the mortal life of man […] this thing is the mind, and this I am myself.”281 
(emphasis added) 
The Augustinian term power of memory is an awareness of ‘what it is to be human’. We 
also see that the power of memory is a force of life which is of the intentional order of 
being that allows for a stretching forth thus forming intrinsic relations. Returning to the 
analogy of the parent-child relation, even though one enjoys self-awareness, albeit 
incomplete, awareness of the essence of the other as truth is effectively nonexistent due 
to limitations imposed through the potency inherent in the matter of the ordinary human 
being imposed because of original sin. In the previous chapter the popular or dogmatic 
understanding of the effect of original sin on the human soul was described as the 
deterioration the soul’s esse which accounts for an imperfect relation with God. The 
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deterioration of the soul’s relation with God it is not due to a degradation of the soul’s 
esse, but, is due to the added potency of fallen human signet-matter of the body. The 
relation of the ordinary human soul to its present body prevents the soul from enacting its 
proper esse. The deterioration of the soul’s relations prevents it from properly uniting 
with, or to be intimately aware of, not only other human souls, but the Trinity as well. As 
such, I conclude that it is the soul’s essence, its quiddity that was not inherently degraded 
by the original sin of disobedience. Furthermore, free-will, an attribute of the act of the 
will, is a principle of the soul and therefore was not altered either.282 The enjoyment of a 
free will necessitates a response; in order for the human soul to be fully aware it must 
properly reciprocate the Father’s self-communication. In this instance ordinary human 
beings cannot reciprocate properly except through Christ and in the human soul’s present 
state Christ provides only a texture to humanity’s existence and nature. In this life, even 
with an invitation by Christ, it is not possible for the human person to acquire the fullness 
of the divine experience.   
The invitation by Jesus to Thomas the Apostle to join his body – to enter into it – 
resembles an intentional existence /intentional being.283 This Thomas-Christ event is an 
esse intentionale as an intentional act of the Glorified Jesus stretching forth and Thomas 
completing the act by reciprocating Jesus’ call causing a joining of the two, which, the 
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thesis suggests, is a description of the Body of Christ.284 But sense images (phantasms), 
since they are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs, do not have the 
same mode of existence as do, for instance, conceptual images residing in the human 
intellect."285 The difficulty arises for Aquinas at the next level: what effect does the 
phantasm produce in the intellect?  
And the LORD GOD made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them. 
The passage from Genesis 3:21 describes the entombment of the human soul and points 
to a limited corporeal life – clothes become soiled, worn, require mending and cleaning 
and eventually are discarded. The clothes given to humanity by our heavenly Father limit 
the true and dynamic nature of the human soul. This limitation is the separation from God 
as humanity chose to reciprocate the call of the serpent instead of abiding by the 
covenant God and the first man and first woman contracted between them. Humanity’s 
separation from God requires a new order of individuation and the imposed haecceity 
rather than a “perfection of concrete existents” as the divinely imposed couture is an 
imperfection of concrete individuals.  
The Unity between the Dyothelite Wills of the Incarnated Second Person of the Trinity. 
 
 The purpose of this section is to briefly examine the nature of the relation 
between the dyothelite wills of the Incarnated Word. The overwhelming concept that is 
proposed regards the notion that the divine mind of the Second Person overpowers or 
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diminishes the mind of the human Jesus to the extent that Jesus’ human mind is 
insignificant. If Jesus’ mind was impotent in its relation to his divine mind such a relation 
could fracture the arguments presented in the thesis. Furthermore such a concept could 
lead to an Apollinarian heresy. Or, one may conclude that there is insufficient unity 
between the two minds which leads to a Nestorian heresy. Therefore, this section 
attempts to disarm the possibility of such fractures. 
 Recently, thinkers such as Richard Cross, Ivor Davidson, Robert Pasnau and Aaron 
Riches have returned to the Council of Chalcedon’s controversies and the “political 
manoeuvring” of the framers regarding the two natures of the Second Person of the 
Trinity.286 Their consensus of the Chalcedon formula is that there exists confusion in its 
understanding of the relation between the human and divine wills of Christ. The main 
argument promoted by most independent commentators on the Chalcedon formula, 
including those mentioned above, is that a finite human will must be passive, or 
completely impotent to the dominance of an infinite and divine mind. To counter the 
divine dominance many look to Jesus as being actively obedient to the will of his Father, 
or, by some ontological mystery “the human freedom of Christ consists concretely in the 
history of the nature assumed by the Word into the personal centre of who he is.”287 
 However, I am taking a view that is coherent with Chalcedon and finds its 
foundation in the primal command from God in Genesis 1 whereby humankind is given 
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stewardship over God’s creation. The human Christ, as the second Adam, is the steward 
of the created order and most specifically humankind. Therefore in his role as steward 
Jesus would have general mandates to, for example, convert all nations. 
“And Jesus came and said to them, “All authority in heaven and on earth has 
been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing 
them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” Matthew 
28: 18-19 
The specific means as to how the general instruction is to be engendered remains with 
the human Christ. The human Jesus chose the twelve, he could have chosen eleven. He 
could have chosen Saul over Simon. Chapter 24 of the Gospel attributed to Matthew 
presents two parables regarding similitudes of heaven whereby the servant, who is 
entrusted with treasure, seems to be provided only with general guidelines. I believe that 
the underlying message in these parables demonstrates that a fundamental trust 
between the Master and the servant exists.  
 Trust necessitates awareness of the other and is based on a truth-relation. Trust 
necessitates bi-directional relations but also necessitates a certain degree of 
interpretation in the mode of execution by the steward as long as the principles of the 
master are maintained. Therefore under this truth-relation the human and divine wills of 
the Incarnated Word functions in the same mode of relation. Later in the chapter the 
thesis argues that the human soul of Jesus functions as the instrumental exemplar cause 
during the ordinary human soul’s act of being. Within the element of trust however, 
resides the principle of truth. It is in the vein of truth that the middle section of the 




Sense-perception, Awareness and Truth 
“CHALCEDONIAN ORTHODOXY: Perception has two natures, which are 
inseparable and irreducible, related to each other as matter to form: it is neither 
a purely material change nor a purely formal one, but rather 'a logos in 
matter'.”288 
We know from Scripture that the earthly Christ enjoyed awareness inherent in 
another human being.289 We may also agree that the resurrected human Christ is a being 
fully in act to the limit a human soul can be actualized and therefore the order of 
apprehension described immediately above by Aquinas is not only inappropriate, but 
perhaps is inaccurate. The gist of my thinking is that a priority in the knowledge 
acquisition process of the Glorified Christ, and the pre-resurrected Jesus is non-existent. 
Contrary to this mode ordinary human beings must prioritize their knowledge acquisition.  
The abstraction of singular knowledge is coincidental with the abstraction of universal 
knowledge for the human soul of Christ which allows for the ability, or soulful power, to 
be fully aware of the other. What is the metaphysical construction that provides for 
instantaneous knowledge?290 What is the Truth-truth relation that could provide for a 
more illuminated human soul? 
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 The passage in John 4: 3-42 records the earthly Jesus’ awareness of the soul of the Samaritan woman to 
name just one instance of many already recorded in the thesis. 
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 The doctrine of the hypostatic union that inheres in the Trinity provides for the 
notion that the divine Persons are fully aware of each other. Trinitarian theology provides 
rich and fertile ground to more fully apprehend the relations amongst ourselves and with 
the divine Beings.  
If we accept the hypothesis that a characteristic of eternity is its limitlessness and 
therefore references such as prior and posterior, up and down or the bi-directional series 
‘1, 2, 3, …10, 9, 8…’, and analogical (non-proportionality)291 terms are meaningless, then 
we must assert that relations are the primary characteristic that distinguishes and 
individuates eternal beings. Thomas Aquinas cites Boëthius on this point, “relation 
multiples the Trinity.”292 The relation between Father – Son and Son – Father are 
particularly relevant. W. Norris Clarke tells us why.  
“For just as the Father’s whole personality as Father consists in his 
communicating, giving, the entire divine nature that is his own to the Son, his 
eternal Word, so reciprocally the Son’s whole personality as Son consists in 
receiving, eternally and fully, with loving gratitude, this identical divine nature 
from his Father. The Son, as distinct from the Father, is subsistent Receiver, so 
to speak.”293 
 
However, I believe that in Norris Clarke’s thinking there is an act by the Son that is absent, 
but alluded to, from the entailment described above. The received gift of Sonship 
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requires, between equal and free-willed Beings, an acknowledgement or reciprocity294 by 
the Son of his very Sonship. The Son acknowledges to his Father his Gift of being Son 
which is transpired through the Holy Spirit as the Bearer of Gifts back to the Father. 
“At that time Jesus said, “I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, […]  All 
things have been committed to me by my Father. No one knows the Son except 
the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the 
Son chooses to reveal him.” 
 
Let us now consider this question. Did the Glorified Body of the risen Christ 
employ the phantasms during his earthly presence? Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of 
Hippo teach us (Ia Q.89. A2) that  
“when the soul is separated from the body it understands no longer by 
turning to the phantasms but by turning to simply intelligible objects – 
the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated 
souls.”295  
 
The encounter of Thomas the Apostle and the risen Christ, fully in act with his glorified 
body, in the upper chamber seems to demonstrate a supra-awareness of each other: 
Thomas was called by Christ to believe therefore Jesus was aware of the depth of his 
unbelief. Thomas not only received the call but reciprocated Jesus’ intentional act of love 
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and exclaimed “My Lord and my God!¨ Thomas became fully aware of Christ’s divine 
nature. Thomas and Jesus, Jesus and Thomas exchanged truths – a communicatio Christi.  
Perhaps the thesis is jumping ahead here but could the truth-exchange between Thomas 
and Jesus may be understood as an effect from an act of an exemplar cause imparted by 
Jesus?  
Relative truth, Sense Perception and Absolute Truth  
  
  Truth in Thomism also entails relations. The difficulty the rational human soul 
suffers in its attempt to know truth is due to its inability to enact the reciprocal principle 
of love.296 The ordinary human soul is prevented to know Uncreated Truth or created 
truth since human initiated relations are burdened by the falsity apparent in extrinsically 
ordered sense perception. I argue in this section that such falsity is not inherent in the 
relation the Christ-soul enjoys with his perceiving senses, either pre- or post-resurrection.  
Therefore the purpose of this section is twofold. The first is to develop a more 
complete understanding of Uncreated Truth, created truth, and, their interrelations. The 
second is to prepare for the final section by providing how Truth is intrinsically employed 
in the act of creation of the human person.        
 Thomas Aquinas has taken great pains to develop the concept of truth and its 
relations. Earlier we learned from Aquinas that truth is conformity of being. We also 
learned that:  
“Augustine says that ‘we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the 
senses of the body’. First, because ‘whatever the bodily senses reach, is 
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continually being changed; and whatever is never the same cannot be 
perceived’.”297  
The manner in which Thomas addresses this quandary is elegant yet complex. 
Thomas identifies two broad categories regarding the term ‘truth’. The first 
category is truth of being, that is, as seen earlier, that which exists must enjoy truth. To 
know or understand truth of being or, ‘ontological truth’ requires that the truth is 
abstracted from the essence of an existing thing. I have already argued that it is in the 
abstraction process that the inherent error of perception is found. However, I have also 
shown that the earthly Jesus could truthfully abstract the truth of essence from the 
ordinary human person. Therefore, examining the truth abstraction process as it pertains 
to the earthly Jesus may shed some light onto the metaphysical reality of Jesus’ human 
soul. The exchange between the risen Christ and his two disciples on the road to Emmaus 
(Luke 24: 13-35) on the first Easter Sunday two thousand years ago provides some insight 
into the truth abstraction process as it relates to Jesus’ human soul and the two ordinary 
human souls of his disciples. 
The redactor to the Gospel of Luke records that the two disciples did not recognize 
the risen Christ until “he took bread, blessed it and broke it, and gave it to them. Then 
their eyes were opened and they recognized him […]” (Luke 24: 30:31) Clearly the ordinary 
souls of the two disciples were unable to read the risen Word until they shared in the 
Eucharistic banquet. Their inability to see the true Christ is analogous to the inability of 
the ordinary human eye to perceive red-coloured words while wearing red-tinted 
spectacles which filter out reddened words written on a school blackboard. The red-tinted 
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lenses of the glasses are analogous to the hypo-potency of matter that burdens the 
ordinary human soul and prevents the true Christ from being perceived and therefore 
known. Knowing the true Christ is the reception of Christ.  
In the order of being, the act of being is the soul’s first act since it allows for the 
reception of the act to be. The structure of the human soul is such that at this level truth 
is intimately inherent in the soul’s act and furthermore, since God is the cause of the 
human soul’s existence, the creative power of God is intimately present to the soul. We 
see from the Thomas-Christ event in the upper chamber and the exchange between the 
risen Christ and the two disciples on the road to Emmaus that it seems to be trivial for 
Christ to remove the hypo-potency of the skin of the clothes of the animal. Such a 
disrobing of human potency allows the disciples to be truly receptive. Thomas has shown 
in the Summa theologiae Ia Q. 16, A3 that in God Being and Truth are convertible. 
Therefore at the soul’s very instant of creation, truth and Truth are in such intimacy that 
the Uncreated and created are one with the human soul. In their encounter with the risen 
Christ, the ordinary human souls of the disciples are also in an intimate relation such that 
they are one with Christ. In contrast to the ordinary human soul, Jesus’ human soul enjoys 
the intimacy with Truth and truth that is unwavering. Throughout his earthly existence 
Jesus’ soul bathed in the illumination of divine light. Augustine illuminates these concepts 
for us: 
“And I turned to the nature of the mind, but the false notion which I had of 
spiritual things let me not see the truth. Yet the force of truth did of itself flash 
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into mine eyes […] and in that unity, I conceived the rational soul, and the 
nature of truth and of the chief good to consist.”298  
 
Augustine clearly lays the foundation for the metaphysical composition of the relation 
between the soul, the nature of truth, and, God as chief good. Augustine’s reference to 
the false notion is the concupiscence he presents as a consequence of original sin. 
Returning briefly to the sections in Chapter 2 on original sin and the metaphysical 
consequences to original sin, and, referencing the Summa theologiae, Prima Pars, 
question 16, article 3, Aquinas states that “good has the nature of what is desirable, so 
truth is related to knowledge.” The Adamic human soul, by tasting the fruit of knowledge 
from the tree of good and evil, broke its bond with God as the Augustinian unity between 
Truth and truth inherent in its soul; this same bond intimately unites the Christ-soul with 
his divine nature and for him to know the will of his Father. Throughout the thesis the 
notion of intentionality has been employed as a stretching forth of the will of God and an 
attribute of the human soul. The intentional act of the soul is, through the force of 
memory, a stretching backwards299 to the source of its origin, back to the quiddity of 
humanity entrenched in the suppositum of God. As such, it is a force of life.  
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"[…] the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images 
retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought."300 
And, 
“So great is the force of memory, so great is the force of life, even in the mortal life of 
man.” 301 
The Christ-soul union with its divine nature and the original human-soul union with the 
Creator at its act of creation still necessitate a process of thinking for the human person. 
Human beings were not created to be robotic doers of God’s will but to wilfully determine 
the acts necessary for the completion of the divine plan of Creation.  
We should divide the process of thinking into two fundamental spheres. The first 
regards the Aristotelian-Thomistic model, or, the ordinary human cognition model, which 
describes the acquisition of knowledge and the process to employ such knowledge as is 
presented in Chapter 2. The second regards the acquisition of truth and the process to 
employ acquired truth by the soul unaccustomed to original sin, such as the Christ-soul. 
The ordinary soul’s process of thinking as it regards the acquisition of knowledge and its 
relation to truth is more completely developed in comparison to the Christ-soul model 
further in this section. Rather, it is the Christ-soul model that is of immediate interest. 
The process of thinking for the person enjoying a soul continually unified, through 
the absence of the original sin, with the divine suppositum commences with a head-start. 
The original human soul had, and, the Christ-soul had, during their earthly presence, a 
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reference point, canonicity for it to refer to during acts of the will, thus avoiding sin.302 
Since each soul’s human essence resides in the suppositum of God, it enjoys, actually, 
natural communication with the divine nature. It had so-to-speak access to Truth. In other 
words the original rational human soul is able to bring into the passive intellect that which 
it perceives but with the added grace of knowing truth through the eyes of God. Once in 
the passive intellect whatever is present is predicative for the agent intellect to employ. 
The agent intellect is the mode of operation of the will. Therefore, the awareness, the 
truth of another is predicative through the eyes of God. The human soul of Jesus, being 
more perfectly united to the Triune God through the Second Person is the exemplar of the 
image of God that illuminates the human intellect to see truth. How does this happen? 
We know that the substantial form in created beings is the first actus essendi 
which allows for the reception of the act to be. Therefore the degree of intentionality – 
the ability or inability of the mind to stretch back and forth and the soul’s degree of truth-
relation with God determines the mode of individuation as a principle of the human 
composite and the degree to which sensory perception is necessary. At one extreme is 
the individuation as determined through signet-matter, the Aristotelian – Thomistic 
model. At the other extreme is my Christ-soul exemplar model, whereby individuation is 
determined through the intentional act of the soul and its awareness of its source of what 
it is to be human, which is grounded in the Augustinian force-of-memory model.  
The relation the proper human soul inheres with truth may be conceived in three 
modes. Firstly, truth exists as extra-mental objects that exist in their own right. The 
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second mode refers to concepts that exist only in the mind, such as fictitious characters in 
a novel, or entities of a dream, or logically constructed concepts such as a golden 
mountain. And, finally the third mode relates to universals and time which requires the 
employment of the cognition process as is initiated by the intellective soul. The latter is 
the most relevant for it assists in apprehending the mode by which the human soul 
functions in order to understand the relation between universal and individuals, and, the 
concept and actuality of truth.303 
“*K+nowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings in that the latter 
possess only their own form, while the knowing being is naturally adapted to 
have also the form of some other thing; for the species of the thing known is in 
the knower […] Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the 
reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the 
mode of knowledge.”304  
 
Thomas highlights three aspects of knowing to consider. Firstly, it is the human 
soul that has the ability to conform itself to the thing known which according to Thomas is 
defined as truth, as we have seen before.305 Secondly, it is the thing known that can be 
conformed to the intellective soul through an immaterial abstraction process. Thirdly, the 
more immaterial the object to be known is, the more knowledgeable the cognition 
process must be. Therefore, the rational soul’s cognition process, which is based on 
sensible perception, reduces the human composite to be subjugated by the material 
order, which is contrary to humanity’s original mode of acquiring knowledge. We see that 
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the Apostles questioned “What sort of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey 
him?” (Matthew 8:27) According to the redactor of Matthew, Jesus, the second Adam, 
seems to have possessed Adam’s original power to have dominion over the created order. 
(Genesis 1: 26) Furthermore, such immaterially ordered knowledge addresses the relation 
between rational beings.  
Why would God create human beings with an rational soul that cannot 
communicate with other intellectual beings such as angels? We know from Genesis 3 that 
the soul enjoys a natural communicating ability with spiritual substances. However, if the 
ordinary human soul is unable to or prevented from participating in direct spiritual 
communication, then upon its separation from the body the soul would not be able to 
know God unless He acts at the moment of separation to impart this skill, which is 
incoherent.  
To conclude this section and to draw the strings of the thesis together, the thesis 
draws upon the analytical technique of Lawrence Dewan O. P. Dewan compares two of 
Thomas Aquinas’ works regarding the concept of truth as presented in the De veritate and 
the pertinent questions in the Summa theologiae. Dewan points out that which seems to 
be an incongruence between these works regarding Aquinas’ concept of truth. Since De 
veritate was written prior to Summa theologiae one may conclude the arguments 
presented in Summa theologiae matured if not evolved and migrated away from the 
former work. According to Dewan De veritate contains errors that have been corrected in 
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Summa theologiae.306 The errors affect the outcome of the thesis. Following Dewan 
through the maze of his analytical metaphysical process lends significant illumination to 
my argument regarding the proper structure of the human soul. Bluntly put, the 
incongruence centers upon whether or not truth is part of the forming principle of the 
human soul. If not, then truth resides in things, which includes the human body which at 
separation becomes corruptible. I argue therefore that truth is part of the formation of 
the human soul; my understanding of Dewan’s analysis is that he concludes that Aquinas 
states it is not. 
As we advance though the analysis, I respectfully request that the reader retain 
the following four aspects of the thesis’ arguments. The first aspect regards the human 
soul, which at the time of its creation is in an intimate and unified relation with its 
Creator. The second aspect regards the Christ-soul and its relation to his corporeal body, 
which enjoys the original actuality of the Adamic soul, and, therefore was not affected by 
the added potency of the skin of the animal. Building on the latter, the third aspect 
suggests that Christ's soul did not include the haecceitic privation or separation from God. 
Finally, the fourth aspect builds on the second as well and regards the attribute of Jesus to 
acquire knowledge without turning to the phantasms.      
According to Dewan’s analysis, Aquinas himself grappled with the proper 
determination of truth. The question Thomas proposed in both his works is whether or 
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not truth resides in the being (ens) of things or in the mind. If truth resides in the thing 
then the question of how to identify the truth of the thing, since things are particulars and 
the truth to be understood is a universal, becomes front-and-center in the mindful 
conflict. If truth resides only in the mind, then perhaps we are dealing with Platonism. 
Citing Jacques Maritan, Lawrence Dewan records that the consensus of thinkers within 
Thomism understands truth to be inherent in the form of things since it is “related to the 
doctrine of the transcendental properties of being.”307 Aquinas’ account of truth as it is 
told in De veritate is that truth is “prior to and the cause of knowledge.” Truth, as the 
source of knowledge, is absent in the Summa theologiae which provides a clue that 
Thomas is downgrading the role of truth as part of a forming principle. Aquinas does 
assert that knowledge is a source of truth. Finally, Aquinas asserts that good is in the 
thing.308 Therefore the knowledge of the good is though the acquisition of the similitude 
of the thing by the intellective soul. Error, or sin, or evil, comes through the potency of the 
rational soul’s misalignment with the good of creation. Dewan cites Aquinas: 
“[...] the agreement of being with appetite is expressed by the word “good” 
  [...] the agreement of being with intellect is expressed by the word “true”” 
 
Dewan continues to interpret Aquinas by concluding that the appetitive soul tends 
towards things and the intellective soul tends towards truth. Dewan’s and Aquinas’ 
emphasis requires agreement between what is perceived and what is assimilated, since as 
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we have seen earlier,309 Aquinas’ cognition theories, to be coherent, require a similitude 
of what is known in the knower in the mode of the knower. The exactitude of the 
agreement is known as truth; an inexact relation is known as a falsity.  
The role of truth in the formation of the human soul as it is portrayed in the Christ-
soul function is critical to the success of the arguments in the thesis. The role of truth in 
my arguments is somewhat dissimilar to Thomas’ employment of truth. The following 
point is crucial. Thomas’ treatises on truth, whether in De veritate or the Summa 
theologiae point towards truth in the human composite’s relation with the created realm, 
or regarding Truth as it inheres in God. On the other hand I am interested in truth as it is 
employed in the divine creation of the human soul, the role truth plays in the formation of 
the human soul as a likeness of God, and, in reference to, or mensurate with Jesus as he is 
Truth.  
Let us summarize three of the arguments already presented in the thesis to arrive 
at some conclusion to the tensions presented above. The first argument rests on the 
biblical account of the creation and fall of humankind. Prior to the fall the first beings 
enjoyed a natural relation to God. The first humans were ignorant of the knowledge 
inherent in the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Metaphysically, their 
separation from God after the fall is an increase in potency due to the divinely imposed 
clothes of the skin of the animal. Finally, human existence is adversely impacted through 
this potency, not the forming principle of the human composite.  
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Thomas Aquinas asserts that being, truth and goodness are convertible. For 
human beings to gain knowledge requires an operation of acquisition either through the 
senses as asserted by Thomas or, as in the case of Jesus through a divine illumination due 
to a natural union of his un-fallen soul with God. God is Truth, One in Being and Goodness 
Himself. God understands, so-to-speak, all knowledge. But, He is not knowledge.  
Earlier in the thesis I presented the Augustinian notion of the power of memory 
and drew the conclusion that the quiddity of humanity resides in the suppositum of God. 
One may argue that the memory of what it is to be human or humanity’s quiddity is either 
knowledge, or being (ens) but not both. Now, God creates through the intentional act of 
His will. Thomism views creation as a terminus of the Triune God; it is an attribute of 
divine love to self-communicate. The most necessary terminus of God is for Him to 
express His goodness. His goodness is “spread abroad” through His intentional will.310 The 
created entity can only receive God’s goodness to the limit of its perfection, with the 
human soul of Jesus as the most perfect receptor. Within created things therefore, there 
is a potential for imperfection or badness. Inherent in the creation of the ordinary human 
being is more imperfection or metaphysically, more potency than there exists in Jesus. We 
read in Genesis 1:31 that for human beings the original level of goodness was very good, 
that is, “God saw all that He had made and it was very good.” With few exceptions, all 
human composites of soul and body since the fall, suffer through the body an added 
potency. To add this potency to the human signet-matter of the body necessitated a 
particular act to introduce very specific type of badness into human existence. The trap of 
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the Serpent was not to introduce badness into the good of creation, but to introduce 
falsity into the relation of the created human with the divine Creator. The role of the 
serpent was to weaken, if not destroy, the true.  
“As good has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge … 
the soul is in some manner all things. [And] […] as good adds to the being the 
notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.”311   
 
The Serpent set the trap by presenting the notion of what is desirable. The order of being 
is knowledge, the good, the true, which adds relation to the intellect, and, in the mind of 
God, in His Intellect, as the divine Artist, resides the plan or exemplar or memory of the 
quiddity of humanity, which He then wills into creation.  
The act of the Serpent, aided by humans, was designed to strike at the suppositum 
of God through the forming truth of the quiddity of humanity, the human soul, which is 
the first act of being for the human composite.   
“[…] the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum […] yet 
true is more closely related to being, which is prior, than is good.”312  
 
And, 
“in the order of things desirable [e.g., the knowledge of the tree of life] good 
stands as the universal, and the true as the particular [e.g., the union of the soul 
with God]; but in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case.”313 
 
Humanity’s complicity in the assault on God’s Being by the Serpent necessitated 
punishment through one of two means. The first punishment could have been directly on 
the soul “because the true is more closely related to being.”314 Punishment directed to 
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the soul could only be through the annihilation of the soul since existence, the soul’s first 
act, is prior to all other acts. The second punishment is directed to the mode of relation 
through which the soul interacts with Creator and created. Punishing by non-existence is 
evidently not the mode of punishment God choose. Therefore it is the latter punishment 
that remains as has been previously noted in the thesis. However, in God’s mercy there is 
a remedy. 
The remedy for the punishment is in the following words of Jesus:  
“I am the Way and the Truth and the Life […] If you really know me, you will know 
my Father as well.” (John 14:6, and, cited by Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 
Ia q. 16, a5 sed contra) 
 
Note the priority in Jesus’ message. The Way, the Truth and the Life are the means to 
know the Father. The order of the message is the reverse of Aristotle’s and Thomas’ order 
of being. Jesus is the terminus for humanity to know the Father. We see in Jesus’ message 
a direct countering to the Serpent’s assault and an illuminated path back to the Father. 
However, in what manner or mode of being was the earthly Jesus so fully aware of 
himself and others? 
 The true is comprehended in the metaphysical category of a universal and the 
good in the category of a particular. Ordinary human beings perceive and abstract the 
essence (universal) through the intellective soul’s powers of dividing and composing as 
has been shown in Chapter 2. I have clearly demonstrated that the ordinary human soul 
cannot break through the added potency of its signet-matter and therefore cannot be 
fully aware of the particular. I also demonstrated that Jesus did not taste of the fruit of 
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the tree of knowledge. Therefore he enjoys a different access to knowledge, an 
aphantasmal access to knowledge.  
“ […] knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings [animals, 
therefore the animal soul] in that the latter possess only their own form, while 
the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other 
thing; for the species [idea, concept+ of the thing known is in the knower.”315  
 
The essence of Jesus’ soul and soul’s of all human beings is to know God which is 
impossible through the natural and perceptive mode of the ordinary human cognition 
processes. The human rational soul primarily acquires knowledge through sensory 
perception, the phantasmal mode, which is the mode of the tree of knowledge. The 
ordinary human soul’s garment of the skin of the animal is specifically adapted to acquire 
knowledge through the natural order. However, Jesus’ rational soul has not been adapted 
to the fallen mode of perception to acquire knowledge and therefore knows through the 
forming principle of truth inherent in God. “… *A+n effect is conformed to the agent 
according to its form.”316 Jesus’ soul is aware of the particulars of the ordinary human soul 
through the soul’s natural structure of awareness and acquisition of knowledge through 
and of and from God.  
The human soul of Jesus enjoys the continued presence of the quiddity of his own 
nature by his human union with the suppositum of God, the very center of the attack of 
the Serpent. The absolute point of reference for Jesus’ purpose is the ‘true’.  
 “If you love me, keep my commands.  And I will ask the Father, and he will give 
you another advocate to help you and be with you forever— the Spirit of truth. 
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The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But 
you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you.” (emphasis added) 
 
My conclusion is that the human soul was designed to know Absolute Truth and not only 
the relative truth presently acquired through sensory perception.  What is the mechanism 
and structure of the human soul that provides for it to know Absolute truth and the true 
absolutely? 
Truth-exchange and the Christ-soul as the Causal Exemplar 
“[…] the closer the intellectual content of the principle is to the act of being, the 
stronger the truth it expresses.”317  
The above quotation attributes to Thomas Aquinas the notion that truth is an 
inherent principle in the human soul’s esse. Reflecting on the content of the previous 
section we may well apprehend that the created human soul is designed to enjoy a 
certain intimate union with its Creator. If we take a moment to contemplate the 
encounter Thomas the Apostle had with the risen Christ whereby he expressed, 
absolutely, “My Lord and my God”, (John 20:28) an Absolute Truth, perhaps there is some 
agreement with the claim that an inherent component or principle of the human soul is 
that of the true, or trueness.318 And perhaps there is some agreement that in order to 
communicate such truth, Christ communicated aphantasmically with Thomas.  In Thomas’ 
encounter with Christ, Thomas is entitatively subordinated to Jesus. Thomas’ very being is 
re-formed by the informing act of the Christ-soul Incarnated with the Word. What is the 
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metaphysical structure of Thomas the Apostle’s re-formation? Simply put, it is a truth-
exchange. Jesus is exchanging the place where the knowledge from the tree of knowledge 
of good and evil resides and exchanging it with the Spirit of truth.319 Let us examine how 
the truth-exchange might take place. 
Thomas the Apostle’s encounter with the Risen Christ is a spiritual relation. 
Anagogically one may conclude that the relation is similar to the relation the Christ-soul 
enjoys with his divine nature. As noted by the quotation at the beginning of the section, 
the truth content of a relation depends on its proximity to its act of being. The unity 
between the human soul of Jesus and the divine nature of the Word dictates perfectly 
ordered truth-content since the human soul of Jesus is united with the divine nature at 
the very being (esse) of the Christ-soul. In other words Jesus’ human intellect and His 
divine Intellect enjoy one could say a symbiotic relation; a relation that is beneficial to 
both natures. The human soul of Jesus enjoys to its fullest extent the divine Wisdom, 
Companionship and Love. The divine nature in return enjoys a visible exemplar in the 
personage of the Son who is able to be known by all creation in order that the terminus of 
the Father may be realized. There is a particularly intimate unity to this ontological being, 
that is, the signification of exemplar-unity,320 as the character of truth. In His wisdom God 
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 Referencing footnote 59 above the relation between the Son as Second Person of the Trinity and the son 
as son of humankind necessitates a unity as per the Chalcedon (451) dogma. Therefore the exemplar cause 
and the exemplar effect are in such similitude that there is a perfect relation or exemplar-unity between the 
two. The exemplar-unity describes the Chalcedon Definition unity in metaphysical terms. Further to the 




maintained the similitude of the divine intellect in the intellect of the created rational but 
fallen being: 
“And in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in 
the thing exemplified, or as in an image.”321 
Regarding the event with Thomas, Thomas’ soul is intimately joined to the Christ-soul 
through the instrumental yet causal power of the exemplar-unity character and Thomas’ 
soul is primed such that the falsity of the Serpent is replaced with the Spirit of truth at 
Pentecost. The falsity-truth exchange not only takes place in Thomas’ eternal soul, but in 
his soul’s relation to the Trinity as well.  
Earlier in the chapter several aspects of eternity and the relations between the 
Persons of the Trinity were presented. The notion of God the Creator as the Divine Artist 
and Exemplar Cause was introduced. Furthermore the unique reciprocating act of the Son 
to the Father has been well developed. Finally I have examined in detail the truth-relation 
the Christ-soul enjoys with Triune God. To conclude the chapter one final aspect to 
unpack is necessary. This unpacking regards a more complete understanding of the 
human soul of Jesus Christ as the instrumental causal exemplar.322 
My understanding of the personhood of the Triune God is such that each Person of 
the Trinity dominates within their Personhood. The Father creates, the Son is the Word 
and the Holy Spirit is the Bearer of Gifts. Each Person plays a role in the act of the 
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exemplar cause as well. Thomas Aquinas’ example of the signet-ring as a means to 
transfer from master to steward not only knowledge but also authority is particularly 
relevant. Also, the reciprocating principle as it is inherent in the Second Person of the 
Trinity plays an important role in the Truth-identity relation of the human soul to God.  A 
unique role of the Second Person of the Trinity is the reciprocating principle of identity 
and therefore truth. Jesus has claimed that he is “the Way, the Truth and the Life.”  
The human soul of Jesus, who is the exemplar of the divine Second Person, also 
enjoys the reciprocating principle of identity and truth, but in an instrumental causal 
exemplar mode. Aquinas teaches that there is only reciprocity between beings that are 
alike. Dewan, citing Aquinas, comments that “forms or natures … are seen as measures of 
creaturely participation in the divine nature.”323 The human soul functions in two modes 
of being. The first is as a principle, more exactly, a forming principle, which is interpreted 
as that which initiates the act of being. The second is the immediate terminus of the soul’s 
first act which is the human soul as the form of the human composite of body and soul. 
Aquinas proposes that there are two types of forms. The first is the universal form which 
relates to the divine will. The second is the particular form which causes the existence of 
the individual.324 It is the latter which is of interest at this moment.  
In the act of creation of the human soul and then the human composite, one can 
imagine the Creator, reaching into his suppositum, His very nature, and as the Divine 
Artist causing to come into existence the human soul. I propose that the rational soul’s 
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coming into existence consists of three parts. The first is its essence, stamped not only in 
the image and likeness of Himself, but also in the image of the Son, Who by reciprocating 
the very Being of the Divine Artist acknowledges not only the Paternity of the Father but 
the filial relation of humankind as well. The Son is the Exemplar of the Father and the 
human soul of Christ is stamped in the likeness not only of the Father but in the image of 
the Son Who reciprocates the Father’s communication of His Love through the Bearer of 
Gifts.  As such the Second Person and the human soul of Jesus through their unity 
personify the principle of reciprocation in generated and created beings. Continuing with 
the reciprocation theme, the second part of the human soul that is impacted is the truth-
relation it enjoys as part of its being (ens). Recall that the Serpent targeted the truth 
relation the original human soul enjoyed with God. The human soul of Jesus, the Christ-
soul, causes, through his own exemplar form, the reciprocation formation of the human 
soul. In creating the human soul the Creator employs the essence of what it is to be 
human which includes the exemplar of the human soul of Jesus who reciprocates the love 
of the Father. In other words the proper human soul enjoys an inherent ability to 
reciprocate the gift of creation of the Father as recorded in the Gospel of John. 
“After Jesus had spoken these words, he looked up to heaven and said: 
“Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son, so that the Son may glorify you, 
since you have given him authority over all people, to give eternal life to all 
whom you have given him.  And this is eternal life, that they may know you, 
the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent.”  (John 17: 1-3) 
 
The human act of reciprocating the gift of creation is to acknowledge the Father: “*i]n all 
your ways acknowledge him, and he will make straight your paths” (Proverbs 3:6) and to 
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love the other and oneself.325 Finally, through the Personhood of the Son and again in 
unity with his human nature, the ordinary human soul receives its identity principle, which 
is inherent to the soul through the unity it enjoys with the Creator while being created.  
The universal form of the human soul which is necessarily caused to exist by divine will, 
finds its individual identity in its relation with Truth which is convertible to the good and 
to being (ens) through the prayerful incantations of Jesus to his heavenly Father.   
“They do not belong to the world, just as I do not belong to the world. Sanctify 
them in the truth; your word is truth. As you have sent me into the world, so I 
have sent them into the world. And for their sakes I sanctify myself, so that they 
may be sanctified in truth.  
I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in 
me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me, and I 
am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you sent me. 
The glory that you have given me, I have given them, so that they may be one, as 
we are one, I in them, and you in me, that they may become completely one, so 
that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them, even as 
you have loved me. Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, 
may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which you have given me because 
you loved me before the foundation of the world. Righteous Father, the world 
does not know you, but I know you; and these know that you have sent me. I 
made your name known to them, and will make it known, so that the love with 
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I have attempted to provide a metaphysical and ontological speculation of the 
ordinary human soul as illuminated by the human soul of Jesus Christ. The main 
difficulties within the thesis were to arrive at plausible modes of comparison between 
corporeity and eternity; between natural being and intentional being, and, defining the 
role of the human soul of Jesus Christ in the act of creation of the ordinary human soul.  
The foundation of the thesis is three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the notion 
of added or hypo-potency imparted to the body/soul composite by God as the clothes of 
the flesh of the animal which is apprehended as a second overriding layer of potency, that 
is, the animal matter layer overrides the original signet-matter of the human body.  
The second hypothesis concerns the first. The consequences of original sin reduce 
the proper awareness and truth acquisition the original human soul once enjoyed. One 
aspect of lowered awareness requires thinkers to invocate the haecceitic principle as a 
metaphysical principle for individuation. Furthermore, the aspect of lowered truth 
acquisition powers required the employment of the phantasms for the ordinary human 
soul to perceive the world.  
The third hypothesis regards the human soul of Jesus Christ. The thesis concurs 
with the Chalcedon (451) dogma that the human soul of Jesus is in an essential unity with 
the divine nature of the Second Person of the Trinity. From these three hypotheses I 
formulated three claims.  
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The first claim regards the ahaecceitic nature of Jesus Christ. Haecceitism is the 
individuating principle termed by scholastic scholars to explain the ‘thisness’ of entities. 
Because of Jesus’ human soul’s natural communion with the Trinity, he defines his 
individuality through the intentional act of his personage.  
The second claim is that the human soul of Jesus acquires knowledge without 
necessarily employing the phantasms. In other words the human soul is created, through 
its relation with the Trinity, to acquire knowledge through the spiritual/intentional order 
of reality. In contrast the sinful human soul acquires knowledge primarily through the 
natural order and therefore necessarily employs the phantasms.  
The third claim regards the unity of beings. Thomas Aquinas asserted that two 
beings fully in act cannot form an essential unity which may be interpreted as contrary to 
the Chalcedon formula regarding the two natures of Jesus Christ unified as one person. 
Through metaphysical rationale I extended the divine-human essential unity notion to 
include the ordinary human soul without yielding another God-person.  
The metaphysical genre and general arguments of the thesis, an overview of the 
main structure of the human soul and its metaphysical construction blocks were 
presented. The metaphysical understanding of the thesis’ biblical foundations that rest on 
particular aspects of Genesis 1 and Genesis 3 were developed.  A metaphysical foundation 
was prepared that provided an understanding between the natural and intentional order 
of being, and, I related these concepts to the modern notion of de re and de dictum 
modes of reality. Inherent in the modes of reality are the distinctions between the Christ-
soul’s awareness and the ordinary human soul’s awareness of the temporal and eternal 
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realms. Then I re-interpret the Thomistic notion that it is matter that individuates by 
proposing that, with regards to the original or proper human soul, it is the relation of the 
human soul to God that identifies its personage.  
We saw in Chapter 2 a detailed examination of the ordinary human soul’s 
metaphysical construction, its source in the suppositum of God and its fall due to original 
sin. I then presented my interpretation of the metaphysical structure of original sin as a 
trap by the Serpent on the truth (sic) nature of the human soul. I continued on the 
metaphysical theme to provide an understanding of the ordinary human soul’s relation 
with the Triune God.   
I then presented the triptych of metaphysical relations inherent in the Incarnated 
Word with regards to his human nature, the Trinity and the ordinary human soul.  
In the latter sections of Chapter 3, we saw, from an ontological speculation 
perspective, a comparison of the ordinary human soul against the ideal of the human soul 
of Jesus Christ. In order to substantiate the human-soul-Christ-soul relation I 
demonstrated that the Second Person of the Trinity is the unique principle of 
reciprocation since it is he alone who acknowledges His personhood to the Father as Son. 
I then concluded that the Son’s principle of reciprocation is employed as a divine 
exemplar cause who transcribes His attributes to the human soul of Jesus Christ, who in 
turn is the instrumental exemplar in the act of creation of the ordinary human soul. I then 
provided a fresh and innovative metaphysical formula that describes the relation between 
the human soul of Christ, his divine nature and the role both his divine and human 
natures played in the creation of the human soul. I term this relation an ‘exemplar-unity’.  
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I also concluded that the trap of the Serpent was an attack at the nature of God 
through the essence of the human soul that is grounded in the suppositum of God. The 
consequence of this attack is that humankind lost the right to enjoy a true perspective of 
the created order and a natural communion with God.  I then argued that the human soul 
of Jesus did not taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge and therefore acquires 
knowledge aphantasmally. Finally, I claim that a possible salvation-mode for humanity is 
via the mode of a relation with the Christ-soul as an exemplar-unity that forms an 
ontological being between the Christ human soul and the ordinary human soul.  
I conclude by stating that the human soul of Christ, unified with his divine person, 
is the ordinary human soul’s measure, its, canonicity, its formal unity with the Triune God 














                                                     
326
 The official definition holds that the Body of Christ are “members of the Church [who] are bound 
together by a supernatural life communicated to them by Christ through the sacraments.” 




Primary Sources   
Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. Translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. 
and Sylvester Humphries, O.P. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. html edition 
by Joseph Kenny, O.P. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeAnima.htm#11. 
 
---. Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Translated by Fabian Larcher, O.P. 
Html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm#111. 
 
---. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Translated as On the Uniqueness of Intellect 
Against Averroists by  www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8246/  
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeUnitateIntellectus.htm. 
 
---. On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia.) Translated by Robert T. Miller. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-esse.html. 
 
---. Quaestiones Disputate de Anima. Translated by John Patrick Rowan. St. Louis & 
London: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Html edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P.   
 
---. The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Editor in Chief Robert M. Hutchins 
Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Chicago: Great Books of 
the Western World, V. 20, 21 Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952.  
 
Augustine of Hippo. The  Confessions. Editor in Chief Robert M. Hutchins. Translated by 
Edward B. Pusey. Chicago: Great Books of the Western World, vol. 18, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Inc., 1952. 
 
Ghent, Henry of. “Can a Human Being Know Anything without Divine Illumination?” In The 
Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts Vol. 3. Edited by Robert 
Pasnau.  94-95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Origen. “On Prayer.” The Liturgy of the Hours v. IV. New York: Catholic Book Publishing 
Corporation, 1975: 577. 
 
Philo of Alexandria. De Abrahamo 
---. Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat 
---. Legum Allegoriarum 
 
Philoponus, John. On Aristotle’s On the Soul 1.3-5. Translated by Philip J. van der Eijk. 




Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. Of Being and Unity (De Ente et Uno.) Edited by Joseph H. 
Peterson, 2001. Translated by Victor Michael Hamm. 
http://www.esotericarchives.com/pico/beinguni.htm 
 
 Secondary Sources 
Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Original Sin: A Study in the Interaction of Philosophy and 
Theology.” In A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology, edited by Oliver 
Crisp, 229-253. New York: T&T Clark, 2009. 
 
Adler, Mortimer. “Immateriality and Intentionality.” The New Scholasticism, vol. 41, no. 2. 
(Spring 1967): 312-344. 
 
Barnes, Jonathan. “Anima Christiana.” In Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, edited by 
Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, 447-464. New York: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & 
Co., 2009. 
Bobrinskoy, Boris. The Mystery of the Trinity Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the 
Biblical and Patristic Tradition. Translated by Anthony P. Gythiel. Crestwood, New 
York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999. 
 




Caston, Victor. “Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception.” In Metaphysics, Soul, and 
Ethics in Ancient Thought Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji. Edited by 
Ricardo Salles. 254. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Cieśluk, Andrzej. “De Re/De Dicto Distinctions (Syntactic, Semantic and Pragmatic 
Interpretation).” Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 22, 35, (2010): 81-94. 
 
Clarke, W. Norris, S. J. The Compatibility of Receptivity and Pure Act: Reply to Steven Long. 
http://www.anthonyflood.com/clarkereceptivitypureact.htm 
 
Cohen, Sheldon M. “St. Thomas Aquinas: On the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms.” 
The Philosophical Review, XCI, no. 2 (April 1982): 193-209. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184626. 
 
Cross, Richard. The Metaphysics of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002. 
Davidson, Ivor. “Not My Will but Yours be Done: The Ontological Dynamics of 
Incarnational Intention.” International Journal of Systematic Theology. 7:2 (April 
2005): 178 – 204. 
196 
 
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. “Is Truth a Transcendental for St. Thomas Aquinas?” Nova et 
Vetera. English Edition, vol. 2, no. 1 (2004): 1-20. 
---. St. Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things. Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 2007. 
Doolan, Gregory. Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes. Washington, DC: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008. 
Elders, Leo. The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 
1990. 
Gonzales, Orestes J. “The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas.” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVII no. 4 (1994): 475-500. 
 
Grillmeier, Aloys, S.J. Christ in Christian Tradition: From Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451). 
Translated by John Bowden.  Atlanta USA: John Knox Press, 1975. 
Hart, Charles A. Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing. Englewood 
Cliffs N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. 
Hillary, Marion. Philo of Alexandria, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (updated April 
21, 2005). http://www.iep.utm.edu/philo/. 
Hölscher, Ludger. Reality of the Mind: Augustine’s Philosophical Arguments for the Human 
Soul as a Spiritual Substance. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 
Jean Paul II, Pope. Real Significance of Original Nakedness General Audience of 14 May 
1980. http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp2tb26.htm. 
 
Kenny, Anthony. The Anatomy of the Soul: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of the Mind. 
Bristol: Basil Blackwell Western Printing Services Ltd., 1973. 
 
---. Aquinas on Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.  
 
---. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. 
 
Klima, Gyula. Thomas of Sutton on the Nature of the Intellective Soul and the Thomistic 
Theory of Being: http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/TS.htm. 
 
LaPorte, Jean. Eucharistia in Philo Lewiston, New York: USA: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
1983. 
 
Lee, Richard. “The Analogies of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas.” Thomist; a Speculative 
Quarterly Review, 58:3 (July 1994): 471-488.  
 
MacTaggart, John Ellis. “The Relation of Time and Eternity.” Mind, New Series, vol. 18, no. 




McCabe, Mary Margaret. Plato’s Individuals. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Otte, Klaus. “Speculative Theology.” In The Encyclopedia of Christianity Vol. 5, edited by 
Erwin Fahlbusch and Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 149-150. Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2008.  
Pasnau, Robert. “Cognition.” In The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, edited by 
Thomas Williams, 285-311. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
 
Phillips, R. P. Modern Thomistic Philosophy, v. 1; v. 2. London: Burns, Oates & 
Washbourne Ltd., 1934. 
 
Rahner, Karl. Spirit in the World. Translated by William Dych. Dorval QC: Palm Publishers,   
1968. 
 
Riches, Aaron. “After Chalcedon: The Oneness of Christ and the Dyothelite Mediation of 
His Theandric Unity.” Modern Theology 24:2 (April 2008): 199-224. 
 
Runia, David T. Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. 
Brill, 1986. 
 
Schule, Andreas. “Transformed into the Image of Christ: Identity, Personality, and 
Resurrection.” In Resurrection, Theological and Scientific Assessments, edited by 
Peters, Ted, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, 219-235. Michigan: WM. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Welch, Lawrence J. Christology and Eucharist in the Early Thought of Cyril of Alexandria.  
San Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1994.  
 
Wippel, John F. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to 
Uncreated Being. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000. 
 
---. The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fountaines: A Study in Late-Thirteenth 
Century Philosophy. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981. 
 
---. “Truth in Thomas Aquinas.” Review of Metaphysics, 43:2 (December 1989): 295-326. 
 





The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, Audi, Robert. ed., s.v. “Soul.” 




The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 9th edition, Thompson, Della. ed., s.v. 
“Soul.” Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
 
Klinger, Elmar. Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, 1975 edition, 
Karl Rahner. ed., s.v. “Soul.” New York: The Seabury Press, 1975. 
 
The New Oxford Annotated Bible. 3rd edition. College Edition. Michael. D Coogan. ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
 
